Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Cultures
Polish Academy of Sciences

Hemispheres
Studies on Cultures and Societies
Vol. 32

Contents

Book Review

Olga Barbasiewicz[*]

Aiming at Reconciliation. Political Leaders, Post-war *Lieux de Mémoire*, and the Memory Work (*Travail de Mémoire*) in the Context of the Alliance Between Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea Until the End of Barack Obama's Presidency

Abstract

The main aim of this article is to analyze the process of reconciliation between Japan and the United States, assuming that these countries have dealt with their past and the memory work, and to show the influence of this reconciliation onto relations in the region. This article argues that contemporary political leaders of Japan have accepted the post-war reconciliation with the U.S., and based on this experience they try to set a certain position in the triangular alliance, shaping the balance of power in East Asia. The emphasis is put on the 'reconciliation game' as a part of the political actions undertaken by Japanese and American political leaders. I claim that in case of both countries' relations, the bilateral memory work was done in 2016 and all the potential, up-coming demands will be from now on a debate over a completed issue.

Introduction

Celebrations of the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II draw the attention of the international community towards East Asia. From the beginning of 2015, Japan was preparing celebrations of this anniversary. Japanese participation in the war is often, especially in the Western world, associated with the Pearl Harbor attack or with dropping the atomic bombs onto Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Those two events frequently overshadow Japanese-American relations. Nevertheless, in 2015 we could have observed that the process of reconciliation between Japan and the U.S. was coming to the end, or could even be considered as completed. It can be called a 'mutual amnesia' or a will to overshadow the past with a strong determination of bilateral cooperation to strengthen and stabilize the importance of the two countries in the region. This hypothesis can be compared to the statements given from Friedrich Nietzsche to Henry Kissinger, arguing that amnesty and forgetting are the only ways to ensure peace.[1]

Therefore, the main aim of this article is to analyze the process of reconciliation between Japan and the U.S., assuming that these countries have dealt with their past and the memory work (*travail de mémoire*) – a term provided by Paul Ricoeur, and to show the influence of this reconciliation onto relations in the region, especially onto the Japanese-American-Korean relations.

The problem of reconciliation and its influence onto the contemporary relations in East Asia is frequently undertaken by political scientists. The concept of history and memory as the international relations theory in the Asia and Pacific was introduced by G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, especially taking into consideration Japanese elites who found their solution in overcoming the problem of war memory and reconciliation by evaluating the peace constitution, but also by subordinating Japan's military to the U.S.-Japan alliance to lower the level

---

* Assistant professor at the Institute of the Middle and Far East, Jagiellonian University, e-mail: olga.barbasiewicz@uj.edu.pl.
[1] Jeffrey K. Olick, *The Politics of Regret. On Collective Memory and Historical Responsibility*, New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 124.

_____

of regional animosity.[2] Moreover, Victor D. Cha claims, that historical anger is critical in the Japanese-Korean relations, but considers the salience of "patron commitment" in regards to the alliance of both countries with the U.S., that underlies the three states' triangular alliance dynamics.[3]

Nonetheless, the paper introduces a new approach. This article argues that contemporary political leaders of Japan have accepted the postwar reconciliation with the U.S., and basing on this experience they try to set a certain position in the triangular alliance shaping the balance of power in East Asia. To test this hypothesis, several research questions should be answered. First: does the war memory affects the triangular alliance in East Asia, and in which way? Second: what is the mile stone in the Japanese-American reconciliation process, and how this process affects the triangular alliance in East Asia? Third: how can the theory of memory work by Ricoeur be applied in the international relations in Asia-Pacific region?

Due to the changing balance of power in the Far East, and the growing position of the People's Republic of China, the U.S. seeks to maintain its influence in the region also by acting through its allies, including Japan. By showing a great alliance and partnership with Japan, the U.S. is trying to counter balance the power of China in the Far East. Still, there is always the memory of the American occupation of Japan and the impact the Western superpower of the post-war era had in the Country of the Rising Sun. However, according to the realist theory in international relations and memory studies, nations are able to reconcile in case of an external threat that makes the global position of both parties insecure.[4] So, the question arises whether the time of the American supremacy has influenced the current relations between the two countries? Then, does the memory affect the Japanese-American relations and in which way?

Regarding the places of remembrance, it should be emphasized that they can be both tangible and intangible creations and their content, in spite of direct references the World War II, is also the result of the 'living' memory of those events. We can take into consideration the most important according to Japanese and American narratives places of remembrance. These are Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima/Nagasaki creating a certain bracket of events which are the symbol of the Japanese-American conflict. Going further we can refer to professor Carol Gluck's statement that the Japanese ignore everything before Hiroshima and the Americans ignore everything after Nagasaki.[5] It may become a starting point for the analysis which focuses on the perception of memorials (places of remembrance), such as Hiroshima/Nagasaki and Pearl Harbor, by the leading political actors and the influence of the perception onto the reconciliation processes between the U.S. and Japan with respect to the security concerns in East Asia in the 21st century. Nevertheless, the reelection of Abe Shinzō as Japan's Prime Minister could potentially bring an end

---

[2] C. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2003, p. 12.

[3] Victor D. Cha, 'Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: the United States, Japan, and Korea', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2000, p. 263.

[4] Yinan He, *The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II*, New York, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 3.

[5] Isaak Chotiner, 'How Japan and the U.S. Remember World War II', 11 May 2016, http://www.slate.com /articles/news_and_politics/interrogation/2016/05/the_u_s_and_japan_have_very_different_memories_of_world_war_ii .html (accessed 5 July 2016).

to the period of multilateral and regional policy that were out of the realist-pragmatist control regarding the historical memory issues.[6]

The article delivers an evaluation of the primary existing sources. While analyzing the contemporary Japanese and American policymakers' actions, their speeches and statements were taken into consideration. A context analysis will be the crucial one in this case. For providing a broader analysis, the surveys, academic papers, and newspapers articles were also used.

In the first part of this paper the theory of realms of memory will be provided to give the background for the further decision-making processes in Japan. Two most important decision makers on the Japanese side will be analyzed: the pre-war political actor which is the Emperor and the postwar one – the Prime Minister (PM). The first actor can be also considered as a specific realm of memory according to the Pierre Nora's theory. The second one is directly and indirectly the reconciliation processes' creator. The analysis of these issues will be aiming to present the places of remembrance and reconciliation theory in the context of the East Asian – American allies.

Memory and places of remembrance (realms of memory) in the context of International Relations and Political Science

Historians were the first to focus on memory, to distinguish memory and history at the level of definition – with memory referring to all present forms of things from the past.[7] Although the forerunner of the research on memory in a social context was a French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, the 'boom' in memory studies in Europe can be dated to the 1970s and the time his being recalled for a wider audience.

Pierre Nora, a French historian in the 1970s, promoted the theory of *lieux de mémoire*: places of remembrance (realms of memory). He argued that criticism of official versions of national history contributed to the coming of time of remembering, as well as the cult of memories and roots. Previously it was possible to imagine a future in three forms: the restoration of the past, progress or revolution.[8] Currently, one can observe the uncertainty of the shape of the future which overlaps the present. Society itself imposed a duty of memory – we want to collect material creations that have become our property in the past and may in the future be a testament to our existence. Hence, the word "history" has been replaced by the word "memory" – it is general and all-encompassing.

For a deeper analysis of policymakers decisions regarding the certain *lieux de mémoire*, the realist approach toward the reconciliation policy can be taken into consideration. In this case we can refer to the thesis that states in an anarchic world, in which the self-help principle stimulates reasonable security policies and in which cooperation is a rare phenomenon, develop good collaboration in cases of an external threat, as a balance against it and often forgetting about past

---

[6] Kazuhiko Togo, 'Japanese Foreign Policy: Abe II and Beyond: With a Future Perspective of Japan-Korea Relations', in *Japanese and Korean Politics. Alone and Apart from Each Other*, Takashi Inoguchi (ed.), New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 200.

[7] Marie-Claire Lavabre, 'Miejsca pamięci, praca pamięci i ramy pamięci – trzy perspektywy badawcze we Francji' [Places of Memory, Work of Memory, and Memory Frames – Three Research Perspectives in France], *French Memory Studies Seminar*, Warsaw, 20 October 2012.

[8] Ibid., p. 39.

resentments.[9] Moreover, we can analyze the issue in the view of the memory work (*travail de mémoire*) concept, developed by Paul Ricoeur in the 1990s, when memory was moved from psychoanalysis to social sciences. The philosopher proposed the concept of completed memory to obtain closure and to start building a good relationship. When the memory work is 'done', new common goals can be fulfilled. Taking into consideration the theory of the memory work, we can proceed to the decision-making approach in international relations, to show how the key-actors of the political scene in Japan and the U.S. aimed at the reconciliation in the context of reinforcing the alliance in the time of a growing threat from China and North Korea, namely at the beginning of 21st century.

Therefore, because the policy toward and conducted through certain places of remembrance frequently requires decisions of the competent authorities in order to be established, it is difficult to talk about independence of contemporary national memory from political decisions. Consequently, also in the case of places of remembrance, they are often subjected to interpretation by the entity/entities that are in power. So before taking up the discussion on the impact of individual memory locations on the policy of the country, we should look at decision-makers who shape it.

The alliance between the U.S. and their Asian partners, namely Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), can be defined as a triangular alliance, as it was done in the introduction to this paper. Nevertheless, researchers developed a new term to define these relations – a "quasi alliance", implicating a situation when two states stay non-allied but have a third power as a shared ally.[10] In this case, there is a basis on which the neorealist (structural realist) approach of international relations could be implemented, according to which an external threat might integrate countries in order to face it. Nevertheless, in Asia-Pacific region, particularly Japan, the U.S., and ROK, it is doubtful if the full implementation of the realist approach actually does take place, therefore the historical approach can be taken into consideration. While European countries set numerous institutions to establish peace and political order in the continent, Asian postwar legacy seems to have as a baseline the historical disputes, shaping their daily, political resentments.

Since researchers claim the lack of international institutions in Asia, which rather means that the region does not promote international institutions than the regional institutions do not promote stability[11], the liberal approach to the international relations in Asia-Pacific region does not seem to work on the international level. Nevertheless, the local and national institutions' analysis is very important to check the attitude of the Japanese towards the reconciliation and cooperation with the United States. Therefore, the institutional analysis on the national level seems to be helpful.

Policymakers in the Japanese foreign policy and politics of memory

Pierre Nora has put in the category of symbolic places of remembrance all tangible and intangible formations which derive from collective identity. These include the emblem, the celebration of national holidays and anniversaries as well as the national symbols. Their themes are often mutually intertwined and politicians are highly involved in their interpretation. All of these places of remembrance, important to the Japanese people, have been restored by the

---

[9] He, *The Search for Reconciliation…*, p. 3.
[10] Cha, 'Abandonment…', p. 261.
[11] Ikenberry and Mastanduno, *International Relations…*, p. 13.

respective prime ministers who were the members of the dominant party in Japan – the Liberal Democratic Party.[12]

The importance of the government bureaucracy in Japan is huge compared with other democratic countries, because of the degree of controlling citizens and institutions. Japanese state bureaucracy regulates more than 10 000 areas of economic activity which represent around 40% of the GDP.[13] Since 1945 this power is of utmost importance in the decision-making process in the government of Japan.[14] Due to the many controversies that were provoked by actions and influence of the bureaucracy, in 2001 it was decided to reorganize the Japanese government, dissolving the bureaucratic structures existing since the American occupation This was primarily aimed at increasing the powers of the prime minister and his cabinet.[15]

The importance of local and national authorities is also crucial. First, ones cannot take many important decisions (including financial – often related to taxes) without permission and control 'from above'. At the same time state authorities may delegate its members to local authorities to gain more control in certain departments. For example, the activity of local authorities is important in the process of analyzing created places of remembrance in Okinawa. It was the case of this prefecture that local authorities were decision-makers concerning issues shaping the monuments and memorials associated with the battle waged on the territory of the islands in 1945. The process of political decision-making is also distinctive for actions in foreign policy where various bodies were responsible for the foreign policy of Japan. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs could serve as an example in which – despite taking up different positions on trade policy with the United States – the Department for Economic Affairs and the Department for North America present a common position outside, working to preserve the good name of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[16]

The postwar political system in Japan has strengthened the prime minister, also in foreign policy issues. This enabled strong individuals to play a kind of "one-man show".[17] However, this type of individual actions were undertaken only by prime ministers Yoshida Shigeru and Nakasone Yasuhiro. Diplomatic efforts at the time of their office relied on the decisions taken by the prime minister and the acceptance of it by the minister of foreign affairs.[18] In case of the other heads of government during the Cold War, they were originators in foreign policy issues, leaving the government – consisting mainly of members of the Liberal Democratic Party – taking specific decisions.[19] Currently, the leader's position is taken by Abe Shinzō who has become a major player in connecting the memory policy and international politics.

---

[12] Eddy Dufourmont, 'Satō Eisaku, 'Yasuoka Masahiro and Re-establishment of 11 February as National Day: The Political Use of National Memory in Post-war Japan', in *The Power of Memory in Modern Japan*, Sven Saaler and Wolfgang Schwentker (eds), Kent: Global Oriental Ltd., 2008, p. 204.

[13] Yoshio Sugimoto, *An Introduction to Japanese Society,* Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 214.

[14] James A.A. Stockwin, *Dictionary of Modern Politics of Japan*, London, New York: Rutledge, 2003, p. 22.

[15] Ibid., p. 25

[16] Takao Sebata, *Japan's Defense Policy and Bureaucratic Politics: 1976–2007*, Maryland: United Press of America, 2010, p. 17.

[17] Shizuo Seki, *Nihon gaikō no kijiku to tenkai* [Basics and Development of Japanese Foreign Policy], Kyoto: Minerva Shobo Co., 1990, p. 18.

[18] Ibidem.

[19] Ibidem.

_____

Abe Shinzō and Barack Obama's memory work (*travail de mémoire*)

The Japanese prime minister, Abe Shinzō, is often considered as a politician whose foreign policy is described as 'hawkish'. Hee Cheol Park from Seoul National University claims that the activities of the current prime minister may irritate the closest ally of Japan – the United States[20]. Park mentioned among others the failure in respecting by the new Japanese government the U.S. standards and values that have been implemented in Japan after World War II. However, it was believed during his first office that "Japan, rather than directly facing Asia, would switch its national priority to focus on the U.S.".[21]

The prime minister's speech given in the American Congress during a joint meeting can be considered as a certain memory work (*travail de mémoire*). The event took place in April 2015 and the whole address was titled *Toward an Alliance of Hope*. During this statement Abe Shinzō said the most significant words regarding war memory from the perspective of Japan. "History is harsh. What is done cannot be undone".[22] It can be considered as an ultimate emphasizing of the role of Japan during the war and directing Japanese-American cooperation on new tracks, separating the memory of the war with a thick line from the current alliance between those two countries. Therefore, this chapter's aim is to analyze (through the PM Abe's speech) the process of memory work between Japan and the U.S., and American allies in East Asia, mainly the Republic of Korea.

Only if we look at the introduction of the Abe's speech in Congress, we are able to find the references towards the American influence onto the Japanese post-war generation. The Japanese prime minister recalls his stay in the U.S. during his university education and mentions the big influence the American culture had on him. It is illustrated by Abe's behavior considered by an 'old guard in his party' as a cheeky one. This shows the difference between the pre-war and post-war generations, the misunderstanding between them, and the pro-American way of thinking of Japanese people born after war.

In his talk, the Japanese prime minister mentions his visit to the American place of remembrance – World War II Memorial, which is an important place of remembrance for Americans. He recalls the locations in which different battles took place and offers "with profound respect eternal condolences to the souls of all American people that were lost during World War II".[23] Whether the certain place of remembrance brought to his mind the terrible history of the conflict between Japan and the U.S., or his apologies could be considered as deep and true in a connection to such a meaningful monument, one thing can be true: places of remembrance make people evoke deeper feelings and their narrative definitely has an influence onto the perception of past events.

In congress, Abe recalled the efforts of reconciliation provided by American citizens. The gesture of friendship and respect between Lt. Gen. Lawrence Snowden, taking part in the Battle of Iwo Jima, and Japanese Diet Member Shindō Yoshitaka, whose grandfather, General Kuribayashi Tadamichi, was the commander of the Japanese garrison during the Battle of Iwo Jima,

_____

[20] Cheol Hee Park, 'The Double Life of Shinzo Abe', *Global Asia*, Vol. 8, No. 2, Summer 2013, p. 82.

[21] Gilbert Rozman and Shin-wha Lee, 'Unraveling the Japan-South Korea in "Virtual Alliance": Populism and Historical Revisionism in the Face of Conflicting Regional Strategies', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 46, No. 5, September/October 2006, p. 763.

[22] *Toward an Alliance of Hope*, Address to a Joint Meeting of the U.S. Congress by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201504/uscongress.html (accessed 5 July 2016).

[23] Ibidem.

show that both countries paid a great deal of attention to bring friendship and forgiveness among their citizens to cope with war memory.

What can be extremely important for the reconciliation, but also for the alliance in the Far East, is paying the attention towards the suffering of other Asian nations during the war which – in the words of the Japanese prime minister – was the fault of Japan. In the time of neglecting the Japanese remorse for the committed crimes towards other Asian nations, the Prime Minister of Japan claims that Japan must not avert its eyes from the fact of hurting other nations. He also informed about upholding the views expressed by the previous prime ministers in this regard, not mentioning if he refers to the Murayama Statement[24] or other declarations made by Japanese PMs. These words can be compared to all his previous statement, which made him seen as a 'political hawk' or a leader that does not recognize Japanese war crimes. It was during his first office when he denied that the Japanese military was guilty of the women's coercion or that the agents, not the military itself, had coerced the women.[25] Nevertheless, the words expressed towards the East Asian countries were necessary, also because of the American support for building the positive relations between Japan and its eastern neighbors. It was still the case of the first office of Abe when the Bush administration supported the incoming PM's initial visits to China and South Korea in October 2006, braking the tradition in which the Japanese PMs generally would travel first to the United States.[26]

One year later the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution H. Res. 121, criticizing Japan for not apologizing for forcing women in Asia and Pacific to sexual slavery during the war occupation. In this statement it is claimed that the Japanese Government "should formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility in a clear and unequivocal manner for its Imperial Armed Forces' coercion of young women into sexual slavery, known to the world as comfort women, during its colonial and wartime occupation of Asia and the Pacific Islands from the 1930s through the duration of World War II".[27] In the Japanese response to this resolution, Abe confirmed that he will stay by the statement, but in the same year his government released a study that examined the Kono Statement (1993) concluding that it was prepared in consultation with Seoul and suggesting that it was not based only on historical evidence.[28]

The analysis above shows that Americans use the power of reconciliation for strengthening the Japanese-American alliance but also pay a huge attention towards the Japanese reconciliation with their East Asian allies. As the H. Res. 121 shows, the problem is broadly seen not only by Asians but also the U.S. citizens, in this case the Japanese Americans (congressman Michael Honda presented this resolution in January 2014), who are aware of the problem of war memory

---

[24] Ibidem.

[25] Hirofumi Hayashi, 'Disputes in Japan over the Japanese Military "Comfort Women" System and Its Perception in History', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 617, May 2008, p. 123–124.

[26] Robert Sutter, 'The United States and Asia in 2006: Crisis Management, Holding Patterns, and Secondary Initiatives', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 47, No. 1, January/February 2007, p. 17.

[27] H. Res. 121 (110th): A resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the Government of Japan should formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility in a clear and unequivocal manner for its Imperial Armed Forces' coercion of young women into sexual slavery, known as "comfort women", during its colonial and wartime occupation of Asia and the Pacific Islands from the 1930s through the duration of World War II. See: https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hres121/text/eh#link=1_~T1&nearest=HAA354776169E477CB 706004B97058339 (accessed 1 August 2016).

[28] Emma Chanlett-Avery, *Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress*, Washington: Congressional Research Service, 29 September 2015.

among American allies. This makes the memory work (*travail de mémoire*) also visible between Japan and ROK, but in this case it is a forced reconciliation, imposed by the global power and the situation in the region. The question of the circumstances of the memory work can be doubtful, but the effects and durability of this work are crucial. It must be remembered that the Japanese-American rapprochement was the outcome of the American occupation's policy, but the circumstances made it extremely strong and undeniable after few years.

For Abe the leading role of Japan as a peace promoter and guarantor of regional prosperity is obvious. According to the Japanese PM, the prosperity provided firstly by the U.S. and then by Japan is the key to promote the peace in East Asia. Therefore, those two countries have to take the leadership in the region and it is their role to establish the strong Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). The only thing is if the other American allies will accept this role and agree on Japan to be the leader of these partnership. Their role can be easily deduced since i.e. in Abe's address, the Republic of Korea was described not as a partner, but joint to the pillar, which is the Japanese-American alliance. ROK is also a country which society do not trusts the Japanese PM. In the Pew Research survey from 2014 only 5% Korean respondents said they trust in Abe's global policy.[29] The attitude among Koreans remained then almost the same as in 2007. That leaves Abe's statements not efficient unless expressed in form of direct apologizes and remorse.

Moreover, spending on the American troops stationed in East Asia, was the issue raising controversies, also in regards to Abe's idea of Trans Pacific Partnership during the Obama's presidency. Korea, that according to Abe's words, was going to be a partner of the Japanese-American pillar, spends more than Japan on the American troops. Data shows that Seoul pays about ¾ of the expenses associated with the U.S. troops in Korea, amounting to .08% of Korean gross domestic product (GDP), which can be compared to the .05 of GDP that Japan spends on American troops in Japan.[30] This case can serve as an example that because of the differences in the U.S. allies' treatment and establishing the pillar of regional cooperation and leadership in which the ROK plays only an additional role (in the regional leadership concept), the Korean objection can became even stronger. It may lead to the failure of reconciliation processes. Nevertheless, Donald's Trump cancellation of the TPP negotiations is not an argument for bringing the position of Japan and Korea in trilateral, equal partnership with the United States. New potential agreement between Japan and the US might turn out to be a help or a hindrance to reconciliation processes in East Asia.

Therefore, two conditions must occur to achieve the unconditioned memory work. The first is the regional situation and the need to balance to rising power of China which is also important for Korea. The second one would be the need of overcoming the historical disputes as a common factor for all allies to achieve a solid and trustworthy alliance in the region. Nonetheless, all allies have to feel they are equal partners – not just an addition toward more powerful alliance.

---

[29] Pew Research Center, *Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and Drones, but Limited Harm to America's Image*, http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/chapter-4-how-asians-view-each-other/ (accessed 1 August 2016).

[30] Frances Rosenbluth, Jun Saito, and Annalisa Zinn, 'America's Policy toward East Asia: How It Looks from Japan', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 47, No. 4, July/August 2007, p. 586.

Places of remembrance (*lieux de mémoire*) as a background for summaries of Abe and Obama's memory work (*travail de mémoire*)

In 2016 two significant events took place in Japan and the United States. Obama and Abe, heads of states, visited Hiroshima and Pearl Harbor – two places that are the opposite site of a certain chain of events, which is the Pacific War. Accumulation of events that took place in 2016, a phenomenon in Japanese-American relations, can be considered as a key to understand how the deep reconciliation and fulfilling of common expectations on both sides can be a tool in foreign policy making, and constitutes a step which cannot be undone.

The first step was the visit of president Obama in Hiroshima, an event that was uncertain until the very end and which was expected by generations of Japanese. It was organized as a stop which came after a meeting of G7 Group in Ise-Shima. Though it was a visit which can be viewed as a 'by the way visit', until 2016 only two American presidents visited (privately) the Hiroshima memorial, but not during the office. Richard Nixon visited the memorial site before taking the position of president, and Jimmy Carter after the end of the office, but did not participate in any official ceremony or commented on his act.[31]

During the visit in Hiroshima in May 2016, Obama gave his remarks on this specific place of remembrance, emphasizing not only the tragedy of dozens of Japanese, but also Koreans and Americans. He claimed that: "We come to ponder a terrible force unleashed in a not-so-distant past. We come to mourn the dead, including over 100,000 Japanese men, women and children, thousands of Koreans, a dozen Americans held prisoner".[32]

Places of remembrance can be a spark, the starting point for discussion, reconciliation or discord. They keep bringing to mind past events, tragedies as well as lessons for future generations. They can be used for conducting the memory work as well as a stage to give certain explanations, gestures that can calm down nations' expectations. It was perfectly felt by the American administration, and involved in Obama's 2016 speech. Nevertheless, while being a milestone in the Japanese-American reconciliation, as well as the official recollection other victims than just the people of Japan, the Korean Atomic Bomb Victim Association sent a letter to Barack Obama before his visit to Hiroshima to pay his attention towards the memorial stone to Korean victims of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park where he should have paid respect to acknowledge the Korean victims of the bomb.[33] The same organization organized protests during Obama's visit to Hiroshima Memorial. American president's words "brought [...] a substantial development in the issue of atomic bomb survivors in South Korea"[34] as one of the survivors claimed, even if there was lack of apologizing to the Korean victims. Raising the Korean issue during the U.S. president's speech was an important factor to pay the world's attention toward

---

[31] Greg Mitchell, 'US Presidents and Hiroshima: Obama Breaks the Mold', *The Nation*, 10 August 2011, http://www.thenation.com/blog/162659/us-presidentsand-hiroshima-obama-breaks-mold (accessed 1 August 2016).

[32] 'Text of President Obama's Speech in Hiroshima, Japan', *The New York Times*, 27 May 2016, https://www.nytimes. com/2016/05/28/world/asia/text-of-president-obamas-speech-in-hiroshima-japan.html (accessed 1 August 2016).

[33] Choi Sang-won, 'Korean Victims of Hiroshima to Send Obama a Letter Seeking His Acknowledgement', *The Hankyoreh*, 12 May 2016, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/743559.html (accessed 1 October 2016).

[34] 'South Korean Survivors of Atomic Bombing Welcome Obama's Hiroshima Speech', *The Japan Times*, 28 May 2016, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/05/28/national/south-korean-survivors-atomic-bombing-welcome-obamas-hiroshima-speech/#.WMbWrIWcFYd (accessed 1 October 2016).

this problem. On the other hand, among the Japanese the issue of the lack of apologies did not cause any serious doubts. The main attention has been directed towards the president's wish of a world free of atomic weapon. Takeda Hajimu, a journalist from Asahi Shimbun newspaper, in his article paid an attention towards the promoted (by Obama) elimination of nuclear weapons. Takeda claims that the common purpose stated by Obama and especially by Abe was double-dealing, since Japan is protected by a 'nuclear umbrella' guaranteed by the U.S.[35] It shows that the main issue that troubles Japanese people is not an act of apology, but the question of nuclear weapon. The Japanese-American alliance is emphasized each time in every statement given by the main Japanese and American politicians. Therefore, no more confession of guilt is needed. The event in Hiroshima also brought the ensuring strength of the alliance, in Obama's words: "The United States and Japan have forged not only an alliance but a friendship that has won far more for our people than we could ever claim through war".[36] In his remarks Abe emphasized the role of almost 70 years of the reconciliation process between Japan and the U.S.[37]

The story of rapprochement of the U.S. and Japan could have ended in May 2016. The political, economic and social cooperation between both countries was strong and the common goals for future were clarified. Many statements have been delivered by both politicians and the reconciliation could be understood as a completed action. From the other side, through their respective visits to places of remembrance, they showed that what hitherto seemed undoable could actually be done.[38]

The title of Abe's statement, *The Power of Reconciliation*, is itself a statement that brings to mind a completed process of working out the rapprochement between Japan and the U.S. The last common tribute to the war victims paid together by Obama and Abe. In the first part of his address, Abe brings to our mind the tragedy of young American soldiers, their undone hopes and dreams.[39] The human dimension of this tragedy is a measurable picture of the events of 1941. In the second part Abe offered his "sincere and everlasting condolences to the souls of those who lost their lives here, as well as to the spirits of all the brave men and women whose lives were taken by a war that commenced in this very place, and also to the souls of the countless innocent people who became victims of the war".[40] This is not an apology, but words of compassion that can be compared to the Obama's gesture of an extended public embrace towards Mori Shigeaki – a Hiroshima bomb survivor.[41] An important aspect of Japan's Prime Minister's address was a reference to the Commander Fusata Iida memorial and history, as a symbol of tremendous spirit of tolerance.[42]

---

[35] Hajimu Takeda, 'Kakugunshuku, susumanu genjitsu Obama Hiroshima enzetsu, gutai-saku kaku' [Nuclear Disarmament. The Reality that is not Going Forward. Obama's Address in Hiroshima. Lack of Specific Measures], *Asahi Shimbun*, 28 May 2016, p. 3.

[36] 'Text of President Obama's Speech in Hiroshima…'.

[37] *Remarks by Prime Minister Abe during the visit to Hiroshima with President Obama of the United States*, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201605/1217844_11007.html (accessed 1 October 2016).

[38] Yukari Easton, 'Abe in Pearl Harbor: From Remembrance to Reconciliation', *The Diplomat*, 29 December 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/12/abe-in-pearl-harbor-from-remembrance-to-reconciliation/ (accessed 1 February 2017).

[39] *The Power of Reconciliation: Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe*, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe /statement/201612/1220678_11021.html, (accessed 1 February 2017).

[40] Ibidem.

[41] Kirk Spitzer, 'Sympathy for Victims but no Apology as Obama Makes Historic Hiroshima Visit', *USA Today*, 27 May 2016, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/05/27/obama-visit-hiroshima-bomb-site-pledges-no-apology/85022938/ (accessed 1 February 2017).

[42] *The Power of Reconciliation…*

The post-war American occupation of Japan was also presented as a significant step towards post-war reconciliation and cooperation between both countries. This is unusual phenomenon when the sovereignty of one country is limited by the other and at the same time this fact is used for building peace and friendship. This question is an expression of pragmatism of reconciliation, as well as the fulfilled memory work.

Even if the future actors will claim that this 'reconciliation game' was not satisfying for some groups or individuals. Albeit some will shout, that the history is a fact and keep stuck to it as a main argument in the political game, in case of Japan and the U.S. the bilateral memory work was done in 2016 and all the potential, upcoming demands will be from now on a debate over a completed issue. The end of Obama's presidency was the very last moment to fulfil all the political gestures in a places that were highly observed by public opinion. In Hiroshima and Pearl Harbor which were the hot spots of debates over history the memory work was conducted. Regardless for the lack of direct apologies, the issue of war was worked out, and the time taken for *travail de mémoire* proved that in case of a strong alliance between Japan and the U.S. the gestures, not words are the most important factors to fulfil the will of both nations.

Conclusion

Places of remembrance (realms of memory) is a term used by Pierre Nora in 1970s to create a theory of using the memory (private sphere) instead of history (official narration) by those who needed to establish their identification in a new social order. This definition was used for the first time in France. It was basing on the prewar researches in social sciences by Halbwachs, but it was reused by French historians also half century later.

In Japan, first of all, the process of remembering was restricted until the death of the emperor Hirohito, because according to Japanese culture, reminding about bad events from the past is not proper when the person who was in charge of those happenings is still in his/her position. Secondly, Japanese post-war memory was shaped by the American occupation policy, which at the beginning censored the happenings from the war time.

Those events have definitely shaped Japanese remembrance about World War II, and about their specific *lieux de mémoire*. But among different war monuments and memorials, it is worth to distinguish intangible places of remembrance (or realms of memory) which are also related to the World War II events. It can be, as it was mentioned in this article, the person of the Emperor. With the background of material places of remembrance in Asia and Pacific, the reconciliation processes involving various political actors are in progress. This actions are often shaped by the contemporary regional situation.

The aim of this article was to show the abovementioned realms of memory and memory work in the context of Japanese-American relations and the alliance among them. Japan has different issues with its Asian neighbours, and those places of remembrance can be analysed in different perspective, but it is worth remembering that Japan and the U.S., besides its contemporary alliance, were the countries which relations led to the outbreak of the Pacific War. It should be not forgotten, that the current position of Japan is the result of the American occupation of Japan, and the rhetoric of victorious country over the beaten one.

Americans had to preserve the figure of the Japanese emperor to get the support of the occupied nation. Nevertheless, the figure of the emperor, especially long time ruling Hirohito,

_____

because of his active role during the war, became a certain place of remembrance, and his son had to deal with these controversies. Especially the public opinion basically in Japan, but also in the U.S. is very active during the planned official visit in other tangible places of remembrance, such the Pearl Harbor, undertaken by the imperial couple. Although Akihito as a private person visited the Arizona Memorial, his official visit was cancelled in the 1990s. It shows that the emperor, who was adopted to feel the responsibility for the hostilities felt the need to pay tribute to those who died on the Arizona battleship. It shows the changes that happened in the second generation, and the role of him as a certain place of remembrance.

Japanese-American relations are basing nowadays on the alliance, sharing the common view of Asia-Pacific security relations. Nonetheless, we cannot forget that this alliance was shaped by the victorious rhetoric of Americans, and respect toward this decisions (imposed by the postwar situation). Thus, since the alliance and the vision of Asia-Pacific security is incontrovertible, we cannot forget that memory matters while talking about the bilateral relations of this partner and the further reconciliation processes in the Far East are shaped in the same manner of the American 'Big Brother' that is dictating the rules.

To show the power of reconciliation over the war memory and disputes, the Americans were the ones who took the first step to visit the controversial place, which in this case is Hiroshima. Although the non-apologetic tone of the President Obama's speech was mentioned on every occasion, American president emphasized the role of reconciliation in East Asia. By this visit, and the statement in which Obama stated that "The United States and Japan have forged not only an alliance but a friendship that has won far more for our people than we could ever claim through war […]. To prevent conflict through diplomacy and strive to end conflicts after they've begun. To see our growing interdependence as a cause for peaceful cooperation and not violent competition. To define our nations not by our capacity to destroy but by what we build".[43] We can see the encouragement to build relationships between the former enemies, on the model of the Japanese-American relation. This can also be a starting point to analyze the contemporary relations in the region, in the context of historical animosities and possible reconciliation processes.

---

[43] *Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Abe of Japan at Hiroshima Peace Memorial*, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/05/27/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-abe-japan-hiroshima-peace (accessed 5 July 2016).

Sabina Brakoniecka[*]

Drivers for the Growth of Salafism in Northern Nigeria: The Case of Boko Haram

Abstract

The paper discusses the drivers for the growth of Salafism in northern Nigeria, using Boko Haram as case study. The organisation depicted as Salafi by its leaders, gained considerable support among local communities in northern Nigeria at the initial phase of its existence. Boko Haram started a military campaign in early 2000's that resulted in thousands of deaths among civilians, and still obtains new recruits and material assistance, both by enforcement and voluntarily. The paper discusses the determinants of radicalisation towards Boko Haram on three dimensions, namely: individuality, the influence of social network, and the role of macro-level processes in the country.

Introduction

Celebrations Boko Haram,[1] an organisation established about 2002 by a Muslim preacher Muhammad Yusuf (1970-2009), is believed to represent the fighting branch of Salafi Islam. In the beginning of its existence, it was a loosely bound group of students concentrated around their charismatic teacher, Yusuf. He conducted a preaching campaign in the north-eastern part of the country, which rapidly gained wide support in the region. In 2002, after several years of public action, his position became strong enough to enable him raise funds and establish an Islamic teaching centre in Maiduguri, the capital city of north-eastern Nigerian State of Borno. He named the institution *Markaz Ibn Taymiyya* (Ibn Taymiyya's centre), after the 13th century Damascene scholar, considered as the spiritual father of Salafism. Yusuf's vibrant opinions and oratorical skills earned him sound position among local Muslims. He called his followers to abandon laic type of education (*boko* in local Hausa language), which in northern Nigeria is often equated with Western influence as a result of colonial history.[2] Between 2006 and 2009 many of Yusuf's supporters obeyed his teachings and dropped out of university education.[3] The second fundamental aspect of Yusuf's teachings was the rejection of the Nigerian state as illegitimate. He supported this position quoting the fact that a secular state like Nigeria is built on the basis of human law, while the only legal power in the world is derived from God. Following Yusuf's teachings, Boko Haram

---

[1] 'Boko Haram' is a nickname given to the organisation by local people. Its full name is *Jama'at Ahl al-Sunna li'l-Da'wa wa'l-Jihad 'ala Minhaj al-Salaf* (Arabic for: 'Association of the People of the Sunna for Preaching and Jihad According to the Salafi Method'). It also operates under a shorter version of the name: *Jama'at Ahl al-Sunna li'l-Da'wa wa'l-Jihad.* In March 2015, Abubakar Shekau, one of the organisation's leaders, gave it one more name: *al-Dawla al-Islamiyya Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiya,* (Arabic for 'The Islamic State, West African Province') in order to mark the allegiance he pledged to Islamic State. See Sabina Brakoniecka, 'Muhammad Yusuf's *Jihad* in the Light of the Mahdist Tradition of Northern Nigeria', *Hemispheres,* Vol. 31, No. 3, 2016, p. 14. In the present paper I use the more popular name 'Boko Haram' to refer to the organisation.

[2] On the position of education in Nigeria's history see A. Babs Fafunwa, *History of Education in Nigeria,* London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1975.

[3] Interview A – with a follower of Muhammad Yusuf, who attended his sermons from around 1997 to 2009. The interview was conducted by the author on July 21st–22nd, 2017, in Kano, Nigeria. The interlocutor requested anonymity.

has been struggling to overthrow the Nigerian state and build structures of what they consider as Islamic government ruled in line with sharia.

In July 2009 Yusuf was killed alongside hundreds of his followers, in a summary execution conducted by Nigerian security forces in Maiduguri. The violent incidents and the demise of Yusuf in that year created factions among the leaders, leaving the organisation in disarray. His close associates such as Mamman Nur, Khalid el-Barnawi, and Abubakar Shekau, parted ways, each followed by his own loyalists and sympathisers.[4] Since then, Shekau has led the most active and violent faction that caused mayhem, particularly in the north-eastern, but also in other parts of the country. His group is said to be responsible for thousands of deaths,[5] constant threats of terrorist attack, mass abductions and other criminal activities against civilians.[6]

According to statistics quoted by Counter Extremism Project,[7] there might be few hundreds of core Boko Haram fighters and several thousands of local sympathisers who fight for it.[8] While many of its members were simply forced to join the organisation under death threat to their lives or that of their family or relatives,[9] coercion is not the only method of recruitment into the organisation.[10] People are also motivated to join Boko Haram by other factors related to both religious and non-religious spheres.

The aim of this paper is to answer the question of the reasons for which Muhammad Yusuf's teachings and Boko Haram campaign gained support among local communities in northern Nigeria. To answer this question I adopt Alex P. Schmid's classification of factors contributing to radicalisation presented in his paper *Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review*.[11] The data for the current study is based on interviews with Muhammad Yusuf's followers, local researchers and academics, conducted by the author during field research in northern Nigeria in June and July 2017. Furthermore, academic literature, NGO reports as well as excerpts from Muhammad Yusuf's Hausa speeches have been used to supplement the primary data.

According to Alex P. Schmid the study of the root causes of radicalisation and terrorism was for long considered to be politically incorrect among many Western societies.[12] Peter Neumann claims that this perception intensified especially after the attacks of September 11, 2001, when the

---

[4] Interview B – with one of Muhammad Yusuf's in-commands, former Boko Haram preacher in Kano State. The interview was conducted by the author on July 26th, 2017, in Kano, Nigeria. The interlocutor requested anonymity.

[5] According to Uppsala Conflict Data Program, until the end of 2016 more than 20 000 people were killed in the Boko Haram rebellion in Nigeria, although part of this number was killed by the Nigerian security forces. Another 9 000 people were killed in 2015 and 2016 in the violence perpetrated in Nigeria by the Islamic State, which is associated with Boko Haram on these territories. See Uppsala Conflict Data Program database: http://ucdp.uu.se/#/exploratory (accessed 12 December 2017).

[6] See for example Amnesty International, 'Our Job Is to Shoot, Slaughter and Kill. Boko Haram's Reign of Terror in North-East Nigeria', London: Amnesty International Ltd, 2015.

[7] An international NGO created in 2014 with the aim to counter the narrative and on-line propaganda of extremist groups. For more details see its website: https://www.counterextremism.com/about (accessed 10 December 2017).

[8] Boko Haram profile in Counter Extremism Project website: https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/boko-haram (accessed 10 December 2017).

[9] Amnesty International, 'Our Job…', pp. 48–49.

[10] Mercy Corps, *'Motivations and Empty Promises': Voices of Former Boko Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth,* April 2016, https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/Motivations%20and%20Empty%20Promises _Mercy %20Corps_Full%20Report.pdf (accessed 22 December 2017), pp. 11–12.

[11] Published by International Centre for Counter-Terrorism in The Hague, March 2013.

[12] Ibid., p. 3.

study on drivers for radicalisation was interpreted as an 'effort to excuse and justify the killing of innocent civilians.'[13] In light of these views, it should be clarified here that the aim of the paper is not to present the justification for the indiscriminate violence perpetrated by Boko Haram in northern Nigeria. Rather, it is to discuss the motivations that led to radicalisation from a purely analytical perspective. It is also noteworthy that the author is aware of the fact that an exhaustive approach to the proposed topic is almost impossible, as drivers for the growth of Salafism may vary depending on the personal characteristics of recruits and other factors. Thus, it is understandable that other authors may indicate alternative, though not completely different set of factors.

Salafism and drivers for its growth

Muhammad Yusuf considered himself a Salafi, a position he puts clearly in one of his speeches: 'Islam is our religion, the faith of pious predecessors (*al-salaf al-salih*) is our creed (…) and Jihad is our programme'.[14] Salafism, which Yusuf referred to, is a puritan school in Sunni Islam. The name derives from an Arabic term *al-salaf al-salih* (the pious predecessors), used also in the above-mentioned Yusuf's creed declaration. The term refers to the first three generations of Muslims i.e. Prophet Muhammad and his companions (*sahaba*), their successors and the successors of the successors. *Al-salaf al-salih* are regarded as the righteous Muslims who understood and practised the religion exactly in the way the Prophet did and commanded.[15] However, not all aspects of the creed are shared by all Salafis. Only its main elements, such as the central position of the idea of *tawhid* (oneness of God), extra sensitivity to signs of polytheism, and general puritanical approach to religious affairs appear to be shared by all. Despite these common reference points, there is no clear demarcation line between Salafi and non-Salafi ideology.[16]

The history of Salafi school in Islam dates back to the end of the 19th century, when prominent thinkers of Islamic reform, like Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) and Rashid Rida (1865–1935), preached the necessity to return to the initial form of Islam through the literary reading of *nass* (Qur'an and Hadith) and rejection of any interpretation that emerged after the life of the Prophet and his companions.[17] In the 21st century, however, the Salafi notion has become highly politicised as a result of growing activity of armed organisations popularly known as radical, which undertake military actions and legitimise such actions on the basis of Salafi concepts.

---

[13] Peter R. Neumann, 'Introduction', in *Perspectives on Radicalisation and Political Violence: Papers from the First International Conference on Radicalisation and Political Violence, London 17–18 January 2008*, London: International Center for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2008, p. 4. Quoted by Mark Sedgwick, 'The Concept of Radicalisation as a Source of Confusion', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 22, 4, 2010, p. 480.

[14] Muhammad Yusuf, *Fassarar littafin „Hazihi aqeedatuna wa minhajji da'awatuna"* [Interpretation of the Book 'This Is Our Creed and Our Method to Call'], audio recorded on May 30th, 2008, and published in two parts on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JWfWa2rfsKw&index=6&list=PLbaiO5hJvf63GwhGgd8Pn2_mlVwhqe-l and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_OFTRSi5Ips (accessed 14 October 2015).

[15] Pessah Shinar, 'Salafiyya', in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam,* Clifford Edmund Bosworth *et.al.* (eds), vol. VIII, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995, p. 900.

[16] Muhammad Sani Umar, *Salafi Narratives Against Violent Extremism in Nigeria*, Zaria: Centre for Democracy and Development, 2015, p. 2.

[17] John L. Esposito, 'Salafi', in *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam*, John L. Esposito (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 275.

_____

Similarly to other religious movements, Salafism is heterogeneous. Its diversity manifests itself in various approaches to some religious or religio-political concepts.[18] The most striking differences within the Salafists are observed on the level of action. Salafis adopt various methods (*manahij* in Arabic, sg. *manhaj*) to achieve the goal of religious renewal. While some of them choose to stimulate Islamic education in the spirit of literary interpretation of *nass*, others push for preaching the return to the very primal form of Islam, whereas some of them prefer a military approach against what is perceived as an embodiment of unbelief.

The variety of orientations within the Salafi school regarding action was extensively discussed by Quintan Wiktorowicz. He distinguishes three main groups of organisations within Salafism: the purists, the politicos, and the jihadis. Wiktorowicz's purists' group consists of the Salafis who choose non-violent methods to propagate their interpretation of Islam, including education and peaceful preaching, and do not engage in politics, whereas those who advocate for the implementation of Salafi creed into both national and international politics were classified as the politicos. Jihadis eventually call for the use of violence and participate in revolutionary activities aimed at bringing about the Islamic revival.[19] Despite the clarity and usability of Wiktorowicz's classification, its validity has been questioned.[20] Many argue that Salafism is a far more complex phenomenon than he claims. In practice, we can observe complex trajectories in Salafi thought and action and the categories outlined by Wiktorowicz are overlapping. Despite the stark criticism and the fact that some of the concerns raised against this classification are valid, there is yet to be a better classification of Salafism than Wiktorowicz's model, which in the opinion of some scholars is the best clarification of the creed, thus far.[21]

The growth of Salafism will be analysed here as a process of radicalisation. It is important to note that this specific ramification is burdened with the risk of blurring the already vague picture of Salafism. Despite the huge amount of research on radicalism and radicalisation with a special focus on their Islamic variants,[22] these concepts remain imprecise. Most definitions consider 'radicalism' as a state of standing at distance from mainstream political thinking or representing an extreme section of a party/society etc.,[23] while 'radicalisation' refers to a process leading up to this condition.[24] The noun 'a radical' is strongly relative and subjective, as its meaning depends on the speaker's position. To picture it clearly, we can track the changes of its meaning in different historical periods.[25] For instance, in the 19th century, 'radicals' were those who pleaded for the equality in voting rights not related to gender or social status, and for the introduction

_____

[18] For more discussion on the diversity of Salafi doctrines see Roel Meijer (ed.) *Global Salafism. Islam's New Religious Movement,* London: Hurst & Company, 2009. For the detailed discussion on different approaches to Salafi ideas among Nigerian Islamic scholars see Alexander Thurston, *Salafism in Nigeria. Islam, Preaching, and Politics*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

[19] Quintan Wiktorowicz, 'Anatomy of the Salafi Movement', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29, 2006, pp. 207–239.

[20] Joas Wagemakers, 'Revisiting Wiktorowicz: Categorising and Defining the Branches of Salafism', in *Salafism After the Arab Awakening: Contending with People's Power*, Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone (eds), London: Hurst, 2017, pp. 7–24.

[21] Ibid., p. 8. In the quoted paper Wagemakers also presents his reservations regarding Wiktorowicz's classification.

[22] Schmid, 'Radicalisation…', p. IV.

[23] Ibid., pp. 6–7.

[24] Ibid., p. 1.

[25] For a detailed discussion on the history of the concept of 'radicalism' see the section on 'Radicalism – the historical roots' in Schmid, 'Radicalisation…', pp. 6–8.

of democracy – positions that would rather be labelled as 'reformist' than 'radical' today. As Alex P. Schmid put it, 'while in the 19th century, "radical" referred primarily to liberal, anti-clerical, pro-democratic, progressive political positions, the contemporary usage – as in "radical Islamism" – tends to point to the opposite direction: embracing an anti-liberal, fundamentalist, anti-democratic and regressive agenda'.[26]

Alex P. Schmid attempted to separate the concept from relative notions and described 'radicalism' in a two-point definition. In his opinion, radical thought/attitude should be understood as 'advocating sweeping political change, based on a conviction that the status quo is unacceptable while at the same time a fundamentally different alternative appears to be available to the radical', whereas radical action/behaviour is characterised as 'the means advocated to bring about the system-transforming radical solution for government and society [that] can be non-violent and democratic (through persuasion and reform) or violent and non-democratic (through coercion and revolution)'.[27] As we can see from Schmid's definition, radicalism is not unavoidably connected to violence. Military action may, but not necessarily, appear at some stage of radicalisation. This conclusion is consistent with Wiktorowicz's classification of Salafi approaches that differ on the subject of the use of violence.

Having in mind the very relative nature of radicalism, we can still analyse the drivers for radicalisation with the special focus on the growth of Salafism. In his discussion on the state of research on radicalisation, Alex P. Schmid distinguishes three groups of contributory factors, placing them on different analytical levels:[28]

1. Micro-level factors: these are attributed to the level of individuality, which might involve problems with identity, hampered process of integration, sense of alienation, relative deprivation, marginalisation or discrimination, moral outrage and desire for revenge;

2. Meso-level factors: these are related to the influence of 'radical milieu', a concept introduced by Peter Waldmann and Stefan Malthaner. In their opinion, drivers of radicalisation include, among others, 'political and social processes that involve a collectivity of people beyond the terrorist group itself'.[29] Other factors to be placed on the meso-level are in-group relations and their effects such as the comfort of comradeship, sense of brotherhood and the thrills of adventure.[30]

3. Macro-level factors: these are related to the role of government and society. In this category we find radicalisation of public opinion and politics, difficult relations between majority and minority groups, and lack of socio-economic opportunities for the whole social groups, which lead to mobilisation of the underprivileged.

While most researchers agree that a set of possible internal and external factors which may foster radicalisation exists, it is essential for us to understand that there is no single pattern of this process. We should rather admit that various factors can possibly contribute to radicalisation. What

---

[26] Ibid., p. 7.

[27] Ibid., p. 8.

[28] Ibid., p. 4.

[29] Stefan Malthaner, *The Radical Milieu*, Bielefeld: Institut für interdisziplinäre Konflikt- und Gewaltforschung, November 2010, p. 1; Stefan Malthaner and Peter Waldmann (eds.), *Radikale Milieus. Das soziale Umfeld terroristischer Gruppen,* Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2012. Both works are quoted in Schmid, 'Radicalisation…', p. 4.

[30] Ibidem.

adds complexity to the issue is the fact, that many findings are applicable only locally, because risk factors occur in particular, often very narrow regional contexts.[31]

Factors related to individual level[32]

Muhammad Yusuf was considered by many northern Nigerian Muslims as an outstanding preacher who had the audacity to speak out against the malpractices of powerful government officials and to challenge the corruption ravaging the society. He framed this criticism in religious terms, referring to Salafi ideas of Islamic revival as a means of tackling these mundane problems. His charisma helped convince his followers that a change was only possible if the tenets of Islam were rebuilt according to the Salafi doctrine. He applied the concept of *takfir* (excommunication)[33] to condemn those who do not comply with the literal interpretation of Islamic rules as non-believers. Many among Yusuf's followers were attracted to him by their quest for religious devotion and puritanism. The religious motivation to join Boko Haram has continued to be in existence after the death of Yusuf. After the organisation launched its military activity, some of the new recruits were motivated to partake in what is presented by the preachers as Jihad that provides a reward in paradise.[34]

The other reason why Boko Haram gained strong support is that its leaders have openly criticised the impunity of the Nigerian security forces, including the police and army officers, and called for active resistance. Nigerian security forces have a bad reputation of using unjustified violence. They are regularly reported committing extra-judicial killings in the name of law enforcement.[35] Their repressive activities are especially noticeable in north-eastern region of the country, where more than 4500 civilians were executed by security officers just between 2006 and 2014.[36] Muhammad Yusuf strictly rejected and heavily condemned the security forces for impunity, corruption and violence against civilians. This criticism was once again, framed in religious concepts. He sought reasons to call them polytheists, pointing at common military practices like saluting officers, paying tribute to superiors, and accepting cross-shaped medals, as actions against *tawhid*.[37] In this context, considering that he was arrested numerous times and kept under surveillance as a person suspected of sedition, he had become a local hero in the fight against polytheistic – in his opinion – security officers who represent an illegitimate state. His fame as an anti-establishment crusader reached its highest peak when he was killed on July 30, 2009, in a summary execution conducted by the Nigerian security forces. Since then he has been regarded

---

[31] Ibid., p. 38.

[32] For further discussion on micro-level factors see also Sabina Brakoniecka, 'The Beginnings of the Boko Haram Rebellion from a Micro-Level Perspective', *Hemispheres*, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2015, pp. 77–92.

[33] Further on the concept of *takfir* see Abdulbasit Kassim, 'Defining and Understanding the Religious Philosophy of Jihadi-Salafism and the Ideology of Boko Haram', *Politics, Religion & Ideology*, Vol. 16, 2–3, 2015, pp. 179–187.

[34] Mercy Corps, *'Motivations…'*, pp. 14–15.

[35] Super Odomovo Afeno, 'Killings by the Security Forces in Nigeria: Mapping and Trend Analysis (2006-2014)', in *Violence in Nigeria. A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis*, Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos (ed.), Leiden: African Studies Centre, 2016, p. 114.

[36] Ibid., pp. 128–129.

[37] Muhammad Yusuf, *Nasiha* [Good Advice], audio recorded on Ramadan 9th, 1429 Hijri (September 9th, 2008), and published on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kHG6f5cWjKs (accessed 30 August 2017); Muhammad Yusuf, *Al-Imraan* [The Family of Imran], no date, audio published on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aXXX5-49TtA (accessed 13 October 2017).

by a substantial section of his followers as a martyr in the fight for the Islamic cause against the secular, un-Islamic government. His followers became even more determined to stand up against the Nigerian state and security forces than they used to be when he was alive.[38]

Alongside the above-mentioned resentment against the security apparatus is the desire for revenge. As Alex P. Schmid noted, 'many acts of terrorism are motivated by revenge for acts of repression, injustice and humiliation and (…) a tit-for-tat process can evolve after a while'.[39] This type of drive is particularly meaningful in the case of mobilisation to Boko Haram. More than half of the casualties of Boko Haram rebellion were civilians killed by the state security forces.[40] For instance, in July 2009, the police and army officers extrajudicially killed about 800 people just within five days and none of the perpetrators of these summary executions was tried or convicted.[41] The importance of the desire to retaliate was confirmed by Anneli Botha and Mahdi Abdile, who in 2015 and 2016 questioned 119 former Boko Haram fighters in Borno and Adamawa States. It turned out that 57 percent of former fighters indicated that revenge was the only or the main drive for their mobilisation to the group.[42] Most of them lost relatives or friends as a result of military intervention and they felt obliged to avenge these deaths, or they simply no longer had anything to lose.

The role of 'radical milieu'

Stefan Malthaner, who coined the term, grasped the function of the radical milieu as follows: 'Even if their violent campaign necessitates clandestine forms of operation, most terrorist groups remain connected to a radical milieu to recruit new members and because they depend on shelter and assistance given by this supportive milieu, without which they are unable to evade persecution and to carry out violent attacks (…) Sharing core elements of the terrorists' perspective and political experiences, the radical milieu provides political and moral support'.[43] Alex P. Schmid also stresses the key role social (and kinship) networks play in radicalisation process. He equates it with the role similar networks play in mobilisation towards street gangs. Usually, people are more vulnerable to accept extremist ideas in 'dense, small networks of friends' and when these ideas are articulated by charismatic or credible leaders.[44]

In the first years of its existence, Boko Haram gained a strong foothold in local communities. Leaders of the organisation, including Muhammad Yusuf and his in-commands, took advantage of the grievances around government's ineffectiveness, an attitude that is so much widespread in northern Nigerian communities. People in that region are deprived of access to public

---

[38] Interview C – with a sympathizer of Muhammad Yusuf, who attended his sermons between 2007 and 2009. The interview was conducted by the author on July 29th, 2017, in Kano, Nigeria. The interlocutor requested anonymity.
[39] Schmid, 'Radicalisation…', p. 36.
[40] Uppsala Conflict Data Program…
[41] Amnesty International, 'Our Job…', p. 10.
[42] Anneli Botha and Mahdi Abdile, *Getting Behind the Profiles of Boko Haram Members and Factors Contributing to Radicalisation Versus Working Towards Peace: A Summary*, The Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers, Finn Church and Act Alliance, KAICIID Dialogue Centre, no place, no date [estimated September 2016], https://www.kaiciid.org/publications-resources/getting-behind-profiles-boko-haram-members-summary (accessed 12 December 2017), p. 5.
[43] Malthaner, *The Radical...*, p. 1.
[44] US Bipartisan Policy Center, National Security Preparedness Group, *Preventing Violent Radicalisation in America,* Washington, D.C.: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2011, p. 1. Quoted in Schmid, 'Radicalisation…', p. 27.

officials enabling them to express their disappointment and request for social services. On this ground, many of them are receptive to the influence of anti-establishment initiatives of the likes of Boko Haram. The existence of general public support for the ideas propagated by Boko Haram at the initial phase of its activity was stressed by about half of former fighters interviewed by the Mercy Corps organisation.[45] One of the female interlocutors from Borno State was quoted saying: 'The community perception about [Boko Haram] was that… they are a new sect that is coming in peace because at the beginning they showed love and concern, and [they] provided things to needy people of the community.'[46] This stance was confirmed in other reports. According to Kyari Mohammed, Boko Haram initially constituted a Muslim social movement, catering for the vulnerable, orphans and widows.[47] Muhammad Yusuf had raised numerous initiatives to improve his followers' well-being. He lent money to his followers which enabled them to invest and trade in the Monday Market of Maiduguri. He provided *achaba* motorbikes to his supporters on significantly lower charges than other entrepreneurs in the city.[48] Through these methods members of the group became a very close-knit community. The author's interviewees also reported very close, almost family-like relations in the group, which constituted Muhammad Yusuf, his in-commands and their followers. The interlocutors mentioned instances of nights spent under one roof with the teacher and joint night prayers, among other signs of intimacy.[49]

'Radical milieu' had served as an economic background for the Boko Haram organisation, especially after the start of its violent campaign. Local patrons provide fighters with food, money (paid in form of compulsory taxes or donations) and medical supplies. Though many people provide the support under coercion, others support the organisation voluntarily. Motivation for this form of support is, among other things, based on the perception that assisting Boko Haram is beneficial to the cause of religion.[50] This is visible in the practice of donating children as future fighters by parents who see it as contribution to the struggle for the Islamic revival, which Boko Haram claims to conduct.[51]

The role of 'radical milieu' is noticeable in the recruitment process of new followers. Social connections play key role in radicalisation and recruitment into Boko Haram. Many of the former fighters interviewed by Mercy Corps cited family members, friends or business peers who have joined the organisation before them and affected their own decisions.[52] Similar findings were presented by Botha and Abdile. Their research concludes that about 60 percent of the ex-members were introduced to Boko Haram through people close to them, such as friends, family and

---

[45] Mercy Corps, *'Motivations…'*, p. 14.

[46] An interview with a female Boko Haram ex-member from Borno State. Quoted in Mercy Corps, *'Motivations…'*, p. 14.

[47] Kyari Mohammed, 'The Message and Methods of Boko Haram', in *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria*, Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos (ed.), Leiden: African Studies Centre, 2014, p. 23.

[48] Interview D – with Professor Kyari Mohammed, Modibbo Adama University of Technology in Yola. The interview was conducted by the author on July 2nd, 2017, in Yola, Nigeria.

[49] Interviews A and C.

[50] Interview E – with Aishatu Sambo, research fellow at National Defence College in Abuja. The interview was conducted by the author on July 12th, 2017, in Abuja, Nigeria.

[51] Interview E. The range of this phenomenon is not known to the author. Its existence was also reported by the Nigerian press. See for example Ruby Leo, 'Listen to the Army, Don't Give Your Children to Boko Haram', *Daily Trust*, 11 August 2017, https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/home-front/listen-to-the-army-don-t-give-your-children-to-boko-haram/209611.html (accessed 20 December 2017).

[52] Mercy Corps, *'Motivations…'*, p. 12.

neighbours.[53] The influence of relatives and close friends towards the mobilisation to Boko Haram has been confirmed by several sources and informants. One of Muhammad Yusuf's followers was familiar with his teachings since early childhood. *Malam* ('teacher' in Hausa) Yusuf used to visit his home-village when he was in primary school. He recalled that his whole family and neighbourhood attended Yusuf's sermons. After meeting Yusuf again in 2000s, this time as a student in the University of Maiduguri, he found it only natural to join Yusuf's followers, as it was typically not a new thing to him. At that stage, the role of milieu was visible again. The interlocutor and his friends always attended sermons in peer-groups, using special buses that drove students from the university campus to *Markaz Ibn Taymiyya*.[54]

Macro-level drivers for radicalisation

The growth of Salafi branch of Islam represented by the Boko Haram group was accelerated by historical factors closely related to the colonial episode. The nature of British administration laid the foundations for numerous disagreements between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria, what subsequently contributed to the radicalisation of Islam in the north. In 1914, the British amalgamated Southern Protectorate and Northern Protectorate to create a country that we know today as Nigeria.[55] The Southern Protectorate was predominantly inhabited by the Christians and the followers of traditional religions at the time, while the Northern Protectorate was largely dominated by the Sokoto Caliphate,[56] an Islamic empire that has been in existence for over a century, and non-Muslim communities who occupied the Middle Belt region. However, the British administration policy appears to be partial in providing developmental opportunities for the two regions. Firstly, unlike in the north, the British invested more in infrastructural development and economic growth in the south. Secondly, while the colonial administration popularised missionary schools and introduced the secular type of education in the south, it applied an indirect rule system in the north, using the already existing local administrative structures of the Sokoto Caliphate to control the society.[57]

The above-mentioned inconsistency in the politics of the colonial administration resulted in widening the gap between northern and southern parts of the country in terms of economic development, living conditions and level of education. Despite the existence of Nigeria as a single entity for several decades after the end of the colonial rule, these disparities are still noticeable in many ramifications. The north-east, which is an area that has been mostly affected by the Boko Haram rebellion, is a region with the lowest indicators of child school enrolment and the highest percentage of people living below poverty line in the country.[58] An uneven development of secular

---

[53] Botha and Abdile, *Getting…*, pp. 2, 6.

[54] Interview A.

[55] For more information on the amalgamation of Nigeria see Anthony H.M. Kirk-Greene, *Lugard and Amalgamation of Nigeria: A Documentary Record, 1912–1919*, Michigan: Frank Cass, 1968.

[56] For more information on the Sokoto Caliphate see J. Spencer Trimingham, *A History of Islam in West Africa*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970, pp. 193–219.

[57] László Máthé-Shires, 'Nigeria: Lugard, Administration, and "Indirect Rule"', in *Encyclopedia of African History*, Kevin Shillington (ed.), vol. II, New York-London: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2005, pp. 1097–1098.

[59] According to Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, in 2013 a Multidimensional Poverty Index for the whole country amounted to 0.303, whereas in the states most affected by the Boko Haram rebellion it turned out to be significantly higher: 0.401 for Borno, 0.635 for Yobe, and 0.471 for Gombe States. MPI reflects income-based poverty, as well as other deprivations like access to education, health and living standards. Cf. Oxford Poverty and

_____

education in the country led to the northern people's aversion to the Western-type of education and its adherents. At some point, graduates from the secular universities were called *'yan boko* (in Hausa 'modern-educated elite') – a term that became pejorative over the time. *'Yan boko* were considered as collaborators of the colonial administration, those who had denounced their pride for financial gains and better social status.[59] This aversion to those who went through secular education became deeply rooted in northern Nigerian society for decades. Different radical religious groups have tried to re-establish this aversion, using it as an explanation for their rejection and disdain for Western influence in the region. Boko Haram is the most recent of such groups that call for the abolishment of secular education in northern Nigeria.

In analysing the drivers for radicalisation from the perspective of regional rivalries in Nigeria, it is important to make a distinction between grievances resulting from relative deprivation and economic problems. One of the major misunderstandings in the literature on radicalisation is the assumption that poverty may be a crucial factor in the process. In fact, there is no evidence confirming this thesis. Having worked with imprisoned ex-terrorists, Jessica Stern claimed that they come from all socioeconomic backgrounds.[60] Similarly, Tinka Veldhuis and Jørgen Staun in their report on causes of Islamic radicalisation hold 'the demographic profiles of radical Muslims in the Western world show that they are generally not poor, religiously fanatic, or desperate due to suffering from extreme poverty, political oppression or other deprived circumstances.'[61] It rather appears that though poverty may lead to some people joining an armed group for financial gains, most marginalised people might be too busy struggling for their survival than being engaged with the idea of rebellion.[62] This was also one of Jessica Stern's conclusions. She claimed that 'for poor people in countries where economic prospects are bleak, Jihad can be one of the few jobs available'.[63]

Many northern Nigerian youth join Boko Haram because of economic reasons, although their motivation seems to be far more complex than what we could just capture as poverty-driven radicalisation.[64] One of the motivations pointed out by ex-members interviewed by Mercy Corps organisation was a prospect of gaining financial support. Nearly half of these people had their own businesses before joining the organisation and have collected loans to sustain or expand their investments. Interestingly, there was a similar scheme that appeared in several accounts provided by the interlocutors. Young owners of small businesses were offered cash loans by a benefactor who later demanded for either instant repayment or the indebted person to join Boko Haram or be killed.

_____

Human Development Initiative, 'Nigeria Country Briefing', *Multidimensional Poverty Index Data Bank, OPHI*, Oxford: University of Oxford, 2017, www.ophi.org.uk/multidimensional-poverty-index/mpi-country-briefings (accessed 14 December 2017). For details about MPI methodology see http://ophi.org.uk/multidimensional-poverty-index/ (accessed 14 December 2017).

[59] Mohammed, 'The Message…', pp. 11–12.

[60] Jessica Stern, 'Five Myths about Who Becomes a Terrorist', *Washington Post,* 10 January 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/08/AR2010010803585.html (accessed 19 December 2017).

[61] Tinka Veldhuis and Jorgen Staun, *Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model*, The Hague: Clingendael, 2009, p. 8, https://www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/import/islamist_radicalisation.veldhuis_and_staun.pdf (accessed 17 December 2017).

[62] Schmid, 'Radicalisation…', p. 25.

[63] Jessica Stern, 'Five…'.

[64] Mercy Corps, *'Motivations…*, p. 13.

This practice resembles methods of extortion used by organised criminal gangs that offer favours and later demand outrageous price to be repaid.[65]

Joining Boko Haram may also provide security of business and property owned by the recruited, as well as protection for their families. As one of the ex-members described it: 'I officially joined them [Boko Haram] when they started killing indiscriminately in Bama. Because I needed an identity to remain safe, I decided to pledge my allegiance to them. At that time, I needed protection and immunity from persecution by them, so I could continue with my business. When they attacked Bama and took over the military barracks and burned all the houses in our community, my family's house was spared.'[66] It was obvious for residents in the areas affected by the Boko Haram rebellion that collaboration with fighters was the easiest, most immediate guarantee of security.

Finally, the growth of Salafism in northern Nigeria, especially its violent form, has been accelerated by lack of good governance. The conditions in that part of the country are conducive for the proliferation of criminal activities. Porous borders along the Lake Chad region in the north-east, sometimes with zero border control, facilitate weapon smuggling and illegal, undocumented migration. This unmanned region also serves as a gate to the Sahel region,[67] especially Chad and Libya, providing ground for potential cooperation with the Islamic State fighters. Worse still, the boundaries to the western borders of Sahelian countries such as Niger and Mali, affected by the presence of Al-Qaeda of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), facilitate rapid exchange of intelligence and free movement of fighters.[68] The lack of interest in efficient de-radicalisation campaign on the side of the Nigerian government leads to many distortions, like the penetration of Boko Haram recruiters in IDPs camps, where deprived residents succumb to radicalisation.[69] Even in the early days of its existence, deficiency in governance played an important role in the initial mobilisation to Boko Haram. Muhammad Yusuf spoke boldly against pervasive corruption among Nigerian officials, which is one of the factors that earned him strong support within the northern Nigerian society. Many of his speeches centred on the apparent injustice and corruption that characterises the Nigerian government, a position that understandably resonates well with his audience.

Conclusions

Since its inception, Boko Haram has posed a serious threat to Nigeria's national security. Through its wide range and unpredictable terrorist activities, the organisation has destabilised every-day life in the affected territories of northern Nigeria in particular, and the Lake Chad region in general. Boko Haram is by far the most violent and lethal radical Islamic organisation in modern Nigerian history. In the light of the fact that it is accused of committing numerous atrocities, including killing of civilians, rape, mass abductions, forced displacement, suicide attacks by children, etc., it might be difficult to understand why it still enjoys certain level of support from some members of local communities – no matter how little it might be. It is on this basis that this

---

[65] Ibidem.

[66] An interview with a male Boko Haram ex-member from Borno State. Quoted in Mercy Corps, *'Motivations…*, p. 12.

[67] Interview F – with Professor Chukwuma Osakwe, National Defence Academy in Kaduna. The interview was conducted by the author on July 13th, 2017, in Kaduna, Nigeria.

[68] Interview B.

[69] Interview F.

paper analyses the motivations that lead some people to support this organisation. Based on their context, these driver factors were discussed on three levels of analysis.

As would be seen from the foregoing discussion, micro-level factors which are related to the sphere of individuality, personal attitudes, individual worldview, and particular interests, play a significant role in the process of radicalisation towards Boko Haram. Some of the followers have been driven to join the organisation by the desire to deepen their religious knowledge, partake in military campaign that is considered – in Boko Haram circles – as a struggle in the name of God, and familiarise with Muhammad Yusuf's puritanical teachings on the Islamic revival. People were motivated to join the organisation by the frustration related to the impunity of Nigerian security forces which is often seen as one of the factors substantially responsible for violence in the country. People are eager to swell the ranks of this organisation to express their disapproval of state power abuse, especially when these transgressions are committed by the state actor under the controversial label of fighting Islamic extremism. Many Boko Haram members and sympathisers had lost their loved-ones in the hands of police or army officers. In this vicious circle of violence, these victims may decide to join Boko Haram in order to avenge the deaths of their relatives.

Drivers for growth of Salafism connected to a radical milieu, categorised by Alex P. Schmid as meso-level factors, are remarkably valid in the case of northern Nigeria. The people of that region, who have been experiencing lack of opportunities for an improvement of living conditions for years, are prone to support new approaches. Original concepts are alluring especially when they combine the idea of religious renewal with social assistance offered to the destitute, a phenomenon that was particularly prevalent at the initial phase of Boko Haram activities. It was also shown that the process of mobilisation to the group is more effective, if close friends or relatives are engaged. In the case of Boko Haram, close social network serves as a suitable ground for successful radicalisation. A relation between the organisation and the radical milieu appears to be symmetric. In one direction is the flow of assistance offered by the Boko Haram members to the local community, i.e. to potential future fighters and recipients of revivalist ideas. In the reverse direction is the local society's acceptance of the actions of the group, providing protection and essential material support in form of finances and recruits, against all odds.

Following Schmid's classification, macro-level drivers for growth of Salafism in northern Nigeria are those large-scale processes involving radicalisation of public opinion and relations between social groups. These factors include intergroup grievances and prejudices that could be traced in the early history of the country. Among these factors is the deep disproportion between the regions of Nigeria which coincides with religious divisions. This, in turn, leads to radicalisation of religious attitudes. The history of education in the country served as a basis for biases in perception of those who have attended or graduated from secular schools. As a result, condemnation of laic educational system by the preachers of Boko Haram has aggravated the common reluctance towards secular schools. Moreover, it was proven that economic factors played a crucial role in the process of recruitment to the group, though it does not reflect the overrated pattern of poverty-driven radicalisation. Many people who join Boko Haram are relatively well-off, run their own businesses and ask the organisation for further financial support. Finally, an important macro-level driver for radicalisation is the governance vacuum that allows for potential contacts or cooperation with terrorist organisations active in the Sahel region (Islamic State, AQIM). Lack of good governance in general and effective border security in particular,

coupled with the lack of efficient de-radicalisation and preventive policies, accelerate the growth of religious extremism in the region.

Despite the fact that Boko Haram was examined in this paper as a Salafi organisation, it is essential to note that it cannot be regarded as a representative case of the whole Salafi school in Islam. As was indicated above, Salafi organisations vary in spheres of creed and method. All the drivers for growth of Salafism identified in this paper on the basis of the Boko Haram example relate to two dimensions of radicalisation. One of these dimensions is the ability to engage in violent action. Drivers for radicalisation towards readiness to apply violence cover all the above-mentioned anti-establishment resentments resulting from disappointment and frustration as a result of ineffective social policies on the one hand, and reactions to the impunity of state actors on the other. The second dimension of radicalisation could be grasped as perfecting religious views. In the case of northern Nigeria, this dimension is under no circumstance restricted to Boko Haram. It rather extends to the whole Salafi milieu in the region, including organisations that are based on moderate Salafi thought that do not embrace, and loudly condemn violence.

Elaheh Koolaee[*]
Mehdi Shayesteh[**]

Good Governance and the Integrated Coastal Management of the Caspian Sea

Abstract

This article uses descriptive analysis methodology to examine the role of good governance in ICM of the Caspian Sea and its effects on diminishing the environmental challenges threatening the Caspian Sea coastal waters and lands. Given to the various difficulties the Caspian basin faces, authors try to highlight successful methods in similar regions to prevent the increasing degradation and erosion of the Caspian coastal ecosystem.

Introduction

Coastal zones offer a variety of valuable habitats for numerous plants and animal species. Unfortunately, population growth as well as excessive exploitation of natural resources has created a spectrum of regional problems, mostly environmental challenges for the coastal areas. Integrated Coastal Management (ICM) helps to diminish environmental challenges of both coastal waters and lands, as well as facilitates and accelerates the process of good governance in these areas. Coastlines challenges are impossible to resolve in the absence of comprehensive solutions with proactive participation of all coastal stakeholders.

Integrated Coastal Management (ICM) of the Caspian Sea is a process of governance rather than a government. Indeed, due to the complex management structure of coastal zones in the Caspian basin, regional governments are just one of the actors responsible for coordination among different actors to reach a sustainable coastal development. Good governance as an essential part of successful integrated coastal management needs serious considerations.

Coastal population growth leads to degradation of coastal waters, as well as lands. More than 50% of the world's population lives within 60 km of the coast. Population density in coastal areas is 80 per 2 sq. km.[1] Rich in natural resources, coastal areas have always been the target of excessive exploitation. Over the last century, regional affairs, tourism requirements, extraction of minerals and waste disposal have imposed increasing pressure on coastlines. Also, conflict of interests between governmental and private sectors in the Caspian Sea coastal areas has been rising, too. Hence, any policy making regarding sustainable coastal development requires serious consideration of these problems. Recently, integration has been the main factor in the successful environmental management of the coastal zones which is realized in the form of good governance.

Active public involvement, as well as effective presence of civil society institutions are critical to prosperous implementation of integrated management of the coastal zone in the Caspian Sea, as well as alleviating environmental threats of the sea. Good governance increases the legitimacy of decisions, helps in meeting people's needs and creates opportunities for regional policy makers to boost their knowledge. The Caspian Sea is one of the most contaminated lakes

---

[*] Regional Studies Department, University of Tehran, e-mail: ekolaee@ut.ac.ir.
[**] University of Tehran.
[1] Stefano Blifiore, 'The Growth of Integrated Coastal Management and the Role of Indicators of Integrated Coastal Management: Introduction to the Special Issues', *Ocean and Coastal Management*, Vol. 46, No. 3, December 2003, pp. 225–223.

in the world – its water and coastal environmental challenges reflect the unbalanced economic-social development along the coast line, as well as the drainage of its basins which proceeds regardless of environmental requirements. Human factor is one of the main causes of the Caspian coastlines problems; domestic and industrial sewage entering into coastal waters through rivers damage the Caspian Sea ecosystem drastically.   Increasing urbanization, population growth of coastal zones, developing roads as well as ports all have had destructive effects on the Caspian Sea coastlines. The degrees of damage to the Caspian Sea and its living reservoir have been too severe and really concerning.[2] Approximately 10% of the Iranian population lives in the Caspian coastlines – in Ardebil, Gilan, Mazenderan, and Golestan provinces, which reach to 6.425 million with rising density towards the West.[3] This article examines the subject using descriptive analysis methodology, as well as library and online sources.

Pattern of Good Governance and Integrated Coastal Management

According to UNESCAP, the eight criteria of Good Governance are: participation, consensus orientation, accountability, transparency, responsiveness, effectiveness, equity, abidance by the rule of law.[4] Good governance is a process aiming at reforming public sector, enhancing civil society and accelerating private sector participation. World Bank defines good governance as "a manner in which power is exercised to meet the needs of the masses" which consists of the three components: the form of the political regime, the process by which authority is exercised in the management of country's economic and social resources for development, the capacity of governments to design, formulate and implement policies and discharge functions.

The concept consists of many practices including professional civil service, anti-corruption policies, transparency and accountability, as well as the principle of the rule of law.[5]

Since 1990s, the concept of Good Governance has started to be used widely. Governance is a structure consisting of formal and informal arrangements addressing the followings: How to use environmental resources? How to assess and analyze the problems? Which behaviors are acceptable which should be prohibited? Which rules and criteria should be used as models of behavior?[6]

This concept enjoying a high capacity to cover a broader scope of institutions and networks involved in the process of governance has become universal.[7] Successful Integrated Coastal Management depends on some factors including: consensus, regional participation, cooperation and compatibility with environmental conditions.

---

[2] Muhammad Pourkazemi, *Review on the Genetics and Biotechnology of Sturgeons*, Tarbiat Modares University of Tehran: The 5th National Conference – Biotechnology of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 5–3 December 2007.

[3] CEP: Caspian Environment Program, Extent of Desertification in Caspian Region, Result of the Phase I and Tasks of the phase II, August 2000.

[4] Yap Kioe Sheng, 'What is Good Governance?', *UNESCAP. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific*, 2002, http//www.unsccap.org/huset/gg/governance (accessed 20 November 2017).

[5] Baradaran Shoraka, 'Good Governance is the Key to Southwest Asia's Development', *Strategy*, Vol. 46, 2008, pp. 359–384.

[6] Lawrence Juda and Timothy Hennessey, 'Governance Profiles and the Management of the Uses of Large Marine Ecosystems', *Ocean Development and International Law*, Vol. 32, No. 1, December, 2005, pp. 3–44.

[7] Biliana Cicin-Sain and Robert W. Knecht, 'Implications of the Earth Summit for Ocean and Coastal Governance', *Ocean Development and International Law*, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1993, pp. 121–153.

In 1983, the Brundtland Commission formally known as the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) was established within the UN framework to formulate strategies for sustainable development and improving the quality of human life without creating long term regional and international environmental threats. In 1987, the commission released the report called *Our Common Future* also known as the *Brundtland Report* as its reference document. In 1992, the UN held the Earth Summit on environmental and sustainable development in Rio de Janeiro in which 172 countries as well as 2400 NGOs from all over the world took part. Governance is realized through government, private sector and civil society but public participation at different levels is essential for reaching and maintains sustained development. Thus, in the Agenda 21 which was made public in the Rio Summit, governance and sustainable development based on public participation at national, international, regional and local levels were underlined.

Indeed, from the very beginning of the first Earth Summit in 1992, people realized that sustainable development could not be achieved by governments alone. It would require active participation of all sectors of society and all types of people such as consumers, workers, business persons, farmers, students, teachers, researchers, activists and other communities of interest.

Hence, the Agenda 21 formalized nine of these as the overarching categories through which all citizens could participate in the UN activities on achieving sustainable development. These are officially called *Major Groups* categorized as follows: Business and industry, Children and Youth, Farmers, Indigenous Peoples, Local Authorities, NGOs, Scientific and Technological Community, Women, Workers and Trade Unions.

The Rio+20 Conference was one of the most significant international events held in the past decade on sustainable development. Two main themes of the 2012 conference were: (a) a green economy in the context of sustainable development poverty eradication; and (b) the institutional framework for sustainable development. Given to the necessity of institutionalization of sustainable development in all national, regional and international development programs of all the states and establishment of such an institution, Institutional Framework for Sustainable Development (IFSD) was also discussed as the second main theme of the agenda. Nowadays, it is increasingly believed that in the absence of local, regional, national and international participation, states and organizations are unable to reach sustainable development. In the context of integrated coastal management, governance refers to structures and processes used by the government, public and private sector to exploit the coastal resources and relative activities.

Four principles of good governance in coastal zones management are:

1. Sustainable Development: exploitation of natural resources in the coastal areas should be effective and equitable.
2. Comparative Management: in planning, implementation and monitoring stages, comparative management can be used as an effective method for measurement and performance improvement of the systems. This, provides knowledge that can be used for setting replanting strategies.[8]
3. Participation: participation of different stakeholders in decision making on environmental issues related to coastal areas is critical. Policies of Integrated Coastal

---

[8] Bruce Thom and Nick Harvey, 'Triggers for Late Twentieth Century Reform of Australian Coastal Management', *Geographical Research*, Vol. 38, No. 3, November 2000, pp. 275–290.

Management are socially constructed and effective implementation of these policies depends on voluntarily participation.

4. Integration: integrated policies were created in response to disintegrated policy makings, lack of organic links between policy organizations and absence of integration between goals and policy tools. Integrity as a key concept in Integrated Coastal Management dates back to the 1972 Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA).

Integrated management is a comprehensive approach to coastal management that involves scientific, engineering, economic, institutional/political, legal, and social/cultural considerations; and intersectoral, pertaining to management of activities within the coastal zone. This multi-disciplinary approach will promote sustainability in the coastal zone.[9] Lack of coordination between different sectors and executive levels is one of the main causes of failure of integrated coastal management processes.[10]

Exploration and exploitation of energy sources contaminate both coastal and water environment.[11] Different governmental levels (national, provincial, local) hold parallel responsibilities which may create some obstacles in the path towards sustainable development and applying a coordinated policy between national and subnational levels.

Population growth, technological improvements and economic growth increase coastal areas challenges. Integrated Coastal Management (ICM) can be the best option for solving many coastal problems. ICM is a dynamic process in which an intersectoral strategy assures coordination between various social, economic and environmental activities to reach the multiple goals of sustainable development of coastal areas.

ICM follows the following goals:

1. Economic development of coastal zones ensuring the protection of precious water and land resources.
2. Management of human activities to preserve and enhancement of coastal resources.
3. Management of extraction and exploitation of coastal resources to ensure maximum sustainable exploitation of sea resources.
4. Improving the quality of coastal services for regional residents and providing them appropriate access to coastlines for recreational utilization.
5. Management of renewable resources to produce long term, sustainable benefits.

ICM is an interdisciplinary, comprehensive approach and a dynamic, steady process with fundamental purpose of preservation and improvement of coastal ecosystems, elimination of destructive competition between governmental and private sectors as well as prevention of sectoral inclination.

ICM aims at the followings:

1. Perpetuity of the plan.
2. Adaptation to likely and unpredicted changes.

---

[9] Dong Oh Cho, 'Evaluation of the Ocean Governance System in Korea', *Marine Policy*, Vol. 30, No. 5, September 2006, pp. 570–579.

[10] Ibidem.

[11] Bahram Mostaghimi, *Protection of Caspian Sea Environment, Diplomatic Ways,* Tehran: IPIS, 2003.

3. Creating a mechanism for promoting cooperation among coastal users including private and governmental sectors.[12]

Governance approach plays a critical role in successful ICM. Civil society participation is the key factor in effective implementation of ICM in the Caspian coastal areas and reduction of its environmental problems.

The Caspian Sea Issues and Good Governance

The Caspian Sea and its southern coasts – as a huge corridor connecting Central Asian countries to the Indian Ocean, as well as a rich reservoir of oil – have attracted the attention of trans-regional actors to this water basin.[13] Sightseeing attractions of the southern coasts, proximity to Tehran, the capital of Iran and enjoying a temperate climate, increasing villas and residential complexes built along the beach have created increasingly numerous environmental challenges in the Caspian coastlines, which act as heavy obstacles towards sustainable development of the Caspian Sea. Environmental pollution stems in waste entering the region from neighboring countries, thus ICM can prevent land based pollution from spreading into the lake. In the absence of industrial waste management, the Caspian Sea absorbs 150 thousands Liters of sewage annually mostly through the shores as a result of human activities. This type of pollutants originates from costal units while others enter the sea through rivers flowing into the Caspian.

The Caspian Sea takes the leading place among internal reservoirs of the world on stocks of valuable kinds of fresh water fishes: Caspian reach, sazan, zander, kutum, mullet, bream, strat, carp, perch, salmon, but bitter and low oxygen water of the rivers flowing into the sea, especially in the Western Mazandaran has put some fish species within the Caspian in danger of extinction.[14]

Pollutants enter the sea through 130 rivers. Given to the significant acceleration in exploitation of the Caspian resources in the post-Soviet era, thousand tons of oily materials enter the sea annually which threatens this unique ecosystem hazardously.[15]

Local level

While public participation is too much underlined as a key factor in successful ICM, the entity and structure of this popular participation is rarely elaborated. Local authorities providing key infrastructure for planning, protecting the environment and initial requirements are key figures of successful implementation of ICM. Management of highly populated coastal areas of the Caspian Sea and addressing their various problems is not possible merely through legal channels. Indeed, participation among different sectors in vertical levels is absolutely essential. Agricultural wastes containing sediments, pesticides and fertilizers carried by the rivers and flowing into the sea are other major pollutant agents threating the Caspian Sea. Increasing human activities in the coastlines

---

[12] Stephen B. Olsen, 'Frameworks and Indicators for Assessing Progress in Integrated Coastal Management Initiatives', *Ocean and Coastal Management*, Vol. 46, No. 3–4, 2003, pp. 347–361.

[13] Elaheh Koolaee and Mahnaz Goudarzi, *Caspian Sea: Challenges and Perspectives*, Tehran: Mizan Press, 2013.

[14] Roya Imam and Maryam Rasouli, 'Caspian Sea Environment. Challenges and Solutions', *Port and Sea Magazine*, No. 15, 2008.

[15] Elaheh Koolaee and Mahnaz Goudarzi, 'Environmental Threats of the Mazandaran Sea and the Role of the Tehran Convention in Dealing with It', *Environmental Sciences*, Vol. 1, 2009, pp. 69–94.

inattentive of principles of environmental protection leads to the growth in the amount of waste evacuated on coastal areas and degradation of the coastal environment in long term.

National level

Government's actions regarding land and water management as the main task in coastal management process depend on the capacities, methods, functions and responsibilities of the governmental organizations.

Governments implement ICM via three main tools:

1. Illegal mechanisms for cooperation with institutions, policies and rules.
2. Legal mechanisms for coordination among institutions, policies and rules.
3. New rules, policies, institutions and structures.

Regional level

Management of the coastal areas of the Caspian Sea, which are shared by five regional countries (Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Russia and the Republic of Azerbaijan) after the demise of the Soviet Union, requires regional cooperation formalized in the framework of agreements and joint actions of littoral states. During the 1st ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization) Summit meeting held on February, 16-17 1992 in Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran proposed the formation of the Caspian Sea littoral states organization. While ICM is accepted worldwide as an effective, cooperative mechanism for solving the coastal issues, the proposal failed to become a framework for cooperation among littoral states of the Caspian Sea.

Five Caspian Littoral States noting the deterioration of the marine environment of the Caspian Sea due to the pollution arising from land-based human activities, resolved to preserve living resources of the Caspian Sea for present and future generations and signed the Convention of Tehran. In the Convention it also acknowledged the need to ensure that land-based activities do not make harm for the marine environment of the Caspian Sea, mindful of the danger for the marine environment of the Caspian Sea and to its unique hydrographic and ecological characteristics related to the problem of sea-level fluctuation. It reaffirmed the importance of protection of the marine environment of the Caspian Sea; recognized the importance of cooperation among the Contracting Parties and with relevant international organizations to protect and conserve the marine environment of the Caspian Sea.[16]

The most important challenges in Russian coastal areas are:

1. Competition among different coastal users.
2. Lack of integrated policies at national and subnational levels for resolving environmental problems of the coastal areas.
3. Improper solutions for solving the Caspian Sea problems.[17]

Russia's main goal of pursuing ICM is to establish coordination among coastal users, as well as ensuring sustainable development in these regions. They use traditional methods for coastal management and lack an appropriate legal framework – environmental problems have been ignored during the transition from socialist economy to liberal one. Non-governmental organizations have limited facilities to participate in ICM and coordination between governmental and private sector –

---

[16] Ibidem.

[17] Elena E. Andreeva, Yuriy G. Mikhaylichenko and Alexanre N. Vylegjanin, 'Toward a Coastal Area Management, Act for the Russian Federation', *Journal of Coastal Conservation*, Vol. 9, No.1, January 2003, pp. 19–24.

a critical factor for successful ICM – does not exist. The main challenge before serious implementation of the Convention of Tehran remains the legal regime of the Caspian Sea.

Iran's reference to the Russian-Iranian contracts signed in February 1921 and August 1940 has failed to be considered as a robust legal standing point for reaching a practical agreement and a unitary stance among the five littoral states of the Caspian Sea. Iranian concern on providing the security of this strategic water basin without foreign intervention has affected every potential political-legal contract and agreement.[18]

International level

The Agenda 21 in the 1992 UN held Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro is an impetus for the Caspian States encouraging them to solve the Caspian Sea coastal problems through ICM. Integrated coastal management is described clearly in chapter 17, but not in details.

Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 focuses on:
1. Integrated management and sustainable development of coastal areas, including exclusive economic zones.
2. Marine environmental protection.
3. Sustainable use and conservation of marine living resources of the high seas.
4. Sustainable use and conservation of marine living resources under national jurisdiction.
5. Addressing critical uncertainties for the management of the marine environment and climate change.
6. Strengthening international, including regional, cooperation and coordination.
7. Sustainable development of small islands.

Governance and common interests in coastal areas were also discussed in the Seventh Ordinary Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 2004. World Bank, International Conference on Coasts, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), International Society for Environmental Protection (ISEP) and Recommendations of ECO, all have released guidelines for ICM at the global level.[19] Thus, the Littoral States of the Caspian Sea signed the Convention of Tehran with significant effort from the Iranian Parliament and government to legislate it.

Assessment of Good Governance in ICM: circular approach

Inherent complexities of governance process makes its assessment challenging, but emphasize on performance can help make ICM more outcome based rather than input-based accounting. Mostly, assessments of ICM are based on the number of permits issued for coastal development, level of investments and the number of rules and regulations adopted in the coastal areas, but these primitive measures may not be proper indicators for ICM success. Within the ICM policy cycle, evaluation answers two major needs: accountability and adaptive management. In practice, evaluation results are usually used in more than one way. Information used by managers

---

[18] Koolaee and Goudarzi, 'Caspian Sea…'.

[19] Biliana Cicin-Sain, Robert W. Knecht and Gregory W. Fisk, 'Growth in Capacity for Integrated Coastal Management since UNCED: an International Perspective', *Ocean & Coastal Management*, Vol. 29, No. 1–3, 1995, pp. 93–123.

_____

to improve the performance of their management strategies (adaptive management) can also be used for reporting (accountability) or lessons learned by others to improve future planning.

The ICM process can be seen as a cyclical, 6 stage process in which feedback can occur at any stage to assess the progress of the management framework:

1. Issue Identification and Assessment: this stage includes description and creation of institutional, policy and structural frameworks to pursue implementation on ICM within. This stage is helpful in creation a degree of national commitment to ICM, development of comprehensive outlook to ICM and setting institutional and organizational arrangements.

2. *Program Planning and Preparation*: this stage includes examination of the government capacity to implement integrated and effective strategies. This stage is related to the ability to coordinate between decision regarding the programs and operational strategies towards ICM.

3. Implementation: in this stage, adopted policies are put into action but due to the lack of coordination in environmental management of the coasts, ineffective coordinative mechanisms between governmental organizations and limited human and financial capacities of the actors, some problems arise in the implementation phase.

4. Surveillance and monitoring: in this important stage, the efficiency of the implemented policies and programs and their compatibility with environmental, social and economic facts on the ground is identified.

5. Feedback: in recent years, this stage has become a critical and determining factor in environmental policy making. Due to the changing social and environmental conditions, governance mechanisms should be compatible with the changes in order to act properly. Therefore, perpetual commitment to evaluate the system at the organizational level is needed.

Examples of process indicators – inputs and outputs – can include:

1. Legislative authority for management.
2. Resources allocated (personnel, budget, and facilities).
3. Institutional arrangements for planning and implementation.
4. Stakeholders participation in management.
5. Training provided to the stakeholders and local communities.
6. Stakeholders participation in implementation and surveillance, monitoring.

Conclusion

Coastal management should identify all physical, ecological, social and economic processes mutually affecting coasts and sea and make coordination among different actors at local, national, regional and international levels. At regional level, five littoral states of the Caspian Sea have recognized that seeking management strategies to diminish environmental challenges of the Caspian Sea requires effective bilateral and multilateral cooperation as well as participation of non-governmental regional and international organizations.

Integrated management of the Caspian Sea coastal zones aiming at resolving disputes and reduction of environmental problems was legislated in the framework of the Convention of Tehran. A network of governance at all four local, national, regional and international levels is essential

for solving the various problems of the Caspian basin. Given to the necessity of serious consideration of social and economic conditions of the states bordering the sea in successful ICM in this region, Good Governance approach can be helpful in appropriate implementation of ICM in the Caspian basin.

Integrated management with an emphasis on norms of good governance and promoting coordination among different coastal users can be helpful in protecting the Caspian Sea coastal areas from environmental hazards. States enjoying democratic political systems have been successful in ICM through commitment to implement Good Governance's principles. States bordering the Caspian Sea heavily involved in their own economic challenges are inattentive to environmental issues of the Caspian Sea, thus utilizing ICM in this region will be efficient in diminishing environmental problems.

Patrycja Kozieł[*]

Gender-Based Violence in Northern Nigeria. The Context of Muslim and Christian Women's Rights

Abstract

The article explores the problematic of the experience of gender-based violence by both Muslim and Christian women and the question of women's rights under Shari'a in Northern Nigeria. From a perspective of gender studies and anthropology, the current situation of women reflects their insecurity and neglect against the contextual background in which gender-based violence intersects with political-religious insurgency. More than two thousand women and girls in Northern Nigeria are reported to have been kidnapped since the start of 2014. One in three Nigerian women aged 15–24 has been a victim of violence, but it is underreported due to social and psychological pressures.

Introduction

The main purpose of this study is to examine the reason for women's oppression in Northern Nigerian society in socio-cultural and religious contexts. Since the beginning of the Boko Haram attacks against individuals and institutions, the political situation has been adequately researched, however there is not enough analysis undertaken to comprehensively describe the intense phenomenon of gender-based violence (GBV) against women in Nigeria within the specific perspective of the conflict. This study will be limited to the social injustice against Hausa Muslim and Christian women in North-central and North-eastern Nigeria, including any act or threat by men or male dominated institutions that inflict physical, sexual, or psychological harm on a woman or girl because of their gender. The study attempts to test a hypothesis based on published evidence: that links the neglect of women's security to their vulnerability and precarity. Firstly, there is an underreporting of sexual and gender-based violence, particularly rape, in Nigeria, partly due to family, social and psychological pressures; secondly, it is estimated that one in three Nigerian women and girls aged 15–24 has been victims of violence, and more than one third and up to two thirds of women are believed to have experienced physical, sexual and psychological violence in their own family.[1] It is argued that there is a need therefore to try and identify the basic cause of the social prevalence of GBV and its implications, not only in the context of socio-cultural causes, but also in relation to the political-religious related insurgency in Nigeria that currently shapes some frameworks for connecting religion with GBV.

The article provides an overview of the contemporary issues concerning Hausa women from Northern Nigeria, as well as Christian minority groups living under Shari'a law,

* Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Cultures Polish Academy of Sciences, e-mail: patrycjakoziel.edu@gmail.com.

[1] *Gender in Nigeria Report: Improving the Lives of Girls And Women in Nigeria. Issues, Politics, Action*, Abuja: British Council Report, 2012, p. 51.

in particular GBV, women's rights and daily struggles, based on the evidence and arguments of researchers. As they represent many fields of study, such as anthropology, social sciences and gender studies, the research draws attention to current discourses, definitions and different examples of understanding the problematic questions related to women studies.[2]

The notion of gender-based violence

For a proper understanding of the context within which the paper is situated, I attempt to provide a brief explanation of the notion of GBV. According to the UNHCR, the term 'gender-based violence' is used to distinguish violence, that targets individuals or groups of individuals on the basis of their gender, from other forms of violence. The first official definition of the term 'violence against women' was offered in 1993 in the UN *Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women*. It states that violence against woman is any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivations of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.[3] GBV includes sexual violence against both girls and women. Moreover, as reported by the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the term 'gender-based' provides a new context for understanding violence for the reason that it reflects the unequal power relationship between women and men that are based on different gender roles within each society, especially women's subordinate status and that it is perpetrated against a person's will. However, the term also applies to violence that is specifically targeted against men and boys. GBV comprises several categories: overt physical abuse (rape, battering, sexual assault, torture, mutilation, at home or in the workplace); psychological abuse (deprivation of liberty, forced marriage, sexual harassment, at home or in the workplace); deprivation of resources needed for physical and psychological well-being (health care, nutrition, education, means of livelihood); treatment of women as commodities (sexual slavery, forced impregnation, trafficking in women and girls for sexual exploitation).[4]

Some previous studies reflect that as a structurally-motivated phenomenon GBV is legitimised and perpetuated by social norms, institutions and traditional practices. To determine the critical issues and viewpoints concerning GBV a comprehensive review of literature and reports was conducted.[5] A recent document *Nigeria: Gender-Based Discrimination/Harm/*

---

[2] A qualitative methodology is adopted in this research using descriptive and analytical approaches drawing on literature that was gathered over several years. The data collection process included a factual and textual analysis of scholarly articles, scientific literature and international reports edited by non-governmental organisations, regarding Nigerian women and the broad context of the GBV.

[3] *Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women*, United Nations General Assembly, 20 December 1993, http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r104.htm (accessed 20 July 2017).

[4] Atta Barkindo, Benjamin Tyavkase Gudaku, Caroline Katgurum Wesley, *Our Bodies, Their Battleground. Boko Haram and Gender-Based Violence against Christian Women and Children in North-Eastern Nigeria since 1999*, Abuja: Nigeria Political Violence Research Network (NPVRN), Working Paper No. 1, 2013, p. 6.

[5] Abiola Afolabi-Akiyode (ed.), *Sharia Implementation in Nigeria, Issues & Challenges on Women's Rights and Access to Justice*, Enugu: WACOL, 2003; Fatima L. Adamu, 'Women's Struggle and the Politics of Difference in Nigeria', *Gender Politik Online*, 2006, p. 1–11; Mojbol O. Okome, 'Domestic, Regional, and International

Violence Against Women provides information and guidance on domestic violence, witchcraft and traditional harmful practices, such as forced marriage or female genital mutilation (FGM)[6]. Explaining the status of women in Nigeria, the Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) states that women are considered to constitute a particular social group (PSG) within the meaning of the UN Refugee Convention from 1951.[7] Consequently, they share an immutable (or innate) characteristic – their gender – that cannot be changed and they form a distinct group in society as evidenced by widespread discrimination in the exercise of their fundamental rights.[8] They are at risk of persecution or serious harm. Among the factors associated with an increased risk for physical and sexual violence are: relatively young age, income, being divorced or separated, prior victimization and low level of education of partners.[9] The *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women* (CEDAW), for instance, identifies the discrimination in the Penal Code. The Penal Code legalises corrective beating of a child, pupil, servant or wife, as long as this does not cause grievous hurt.[10]

The Nigeria government has spoken out about the high level of GBV. On the occasion of the *2016 International Day for Women* the House of Representatives in Abuja condemned all forms of GBV, discrimination and other types of injustices against women, including genital mutilation. Hon. Nkeiruka Onyejeocha, local member of the National House of Representatives for Abia State, expressed concern that there is still a lot of societal barriers hindering women from achieving their full potential, as illustrated by the alarming statistics of physical and sexual violence against women and girls. She called for the promotion of gender parity to ensure that women are given the same opportunities and motivation in work places.[11]

Improvements as evidenced by the adopted *Violence Against Persons (Prohibition) Act 2015* (VAPP) and *Child's Rights Act* should be noted as well.[12] In May 2015 the Nigerian Senate passed the VAPP that intends to eliminate all forms of violence in the public and private life of Nigerian citizens.[13] However, the new law has been implemented so far only in the Federal

---

Protection of Nigerian Women against Discrimination: Constraints and Possibilities', *African Studies Quarterly,* Vol. 6, No. 3, 2002, p. 33–63; Charmaine Pereira, 'Locating gender and women's studies in Nigeria: what trajectories for the future?', in *Gender activism and studies in Africa,* Signe Arnfred (eds), Dakar: CODESRIA. The Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2004, p. 1–26; Department for International Development, British Council*, Promoting women's rights through Sharia in Northern Nigeria,* Abuja: Department for International Development, 2006.

[6] United Kingdom: Home Office, *Country Information and Guidance – Nigeria: Gender-Based Discrimination/Harm/Violence Against Women*, August 2015, https://www.refworld.org/docid/55dda9204.html (accessed 19 July 2017).

[7] Ibid., p. 4.

[8] Ibidem.

[9] Oladimeji Oladepo, Bidemi Yusuf, Oyedunni Arulogun, 'Factors Influencing Gender Based Violence Among Men and Women in Selected States in Nigeria', *African Journal of Reproductive Health,* Vol. 15, No. 4, 2011, p. 84–85.

[10] *Gender in Nigeria Report…,* p. 49.

[11] Damilola Oyedele, 'Int'l Women's Day: House Condemns Gender Based Violence, Discrimination', *This Day Live,* 9 March 2016, http://www.genderhub.org/be-inspired/news-stories/intl-womens-day-house-condemns-gender-based-violence-discrimination (accessed 20 July 2017).

[12] Ibidem.

[13] *VAPP: Nigeria: Violence Against Persons (Prohibition) Act*, Nigeria: National Assembly, 2015, p. 2,

Capital Territory of Abuja, but it proves the need for further work in the improvement of women's status in Nigeria. The document affirms the right to defend human rights as it provides a maximum protection and remedies for victims and punishment for offenders and for related matters. It serves as a legislative and legal framework for the prevention of violent acts against all vulnerable persons, especially empowering women and girls, as it prohibits multiple forms of GBV such as: rape, physical injury, female circumcision, domestic abuse, trafficking, economic abuse, substance abuse, forceful ejection from home, abandonment of spouse, children and other dependents without sustenance, battery, depriving persons of their liberty, incest, indecent exposure, among others. As the Act states its purpose is to ban 'all traditional behaviour, attitudes or practices, which negatively affect the fundamental rights of women, girls and includes harmful widowhood practices, denial of inheritance or succession rights, forced marriage or forced isolation from family and friends'.[14]

Two of acts listed above are very controversial and cause concern to Nigerian women. Firstly, FGM is often considered a religious and social practice upon which woman's worth is placed, but often without her own consent. It is, however, practiced in a number of Nigerian communities (Yoruba, Igbo, Ijaw, Kanuri) under the mistaken belief that it is demanded by certain religion rules. 'FGM is recognised worldwide as a fundamental violation of the human rights of girls and women. It reflects deep-rooted inequality between the sexes and constitutes an extreme form of discrimination against women'.[15] According to UNICEF at least 200 million girls and women have experienced FGM in 30 countries in Africa and the Middle East, where the practice is most common.[16] In Nigeria, the national prevalence rate of FGM is 41 % among adult women age 15-49, but it is practiced on a smaller scale in the north, paradoxically tending to be in a more extreme form: in the North East – 1.3 %, North Central – 9.6 %, North West – 0.4%.[17] Other data reveals that the reported FGM rate among Hausa women is 12.65 %, while among Yoruba – 69.94 %.[18] There is a noticeably lower awareness level in the northern Nigeria: Igala – 20.16%, Fulani – 22.61%, Tiv – 31.19% and Hausa – 33.27%, compared to results in the south of Nigeria: Yoruba – 92.51%, Igbo – 90.37%.[19] The most common form of FGM in the northern part (65% of mutilated women) is Type 2, which is a practice involving the removal of the clitoris along with partial or total excision of the labia minora. It also had been noted that this type of excision performed on Hausa women could be based on religious reason, and since the method is traditional (performed by local circumciser or birth attendant) it is often more painful and

---

http://lawnigeria.com/LawsoftheFederation/Violation-Against-Persons-%28Prohibition%29-Act%2C-2015.html (accessed 24 July 2017).

[14] Ibid., p. 24.

[15] Tochukwu Okeke, Bond Anyaehie, C. Ezenyeaku, 'An Overview of Female Genital Mutilation in Nigeria', *Annals of Medical & Health Sciences Research,* Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012, p. 72.

[16] *Female Genital Mutilation – Cutting: A global concern*, New York: UNICEF, 2016, p. 2, https://data.unicef.org/resources/female-genital-mutilationcutting-global-concern/ (accessed 20 July 2017).

[17] Ibidem.

[18] Abayomi S. Oyekale, 'Tribal Perspectives on Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) and HIV and AIDS Risks among Married Women in Nigeria', *Ethno Med*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2014, p. 190.

[19] Ibidem.

causes higher tendencies of complications or higher risk of HIV.[20] The study reveals that the age of circumcision is 0–12 months (85%), overall, middle-aged women (45–49) are more than twice as likely to be circumcised than younger women age 15–49 (36% and 15%, respectively).[21]

Secondly, the newly constituted law does not offer women in the north the adequate protection from certain forms of GBV, which are commonly institutionalised by culture and are possibly underestimated for political reasons. The prohibition of forced isolation from relatives might be viewed by many young women as outlawing the Hausa cultural practice of purdah (*kulle*, seclusion of women) and is seen to open to them new agency and empowerment[22]. However, Coles and Mack claim, in their study of Muslim Hausa women, that in rural areas seclusion is limited, but the practice shows that women are misrecognized and denied the individual status in seclusion[23]. Strict form of *kulle*, as a colonial rule, became most marked in the pre-independence time. Since then it had a profound impact on Hausa women's mobility and status in a family life[24]. However, for many women the seclusion is not regarded as violence, but rather – it gives them a space for their own agency.

Contextual background: Gender-based violence in the political-religious context

GBV is a contentious issue among both Muslim and Christian women in Nigeria. By identifying areas of disagreement and of consensus among researchers, three different perspectives on GBV in the political-religious context were identified, which have a focus on the relationship of GBV to Islam or active opposition to it. The approaches outlined below highlight three typical characterizations and theories as suggested by Barkindo *et al*.[25] They present an overview of contemporary issues concerning Boko Haram and GBV against the group of Christian women and children in North-eastern Nigeria since 1999, who are being targeted more frequently in ongoing political and religious power struggle. It is argued that GBV should be interpreted more widely than cultural or economic causes and to include the importance of a broad view of the effects of political insurgency. They endeavor to interrogate the direct link of types and degrees of violence to social, political or ideological motivations, conflict strategies and mobilization processes[26]. However, it is generally believed that Boko Haram attacks everybody regardless of any religious bias and likewise any cultural back ground.

The first framework for understanding GBV and the political insurgency by Boko Haram proposed by researchers from *Nigeria's Political Violence Research Network* describes GBV

---

[20] Ibidem.

[21] *Female Genital Mutilation…*, p. 21.

[22] Patrycja Kozieł, 'Hausa women's rights and changing perception of gender in Northern Nigeria', in *Hausa and Chadic Studies in Honour of Professor Stanisław Piłaszewicz,* Nina Pawlak, Ewa Siwierska, Izabela Will, Warsaw: Elipsa, 2014, p. 221.

[23] Catherine Coles, Beverly Mack, *Hausa Women in the Twentieth Century,* Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1991, p. 8.

[24] Hauwa Mahdi, *Gender & Citizenship, Hausa Women's Political Identity from the Caliphate to the Protectorate,* Göteborg: Göteborg University, 2006, p. 323.

[25] Barkindo, Gudaku, Wesley *Our Bodies, Their Battleground. Boko Haram…*, p. 9–11.

[26] Ibid., p. 4.

as rooted in Islam and Islamic ideological systems (despite the fact that it could be vehemently rejected by many scholars, as Islam preaches peace)[27]. It means that there is a strong interpretation of Shari'a and Islamic thought concerning the social meanings ascribed to gender, female identity and man – woman relations within the family and community. The canonical law of Islam is held to be divine law, implemented as part of both individual and whole Muslim community's submission to God's will. It is regarded as the path or way of God, based on several sources for legal guidance, which is recorded in the Qur'an, hadith (the narratives of practices and sayings of Prophet Muhammad), as well as in the consensus, analogical reasoning and interpretations[28]. However, it is argued that the Shari'a is mediated by different schools of Islamic jurisprudence and interpretations, and the politics of religious institutions and reforms determine the extent to which GBV is directly implicated. Still, GBV, as stated by Barkindo *et al*, is considered to be derived from the opposition toward gender equality and the belief that social and familial roles are legitimately (naturally or divinely) hierarchical because of the differences between sexes. Explaining it further, the Qur'an says:

> "and say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty; and that they should not display their beauty and ornaments except what must ordinarily appear thereof; that they should draw their veils over their bosoms and not display their beauty save to their husbands, or their fathers and their husbands' father, or their sons or their husbands' sons, or their brothers or their brothers' sons, or their sisters' sons, or their women, or their slaves whom their right hand possess, or male servants free of physical desire, or small children who have no sense of sex; and that they should not stamp their feet in order to draw attention to their hidden ornaments".[29]

This perspective, in which the power of men over woman is given to the man, is reinforced by Shari'a and justified in religious matters and diverse rights and duties.[30] The man's sanctioned right and responsibility to control the life and movement of his wife or daughters, can be interpreted as contributing to the common acceptance and prevalence of several forms of violence against women (honour killings, sexual abuse, rape), supported by religion's rules.

According to the second approach, some Muslim feminist scholars underline the lack of consensus on the patriarchal interpretation in which GBV is accepted as a social practice. The authors argue that GBV is a patriarchal misinterpretation and misrepresentation of Islamic Holy texts.[31] They suggest that Shari'a cannot justify violence against women, as the problem is not constituted in Islam or Islamic theological texts themselves, but rather, it depends on the misjudgement of Qur'an by conservative Muslim clerics: 'Islamic jurisprudence, or Shari'a, is not a predetermined list of rules, but an intellectual tradition of interpreting texts. Islamic Holy Books can be interpreted to support relatively progressive legislation affecting women's rights

---

[27] Ibid., p. 9.
[28] Judith E. Tucker, *Women, Family and Gender in Islamic Law,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 12–13.
[29] *The Holy Qur'an*, Surah an-Nur 24:31, translated by A.A. Yusuf, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth, 2000.
[30] Mahdi, *Gender & Citizenship, Hausa Women's…*, p. 207–210.
[31] Barkindo, Gudaku, Wesley, *Our Bodies, Their Battleground. Boko Haram…*, p. 10.

or to serve as an obstacle'.[32] The perspectives or theories about interpretation of texts vary just as there are different analysis of feminists regarding the causes of gender problems.[33] The tensions between these discourses also suggest the support gathered by Boko Haram among patriarchal Muslims in the North and its conflict with modernisation and progressive interpretation of women's rights represented by the government.

Additional to these two arguments is a third perspective, in which it is argued that GBV can be interpreted as state political manipulation of Islam.[34] Scholars and authors of publication reject the direct linkage between religion and GBV and propose the examination of relations between state and religion. They reveal that the state has the outstanding responsibility to create laws and prohibitions, but it has refused to regard GBV as a form of violence showing dismissive attitudes toward women's precarious position. The Government, at the federal and state level, has failed to prevent, investigate and punish such violence. However, in many cases and interpretations of law, the right for women to divorce, the question of custody for their children or inheritance, are protected. This negligence brings about misunderstanding of women's rights, as well as opening a space for the incursionary and discriminatory acts of violence by Boko Haram. In addition, Sami Zubaida claims that 'there is generally shared commitment between Islamists and regimes to preserve patriarchal family relations'.[35] Furthermore, the concept of women is based here on the 'Sunni ultra-Salafi radicalism' and, as stated by Gilbert in explaining the ideologically-driven mindset,

> "women are traditionally treated as second-class citizens under Salafi ideology […]. Islam casts women as lesser beings who, to varying degrees, require male guardianship. Female sexuality is generally perceived as a powerful and dangerous force, a predatory threat to male spirituality and family honor – a perilous feminine element that demands stringent supervision and – because of their lesser value and legal status – leads to grave endangerment to women".[36]

The most significant marker of the current situation in Nigeria was the plight of 276 girls (both Muslim and Christians) abducted in the middle of the night on April 14, 2014, by the militant Islamist group Boko Haram from their secondary school's dormitory in the town of Chibok. The injustice elicited open condemnation and special advocacy. This abduction, which has garnered international attention through *#bringbackourgirls* campaign, was not the first time Boko Haram attacked young girls for attending school. Since Boko Haram has launched its more widespread and systematic attacks against civilians,[37] unknown numbers of girls have been

---

[32] Ibidem.

[33] Margot Badran, 'Shari'a Activism in Nigeria in the Era of Hudud', in *Feminism in Islam. Secular and Religious Convergences*, Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2009, p. 279–299.

[34] Ibidem.

[35] Sami Zubaida, 'Islam and the Politics of Community and Citizenship', *Middle East Report,* Vol. 31, No. 4, 2001, p. 24.

[36] Lela Gilbert, *Gender-Based Violence as an Expression of Christian Persecution in Muslim Lands*, World Watch Research Unit of Open Doors International, 2013, p. 15.

[37] Sabina Brakoniecka, 'The Beginnings of the Boko Haram Rebellion from a Micro-level Perspective', *Hemispheres. Studies on Cultures and Societies*, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2015, p. 78–85.

forced to participate in military operations and civil, collective violence (burning schools, killings of teachers and open threats to countless families supporting their daughters' education).

During several raids in towns and villages in North-eastern Nigeria, abducted women and girls under the age of 15 years were forced to marry members of Boko Haram or forcibly recruited into the group, conscripted to serve as spies and to take active part both in battle or in executions.[38] Many were detained in camps and towns under Boko Haram control. More recently, women and girls, who spent time in captivity and escaped, reported the cases of sexual violence such as sexual slavery. They have found themselves rejected by the local communities and became subject to further abuse. Being referred to as 'Boko Haram wives', 'Sambisa women', 'Boko Haram blood', 'Annoba' (epidemics) by the local communities, reveals the social stigma they now carry from the fears that their exposure to direct violence could spread to other members of society.[39] Further consequence of the suspicion that they are linked to attacks, is that they have been placed in prison camps by government troops. It is reported that they are subjected to inhuman treatment and severe maltreatment (including theft, rape), by the government troops.[40] The successive and repeated subjugation of girls and women reflects one of the most pervasive violations of the rights of women and girls during the period of displacement due to an armed conflict. Moreover, a little progress has been made to end violations by Nigerian armed forces and provide accountability for crimes under international law. As reported by Nahida, a 50-year-old woman whose eight-year-old daughter was injured in Hussainiya (Zaria) in 2015, told Amnesty International:

"My daughter, aged eight, had gone to Hussainiya in the morning because every Saturday she had lessons there from 9am to 2pm. I sent my son to collect her but he called me and said he could not approach because there were soldiers around the Hussainiya. He then called again and said at about 2.30pm and said there was shooting. I set off with my 17-year-old daughter and my other son and we managed to reach the Hussainiya through back roads. We did not attempt to leave as it was too dangerous. At night the shooting grew more intense. The soldiers were flashing bright lights and shooting with heavy weapons. In the morning when the soldiers stormed the building they shot blindly. Bullets were flying everywhere and injured and killed people. My eight-year-old daughter was hit [in her lower right flank, seemingly by shrapnel from a ricocheting bullet]. She said to a soldier 'why did you do this' and he slapped her hard on her face. Two women I know were killed there. Jamila, a woman in her 30s, was shot in the chest near the kitchen and Fatima, a young girl of about 18 or 20, was shot in the head near the toilet".[41]

---

[38] *Bad Blood. Perceptions of children born of conflict-related sexual violence and women and girls associated with Boko Haram in northeast Nigeria,* London: International Alert/UNICEF Nigeria, 2016, p. 6–10.
[39] Ibid., p. 15.
[40] *Nigeria: Human rights violations by the military continue in the absence of accountability for crimes under international law. Written statement to the 32nd session of the UN Human Rights Council* (13 June – 1 July 2016), London: Amnesty International, 2016, p. 1–2, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr44/4203/2016/en/ (accessed 19 July 2017).
[41] *Nigeria – "Unearthing the Truth": Unlawful Killings and Mass Cover-Up in Zaria*, 22 April 2016, London: Amnesty International, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr01/3883/2016/en/ (accessed 20 July

In recent years, however, the impact that the conflict has on women has moved to the forefront, the issue of Nigerian women's subordinate and unstable status and the question of their extreme exploitation and vulnerability in conflict zones have been also engaged with, regarded as a crisis needing intervention. The concern has been raised that women are not just victims of GBV, but also captured as a tactic of war[42]. In this context, some current researchers argue there is evidence that gender is now an increasingly significant component of operations, tactics, messaging and ideology, which reveals in turn a great instrumentalisation of women's status. As Zenn and Pearson state, the version of Shari'a supported by the military group

"promotes narrow gender roles for men and women, enforcing strict rules on women's dress and sexual conduct and instituting other discriminatory and abusive practices against women. Boko Haram's leaders listed among the values to be opposed: 'the rights and privileges of Women, the idea of homosexualism, lesbianism, rape of infants, blue films, prostitution' and beauty pageants, associated with Western ideals".[43]

The report cited previously includes the description of woman's experience: 'their movements were restricted and they were given little food. The older women were often released, while the younger women were forced into marriage, sometimes after the payment of a dowry. Christian women and girls were told to convert and attend Qur'anic classes to prepare them for a forced marriage'.[44] Simultaneously, many Muslim women were effectively used as slave labourers and were frequently humiliated by their militia captors.

Since the start of 2014, more than 2000 women and girls in the region have been kidnapped and thousands of children, both girls and boys, were forced out of schools across communities in Adamawa, Borno, Yobe and Kaduna states.[45] What is important to emphasize is that GBV against Muslim women and girls has implications for the long term insecurity of the girl child and their right to education. The armed insurgency, the use of women as a tactic of war and the further abuse in government military camps reveals their vulnerability and precarity. A continuum of vulnerability is situated within the fabric of social inequalities and unequal power relations under Shari'a law in Northern Nigeria. Young, unmarried women in particular become subjected to many forms of discrimination, being targeted by strangers or their own family members, they are especially vulnerable to exploitation precisely because they tend to lack any means of recourse due to their age. Married female women were more likely to experience physical violence than single women.[46]

2017).

[42] Jacob Zenn, Elisabeth Pearson, 'Women, Gender and the evolving tactics of Boko Haram', *Journal of Terrorism Research,* Vol. 5, No. 1, 2014, p. 46–57.

[43] Idem., p. 47–51.

[44] Amnesty International Report, '*Our job is to shoot, slaughter and kill'. Boko Haram's reign of terror in north east Nigeria*, London: Amnesty International, 2015, p. 32, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr44/1360/2015/en/ (accessed 15 July 2017).

[45] *Nigeria: Human rights violations*…, p. 3.

[46] *Nigeria: Gender-Based Discrimination*…, p. 15.

Muslim women's rights under Shari'a and their activism

The introduction of Shari'a in 12 states in the Northern Nigeria successively from 1999 has opened a new sphere for raising serious questions about the human rights of Muslim girls and women. The complexities of plural legal systems (statutory law, customary law, and Shari'a) mean that women are protected from discrimination under the constitution and legal acts on the national level, but customary and religious laws, including Shari'a, profoundly restrict these rights in practice.[47] Hence, discriminatory laws, violence against Muslim women and gender stereotypes continue to hinder a greater progress towards gender equality in Nigeria. There is no sufficient state law nor specific Islamic legal thought prohibiting domestic violence against Muslim women in Nigeria, except in southern and central states (Lagos, Ebonyi, Cross River, Jigawa, Ekiti and Federal Capital Territory of Abuja), but the extent of the effectiveness of this law should be subjected to a broader research.[48]

As suggested by feminist Muslim scholars,[49] Islam accepts woman's active pursuit of her rights as member of the society and even fosters it through an egalitarian and non-discriminatory approach. However, in social practice it looks different, because Islamic legal thought has assigned women and men distinct social roles[50]. Women systematically face violence at home and in public space.[51] Some social practices applicable in the Hausa regions permit violence against women, such as corporal punishment, sexual harassment, bullying of girls, marriages of pre-pubescent girls to older men, verbal abuse, emotional and psychological abuse, marital rape, according to the report *Promoting women's rights through Sharia in Northern Nigeria*.[52] Moreover, the ongoing conflict between Boko Haram members and the Nigerian security forces, the government's inability or unwillingness to protect women and girls from criminal activity, as well as the high prevalence of different types of acts of violence which are woven into social and cultural discourse, disrupt the provision of internal security, health, education and other public services guaranteed by the Nigerian government. Some high-risk

---

[47] Margot Badran, 'Shari'a Activism in Nigeria…', p. 279–299.

[48] *Nigeria: Gender-Based Discrimination*…, p. 10.

[49] Saba Mahmood, *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005; Akachi Adimora–Ezeigbo, *Gender Issues in Nigeria: A Feminine Perspective*, Lagos: Vista Books, 1996.

[50] Tucker, *Women, Family and Gender*…, p. 24–37.

[51] Mariam M. Abdul (eds.), *An analysis of the socio-economic, socio cultural, religious, environmental, technological, language and educational factors on women's right in Nigeria: the case of. Northern Nigeria*, Madrid: Nawey 2012. See more: Oluyemisi Bamgbose, 'Customary Law Practices and Violence against Women: The Position under the Nigerian Legal System', in *Proceedings of the Women's World 2002. The 8th International Interdisciplinary Congress on Women*, United Nations Economic and Social Council. Economic Commission for Africa, Kampala: Makerere University, 2002.

[52] See more: Sylvia C. Ifemeje, 'Gender-Based Domestic Violence in Nigeria: A Socio-Legal Perspective', *Indian Journal of Gender Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2012, p. 137–148; Ani Kelechi Johnmary, 'Violent Traditional Gender Practices and Implications for Nation Building Process in Nigeria', *Public Policy and Administration Research*, Vol. 2, No. 5, 2012, p. 44–56; Nkiru Igbellina-Igbokwe, 'Contextualizing Gender Based Violence Within Patriarchy in Nigeria', *Pan-African Voices for Freedom and Justice, Pambazuka News*, Issue 632, 2013, p. 1–12.

factors of the normalisation of GBV include the perception that violent actions are justified and go unpunished. Also the perpetrators show no remorse, as the common practice shows, the rule of 'punishing the victim, not the perpetrator' still holds more weight.[53] The victim is punished for making unproved allegations, as reported in cases of many Hausa women, while the perpetrator enjoys impunity. For instance, Bariya Ibrahim Magazu, aged 17 years, was sentenced to 180 strokes of cane by a lower Shari'a court of Tsafe in Zamfara State, in September 2000: 100 strokes for having had sexual relations outside marriage and 80 strokes for allegedly falsely accusing three men of raping her. It reflects that, since there were not four (male) witnesses to support her allegations of rape, there was no conviction and she as the victim was accused of having extramarital sexual relations and therefore faced severe consequences.[54] Similar problems were experienced by Haruna Dutsi and Aishat Dutsi or Umaru Tori Gwaram.

The definitions of rape, which is criminalised in the Shari'a penal laws, do not conform to the principles underlying the Rome Statute definition, they do not provide sufficient protection or redress for women and girls who have been raped, and furthermore, also discriminate against married ones. In some cases, a woman's failure to consent has not been considered in criminal proceedings.[55] It means that GBV might be the seen as one of results of discrimination under Shari'a in cases of rape. Women try to avoid being accused of the offence of adultery (*zina*), which carries a sentence of death by stoning. Several cases from Northern Nigeria involving the charge of adultery (of Amina Lawal and Safiyyatu Hussaini) have been globally heard and publicised in many official reports.[56] Amnesty International describes how in Kano state married women are liable to be punished, if they cannot meet the required conditions to prove their case:

> "Kano Shari'a Penal Code Law in Section 127 lists conditions that must be fulfilled in order to prove rape or *zina* (extramarital sexual relations) in respect of a married person: Islam; maturity; sanity; liberty; valid marriage; consummation of the marriage; four witnesses; or confession. If a woman who alleges that she has been raped fails to establish any of these conditions, she is liable to imprisonment for one year and up to 100 lashes".[57]

The effect is that Hausa women are being discouraged from seeking justice because of the social stigma and the lack of diligent prosecution. For instance, in high risk areas within Kano state (Hotoro community, Kofar Ruwa Motor Park, Naibawa Motor Park and the rural community of Zakirai in Gabasawa) the rape cases are under special control of organisations: Justice for All, Kano State Justice Sector Reform Team (KJSRT) and Coalition against Rape and Violence (CARAV).[58] They ensure that women and girls have equal access to effective safety, security and justice systems; implement a state-wide public sensitisation on rape that is aimed at educating and discouraging would-be perpetrators, encouraging victims and members of their families

---

[53] *Rape: The Silent Weapon, Nigeria*, Amnesty International Report, 28 November 2006, p. 33, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr44/020/2006/en/ (accessed 17 July 2017).
[54] Ibid., p. 34.
[55] Chineze Onyejekwe, 'Nigeria: The Dominance of Rape', *Journal of International Women's Studies,* Vol. 10, No. 1, 2008, p. 52.
[56] Pereira, 'Locating gender and women's studies in Nigeria…', p. 56.
[57] *Rape: The Silent*…, p. 33.
[58] *Justice for All Nigeria,* London: British Council, October 2015, p. 6.

to report rape cases.

Certain gender issues are revealed when the relationship between Muslim women and men, their respective roles, privileges, status and positions are identified and analyzed.[59] Hausa women's activism in response to insurgency based violence experienced in Nigeria is not widespread. There are a few organizations striving to improve Hausa women's empowerment, eliminate discriminatory practices and prevent violence against women in the family, but they operate without the support of the government. Awareness of women's perspectives and education are particularly critical for understanding the roots of the problem of violence and enhancing the effectiveness of any prevention programmes among Muslim women. Project Alert on Violence against Women, Legal Defence and Assistance Project (it developed a model Domestic Violence Bill proposed to several States' Houses of Assembly and set up a national network of men against violence), the Women Advocates Research and Documentation Centre (WARDC) and the International Federation of Female Lawyers (FIDA) are non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that have provided counselling, medical care and contributed to policy and legislative changes, thereby enabling survivors of violence in the family to have access to justice, including providing them with shelter, free legal aid and assistance, and services on training, research, advocacy and conflict resolution to mention a few. Abdul *et al* identify challenges faced by activists, which can be classified as both external to the movement and within the feminist's collectives, starting with a poor recognition of Hausa women's issues by the government; the gross misconception that their intervention might disrupt the status quo of the society; negative press and double standards within and outside the movement.[60]

Women are reclaiming their rights under Islam in several religious communities that are uniting in the Federation of Muslim Women's Associations in Nigeria (FOMWAN) – previously the Muslim Sisters Organisation (MSO). Other human rights organisations, which have also been developed to pay more attention to women issues, are stated below: The Centre for Citizens' Emancipation and Empowerment (aimed at liberation of women in purdah and tenders legal advice to the oppressed and underprivileged women); BAOBAB for Women's Human Rights; The Centre for Citizens' Emancipation and Empowerment, Women's Rights Advancement and Protection Alternative (WRAPA); The Women's Consortium of Nigeria (WOCON); The Nigerian Feminists' Forum (NFF), the international solidarity network Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML); The National Council of Women's Societies; Girls Power Initiative (GPI); Women's Consortium of Nigeria; Widening Scope for Rights and Development (WISCORD); Women's Aid Collective; Women Against Rape, Sexual Harassment and Sexual Exploitation (WARSHE); Women Centre For Peace And Development (WOPED); Murtala Muhammed Foundation.

Women's Rights Advancement and Protection Alternative (WRAPA) also embarked on a three year project focusing on Islamic Family Law in seven Shari'a implementing states in Nigeria. The project was aimed at: documenting Islamic Family Law and practices towards

---

[59] Nina Pawlak, ''Woman' and 'man' in Hausa language and culture', in *Hausa and Chadic studies in honour…*, p. 172–187.

[60] Miriam M. Abdul (eds.), *Analysis of the History, Organisations and Challenges of Feminism in Nigeria,* Madrid: Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID), 2011.

achieving and enhancing the full recognition and enjoyment of women's rights with specific focus on key family law issues; legal aid support for women which have achieved positive attitudinal shifts in perceptions and practices.[61] Additionally, Project Alert focuses on the area of women's human rights abuse, offering services, shelter to victims of abuse and carrying out advocacy and sensitisation on issues such practices as FGM, female disinheritance, male child preference, girl-child marriage, sexual harassment and domestic violence. The organisation, Murtala Muhammed Foundation, has sought to improve the living conditions of Nigerians and implemented information-sharing on strategies to prevent and manage disasters effectively, through the programme 'Grief Trauma and Counseling' to victims of communities, where disasters have occurred.[62] From 2015 it embarked on a project to interview relatives of each of the missing Chibok girls. The team managed to question almost all of the families and to highlight how the families have struggled to cope with violence and trauma.

Conclusions

The paper examines the complex context of Nigerian women's insecurity and exposure to GBV. It is argued that high levels of GBV intersect with and are deepened by the political insurgency, strengthened by socio-cultural practices. The direction of changes in the current situation is difficult to predict. As Alexander Thurston concludes: 'Boko Haram represents an ugly paradox: its ideas have limited appeal but significant staying power'.[63] Undoubtedly, the existence of GBV affecting women was the evident practice before the appearance of Boko Haram. Conflicting religious discourses co-exist, patriarchy is in opposition to modernization, as well as progressive readings of the Shari'a. The continuous violence and the unstable security situation contribute to acts of discrimination in which women and girls, both Muslim and Christian, have been targeted. There is a lack of comprehensive official figures and data to assess the extent of the claim regarding the direct state involvement in perpetrating rights violations against women. It should be ensured that all Nigerian women, who have been subjected to any form of violence, have access to redress in the form of equal access to justice, economic and social rights, including education, freedom of movement, property, employment, social entitlements and political participation in the context of gender-sensitivity measures.

---

[61] Ibid., p. 13.

[62] *Murtala Muhammed Foundation website*, 2016, http://mmfnigeria.org (accessed 10 June 2017).

[63] Alexander Thurston, *Boko Haram: The History of and African Jihadist Movement*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017, p. 301.

Artur Malantowicz[*]

Democracy or Stability? Everlasting Dilemma of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Abstract

So far Jordan has witnessed only minor reforms, and the word "democracy" has been used as a façade for the authoritarian regime. The ruling elites, to a great extent, explain such approach by their willingness to provide security and stability. The question that should be raised, however, is why stability has to necessarily oppose the notion of democracy? This paper aims to explore this dilemma by analyzing key features of the monarchy, indicating how stability is embedded in it. The paper concludes that the stability rhetoric pursued by the regime and transposed onto the society hinders further democratic development in Jordan.

> "Everyone needs to start thinking differently about the Middle East. The international community's old approach was to prioritize stability over democracy and pursue Israeli-Arab peace on a completely separate diplomatic track. This policy proved to be a failure – placing stability ahead of democracy brought neither, and isolated peace efforts went nowhere. If the US and other world powers want to make headway on their three key objectives – stability, political reform and peace – they need to understand how they are linked and pursue all three simultaneously and holistically".[1]

Introduction

The *status quo* in Jordan has remained largely intact for the past quarter-century despite the alleged political opening in 1989 and subsequent liberalisation of the socio-economic system. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is an authoritarian regime where the king holds almost absolute power, and where the very word "democracy" has been used for decades as a façade for the sake of gaining international support and calming the public. The discourse prevailing in the Kingdom sets stability as a key priority to be pursued by all means, even at the expense of democratic reform. Initially launched by the ruling elites, the stability rhetoric gained popular support when the middle class and other groups of the multifaceted Jordanian society jumped on the bandwagon. The question that should be raised, however, is for whom such stability is de facto meant for, and, accordingly, why does it necessarily have to oppose the notion of democracy? Thus, it is essential to explore the main socio-economic, political, historical, contemporary, domestic, and international features of the monarchy in Jordan in order to verify which ones are, quite irreconcilably, calling for stabilising the status quo instead of pushing for meaningful reform.

Full understanding of the contemporary social relations in general, but in the Middle East in particular, requires knowledge about short-term and long-term events, as well as the processes that preceded them. Such an assumption stems from acknowledging the path dependence with all its

[1] Marwan Muasher and Javier Solana, 'Peace Now for Palestine', *Project Syndicate*, 14 March 2011, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/peace-now-for-palestine (accessed 21 July 2016).

_____

consequences.[2] As Jean Grugel rightfully remarked, "Legacies from the past – cultural, political, social – condition, shape, and constrain how (and whether) democratisation happens and the perceptions of key actors about what is, and is not, possible".[3] Same conditions apply to the stability and democracy nexus. Simultaneously, as Andrzej Gałganek argued, social development is not only a multilinear, but also an interactive and interdependent process, and it might be determined or transformed by external pressures.[4] Therefore, it is essential to link a sociological explanation focused on the nature of societies with a geopolitical explanation based on conditions generated by their co-existence.[5] Both components are also vital in elucidating the concept of stability.

Democracy & stability vs. democracy or stability

Very little clarity on the nature of the relationship between democracy and stability can be found in the scholarly literature. This stems not only from the multiplicity of approaches to study both phenomena – and thus differing definitions of the two – but also from the difficulty in designing a clear-cut model applicable to all case studies in question. Potentially, different linkages would be identified when the stability of full-fledged democracies are analysed. Likewise, different analytical categories would have to be applied when analysing authoritarian states that perceive democracy as a threat to their very existence – they would surely have a distinct understanding of stability as well. The case of Jordan falls into the latter category where democracy would imply progress, change, and, eventually, regime transition. In the following analysis, democracy will be understood as a denotation of exactly these processes.

Leon Hurwitz identified four possible approaches to understand political stability: (1) the absence of violence, (2) government longevity/endurance, (3) the existence of a legitimate constitutional order, and (4) as the absence of structural change. Quite understandably, some of them are not necessarily depicting the same reality (e.g. government's endurance does not imply existence of a legitimate constitutional order, etc.).[6] Conversely, F. E. Dessauer's definition of stability is two-fold: it is opposed to progress in the narrow sense, while in the wider sense it "includes a good deal of progress and consists in the ability of social organism[s] to avoid excessive and one-sided advances as well as the immobility, which leads to breakdowns".[7] He then postulates pursuing "functional stability," a state of equilibrium between "absolute stability" and "absolute change", where the conditions are "as fixed as possible and as adaptable as necessary".[8] Going further, Moshe Farjoun posited that stability and change are fundamentally

_____

[2] James Mahoney, 'Path dependence in historical sociology', *Theory and Society*, Vol. 29, 2000, p. 507–548.

[3] Jean Grugel, *Democratization: a critical introduction*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 10.

[4] Andrzej Gałganek, 'Abstrakcja nierównego i połączonego rozwoju w wyjaśnianiu historii stosunków międzynarodowych' [The Abstract Theory of the Uneven and Combined Development in Explaining the History of International Relations], *Prawo i Polityka* [Law and Politics], Vol. 1, No. 1, 2009, p. 80.

[5] Andrzej Gałganek, 'Czy istnieje teoria społeczna «międzynarodowości» i «wewnętrzności»?' [Is There a Social Theory of 'Internationality' and 'Intranationality'?], *Przegląd Politologiczny* [Political Science Review], Vol. XII, No. 2, 2007, pp. 22, 32.

[6] Leon Hurwitz, 'Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability', *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1973, p. 449.

[7] F.E. Dessauer, *Stability*, New York: The MacMillan Company, 1949, p. 269.

[8] Ibid., p. 151.

interdependent, both contradictory and mutually enabling.[9] As Patrick McCarthy argued, the only facet of the concept of stability upon which the literature seems to agree is the idea that stability is something positive, desired, and preserved once achieved.[10]

Looking from the other side of the nexus, Kenneth Bollen and Robert Jackman underlined that first and foremost democracy should not be confounded with stability as it may lead to uninterpretable associations.[11] Likewise, Patrick Bernhagen stressed that stability or civil peace should not be treated as a dimension of democracy. Just as a democratic system cannot guarantee economic growth or administrative efficiency, it also cannot escape threats and challenges to its domestic stability. Democratic institutions may, however, "serve to channel discontent and resolution of major grievances away from the street and into more orderly modes of settling conflicts".[12] On the other hand, as Karl Derouen Jr. and Shaun Goldfinch argued, democracy has a fairly consistent positive effect on stability. They nonetheless acknowledge that although good governance, rule of law, and secularism also foster stability, none of these are exclusive to democratic states.[13] Simultaneously, Jasper Doomen sees citizen inequality as a key cause of instability while, in his opinion, democracies are better institutionally suited to deal with such a problem.[14]

When comparing low-income countries, Joseph Siegle demonstrated that those classified as democracies typically experience higher growth rates and improved living standards, in effect contributing to their stability. 'Low-income democracies, on average, generate life expectancies a decade longer, child mortality rates 50 per cent lower, secondary school enrolment levels that are 40 per cent higher, and cereal yields 30 per cent more robust than autocracies in the same income cohort'.[15] Similarly, democracies are supposedly more "peaceful" as they are better able to address the many contradictory interests of social groups. Inherently helpful in the process are shared power, a system of checks and balances, and the capacity of self-correction.

Quite problematic in and of itself is the process of democratization, which, according to Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, is by its very nature destabilising. First, toppling an autocratic leader or simply undergoing political change does not automatically yield an improved status of democracy. As such, it may produce more threats to a state's security and jeopardise its stability.[16] Likewise, Joseph Siegle indicated that transition processes are vulnerable to being hijacked by 'political opportunists who seize the momentum for change in order to pursue their own

---

[9] Moshe Farjoun, 'Beyond Dualism: Stability and Change As a Duality', *Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2010, p. 213.

[10] Patrick A. McCarthy, *Hierarchy and Flexibility in World Politics. Adaptation to shifting power distributions in the United Nations Security Council and the International Monetary Fund*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998, p. 1.

[11] Kenneth A. Bollen and Robert W. Jackman, 'Democracy, Stability, and Dichotomies', *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 54, 1989, pp. 612–621.

[12] Patrick Bernhagen, 'Measuring Democracy and Democratization', in *Democratization,* Christian W. Haerpfer, Patrick Bernhagen, Ronald F. Inglehart, Christian Welzel (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 30–31.

[13] Karl Derouen Jr. and Shaun Goldfinch, 'What Makes a State Stable and Peaceful? Good Governance, Legitimacy and Legal-Rationality Matter Even More for Low-Income Countries', *Civil Wars*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2012, pp. 499–520.

[14] Jasper Doomen, 'Political Stability After the Arab Spring', *Sociological Forum*, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2013, pp. 399–408.

[15] Joseph Siegle, 'Overcoming Dilemmas of Democratisation: Protecting Civil Liberties and the Right to Democracy', *Nordic Journal of International Law*, No. 81, 2012, pp. 474–475.

[16] Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, 'Democratization and the Danger of War', *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1995, pp. 5–38.

ideological or economic interests'.[17] When analysing the Middle East after 2011, Mohammad Al-Momani added the following to the list of potential challenges for stability: (1) regional or international intervention, (2) potential for the creation of a failed state, (3) the influx of refugees, (4) sectarian conflict, and (5) economic decline during the transition period.[18] It is then legitimate to raise questions about the possible results of a political change in the region, especially if the costs of democratic reversals are high for both the society and international community.[19]

It is justifiable to claim that also many autocratic regimes maintain their stability. Johannes Gerschewski offered an analytical model explaining the three pillars of authoritarian stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation. The first pillar, defined as "a process of gaining support" (even though rarely connoted with autocracy), has to balance the overt abuse of power, whereas repression of both high and low intensity constitutes the very basis of an authoritarian regime. It is, however, very costly to maintain stability in a long-term perspective. The most important pillar, it seems, is co-optation, which is described as 'the capacity to tie strategically-relevant actors (or a group of actors) to the regime elite'.[20] Their loyalty is guaranteed through neopatrimonial patronage and clientelism and by distributing political appointments, state benefits, jobs, or other privileges. In consequence, these actors constitute the major power opposing any reform even after toppling the authoritarian regime since they have vast interests in maintaining the hitherto patron-client networks and status quo.[21]

No matter what is the political regime, the concept of stability tends to be hijacked and instrumentalised for political purposes, very often being presented in utopian terms. As Dessauer rightfully remarked, 'The unpriced and arbitrary use of the concept of stability is, in consequence of its vagueness, a frequent cover for politics of deception and of muddling through. The word appeals to human minds, but it does not commit the speaker to any definite policy'.[22] As such, stability triggers people's emotions and desires, reveals their primary interests and concerns. That is why stability tends to be presented with a positive connotation, although frequently it is deprived of its real meaning, merely being limited to a word 'used to indicate approval for a policy by saying that it promotes stability'.[23] Dessauer posited that it is invoked particularly often in times of uncertainty, but also used to maintain discourse of danger where stability is susceptible to both internal and external threats.[24] In Dennys' words, 'Those who define [stability] often have political agenda in identifying and pursuing it'.[25]

While there is no consensus whether democracy is always tied to stability, there is no distinctive contradiction between these two phenomena either. Hence, their juxtaposition should not be of a dichotomous and disjunctive character, but instead it should be perceived as a possible positive correlation. Nonetheless, there is a risk that the transition period, whether run

---

[17] Siegle, 'Overcoming…', p. 472.

[18] Mohammad Al-Momani, 'The Arab 'Youth Quake': Implications for Democratization and Stability', *Middle East Law and Governance,* No. 3, 2011, pp. 163–168.

[19] Siegle, 'Overcoming…', p. 471.

[20] Johannes Gerschewski, 'The three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation in autocratic regimes', *Democratization*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2013, pp. 13–38.

[21] Siegle, 'Overcoming…', p. 478.

[22] Dessauer, *Stability…*, p. 102.

[23] Robert Axelrod, 'The Concept of Stability in the Context of Conventional War in Europe', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1990, p. 248.

[24] Dessauer, *Stability…*, p. 107.

[25] Christian Dennys, *Military Intervention, Stabilisation and Peace*, London: Routledge, 2014, p. 32.

in a peaceful or violent manner, would bring threats to the states' stability, depending on political and economic interests of certain social and political actors and their willingness to accept the new order.

The case of Jordan

Jordan, surrounded by a hostile and violent neighbourhood, deprived of serious natural resources and concerned with its water scarcity, exists within a sensitive socio-political environment that is economically, militarily and demographically weaker than its neighbours. And yet, it is one of the most stable countries in the Middle East. In fact, it is the only state in the Fertile Crescent where the same regime has remained in power since the polity's establishment in the early 1920s.[26] The regime's survival has always been related to the strong support of the Arab Legion (later the Jordan Arab Army), Jordan's geopolitical centrality, and the extra-regional assistance it receives, which is aimed at securing the state from the threat of regional military intervention. It was also the effect of the rulers' ability to address and adapt to ever-shifting internal and external conditions.[27] Likewise, the Jordanian experience with democracy has always had stability as its main goal – without necessarily bringing a positive outcome for the former, however.

The "wave of democratisation" reached the kingdom in 1989. When its economic situation deteriorated due to a decline in private remittances from expatriate workers and official assistance from the Gulf states, Jordan had to seek support of the international financial institutions in order to renegotiate its debt. In order to make it happen, the government was forced to cut central expenditures and subsidies, impose new taxes, and undertake numerous fiscal and administrative reforms.[28]

This caused a sharp increase in fuel and food prices, which, unsurprisingly, triggered anti-government riots across the country. Confronted with the legitimacy crisis, King Hussein used the democracy agenda as a tool to restore his authority and state's stability.[29] As a result, the first parliamentary elections in more than two decades were held in November 1989, and other reforms consequently followed. The subsequent twenty-seven years brought ups and downs in the democratisation process, clearly reflecting the international context of Jordanian politics. Overall, it was far from being a plausible and genuine reform; nevertheless, the façade of democracy – parliamentary elections – was maintained.[30] Since democracy was initially instituted in Jordan as

---

[26] Asher Susser, 'Jordan: Preserving Domestic Order in a Settting of Regional Turmoil', *Middle East Brief*, No. 27, 2008, p. 1.

[27] Bassel F. Salloukh, 'State Strength, Permeability, and Foreign Policy Behavior: Jordan in Theoretical Perspective', *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1996, pp. 39–65.

[28] Hamid El-Said, 'The Political Economy of Reform in Jordan: Breaking Resistance to Reform?', in *Jordan in Transition*. George Joffé (ed.), London: Hurst & Company, 2002, pp. 261–262; Curtis R. Ryan, 'Peace, Bread and Riots: Jordan and the International Monetary Fund', *Middle East Policy,* Vol. VI, No. 2, 1998, p. 56.

[29] Rex Brynen, 'Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan', *Canadian Journal of Political Science,* Vol. 25, No. 1, 1992, pp. 90–91.

[30] For a broader account, see: Beverley Milton-Edwards, 'Façade Democracy and Jordan'*, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1993, pp. 191–203; Kathrine Rath, 'The Process of Democratization in Jordan', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1994, pp. 530–557; Laurie A. Brand, 'The Effects of the Peace Process on Political Liberalization in Jordan', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, 1997, pp. 52–67; Julia Choucair-Vizoso, 'Illusive Reform: Jordan's Stubborn Stability', in *Beyond the Façade. Political Reform in the Arab World*, Marina Ottaway, Julia Choucair-Vizoso (eds.), Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008, pp. 45–70.

_____

means to foster stability and security, why then is it currently used as an argument against security and stability? To answer this dilemma one has to explore the set of features of the Jordanian monarchy and analyse the stability rhetoric embedded in them. While looking at the broad range of factors influencing the reform process, both domestic and international as well as historical and contemporary, it is essential to underline their interdependence. Multifaceted as it is, the stability-democracy nexus in Jordan will not otherwise be fully comprehensible.

Jordan may serve as a classic case of a buffer state, playing a crucial geopolitical role, both regionally and globally.[31] At the same time, surrounded by stronger neighbours in a chronicle state of instability, Jordan is inclined to maintain a strong army. Even though less numerous than in neighbouring states, it is commonly perceived as professional, well-trained, and well-equipped.[32] The long tradition of the Jordanian Armed Forces and its activities influence the domestic political scene by providing the state with coercive power. Some analysts even posit that the army has played a crucial role in shaping the state structures in Jordan through the pacification and unification of the local population under the rule of Emir Abdullah. With time, its role evolved into securing the Hashemites against both internal and external threats and stabilising the status quo by acting as a tool of legitimacy for the regime and as a source of unity for the Jordanians.[33] Importantly, however, the monarchy very rarely resorts to the use of force when dealing with protesters, which only strengthens its position vis-à-vis Jordanian society.

Not without importance is also the monarchy's colonial heritage. Since its creation in the 1920s, Jordan was a functional state, securing British interests in the Middle East. The colonial authorities – in cooperation with Emir Abdullah – have managed to establish a set of impermeable institutions (e.g., legal system, army, state bureaucracy, tribes' incorporation into the state, identity, etc.), which outlived the mandate of Transjordan as well as secured position and power of the Hashemites in contemporary Jordan.[34] Moreover, the colonial era is the moment when the Hashemites' survival and stability strategy crystallised. Domestically it ascribes to the unwritten contract with Transjordanian tribes, co-opted the local elites, and established a system of clientelism and strong ties with the military. It is also based on the distribution of the state's patronage within which elites function and rotate on the basis of their loyalty to the monarchy and compete for the king's favour (who is de facto and de jure located in the centre of the socio-political system, nominates and dismisses a range of state officials for whom he is a source of power and legitimacy, and plays a role of main arbiter and patron of the clientelist networks). Consequently, such extensive patrimonial links help the regime survive threats to its security and pursue only limited, if any, reforms.[35] Likewise, the Islamist movement, elsewhere seen as the main opposition force,

_____

[31] Artur Malantowicz, 'Buforowość jako wyznacznik polityki zagranicznej Jordanii' [Buffer Status as a Determinant of Foreign Policy of Jordan], *Stosunki Międzynarodowe-International Relations*, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2014, pp. 137–150.

[32] Jeremy M. Sharp, *Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations*, Washington: Library of Congress, 2017, p. 2.

[33] Alexander Bligh, 'The Jordanian Army: Between Domestic and External Challenges', *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2001, pp. 13–20; Shirin Fathi, *Jordan – An Invented Nation? Tribe-State Dynamics and the Formation of National Identity*, Hamburg: Deutsches Orient–Institut, 1994, p. 133.

[34] Joseph A. Massad, *Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2001; Yoav Alon, *The Making of Jordan. Tribes, Colonialism and the Modern State,* London–New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007; Mary C. Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the making of Jordan*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

[35] Salloukh, 'State Strength…'. André Bank and Oliver Schlumberger, 'Jordan: Between Regime Survival and Economic Reform', in *Arab Elites. Negotiating the Politics of Change*, Volker Perthes (ed.), London: Lynne Rienner

has been largely co-opted in Jordan and constitutes an important linchpin in monarchy's stability (although less so nowadays than it used to be until the late 1980s).[36] A combination of these historical, political, and socio-economic factors leads to a situation where the Jordanians cannot envisage an alternative to the Hashemites – even during the most heated demonstrations of 2011–2012, none of the political parties or major social groups called for King Abdullah II to step down.[37]

To a certain extent, such a system is plausible because of the tribal character of the society, which prevails in modern Jordan. Its supporters underline the tribes' role in providing for the survival and security of the state, whereas the tribal traditions (including tribal dispute resolution) are identified as a national symbol. On the contrary, however, historically the unwritten contract between tribes and the Hashemites has led to the monopolisation of the state and military bureaucracy by the former and to the expansion of the patron-client ties from the local to the national level. In a sense they paralyze the state apparatus and contradict the idea of a modern state. In many cases, these tribal "elements" oppose any attempt at meaningful reform as it could undermine their position in the society.[38]

This is linked with another feature of the Jordanian political system: social fractionalisation. Jordan is home to more than three million of Palestinians who constitute more than 50% of the population. Even though majority of them have Jordanian citizenship, they are discriminated against in public life, partially excluded from politics, and deprived of certain social rights. On the other hand, they control the largest share of private capital in the Kingdom, which is a common point of discontent by the Transjordanians who are afraid of losing state power. The regime skilfully plays the card of mutual distrust to further deepen the rift between the Jordanians of the East Bank and those of Palestinian origin. By inciting fear and identifying the democratisation process with threats to stability and interests of both groups, the monarchy is trying to distract them from the reform agenda.[39] In Barari's words, it is 'difficult to foster enough trust between groups in order to unify political activism to (…) a critical level'.[40]

Furthermore, the Jordanian economy is traditionally highly dependent on external rent, initially British subsidies and subsequently both U.S. and Gulf state financial aid. From the early 1920s, the Hashemite leaders formed a coalition with Transjordanian tribes and urban merchant-industrial elites, a basis of which became the external rent. It was used to extensively increase employment in the public sector for tribal representatives and to introduce protectionist economic measures and tax exemptions for the bourgeoisie. Both were a high cost for the state budget

---

Publisher, 2004, pp. 35–60; Ellen Lust, 'Competitive Clientelism in the Middle East', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2009, pp. 122–135.

[36] Mohammad Abu Rumman and Hassan Abu Hanieh, *The "Islamic Solution" in Jordan. Islamists, the State and the Ventures of Democracy and Security*, Amman: Centre for Strategic Studies, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2013, pp. 78–84; Quintan Wiktorowicz, 'Islamists, the State and Cooperation in Jordan', *Arab Studies Quarterly,* Vol. 21, No. 4, 1999, pp. 4–6.

[37] Hassan Barari, 'Reform and the Dynamics of In/stability in Jordan during the Arab Uprisings', *Perceptions*, Vol. XX, No. 4, 2015, p. 79.

[38] Linda L. Layne, 'The Dialogics of Tribal Self-Representation in Jordan', *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1989, pp. 24–39; Agnieszka Syliwoniuk, 'Tożsamość kulturowa a postawy polityczne Jordańczyków' [Cultural Identity and Political Attitudes of the Jordanians], *Społeczeństwo i Polityka* [Society and Politics], No. 1 (34), 2013, pp. 191–213.

[39] Yitzhak Reiter, 'The Palestinian-Transjordanian Rift: Economic Might and Political Power in Jordan', *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 58, No. 1, 2004, pp. 72–92; Luisa K. Gandolfo, *Palestinians in Jordan. The Politics of Identity*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2012.

[40] Barari, 'Reform and the Dynamics…', p. 78.

but crucial for the regime's durability. Such a coalition has continued to persist into the present as well, albeit in a modified form.[41] Furthermore, reliance on foreign aid leaves Jordan exposed to external influence, also in decision-making towards reform processes. In this sense, Jordan's semi-rentier economy is both undermining and strengthening the regime's stability. On the domestic front, it secures support from the groups benefiting from the rent redistribution; externally, however, it exposes Jordan to economic and political shocks, risking foreign support to becoming contingent on specific foreign policy behaviour.

Needless to say, Jordan's domestic political scene is conjoined with international and regional affairs. Its fortune is tied to developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, relations with the external powers – such as the U.S. and Europe – and regional actors – the Gulf states – and, most recently, the socio-economic, political, and military consequences of the Arab uprisings. First and foremost, Jordan's stability lies at the core interest of the United States, probably more than ever before in its history. The fact that Jordan is a reliable partner, a buffer zone between Israel and the "hostile" Arab world, and a key contributor to the U.S.-led coalition to counter the Islamic State makes it a strategic asset for Washington.[42] That is why the U.S. provides historically high financial support (both economic and military) to Jordan, amounting to more than $1.5 billion annually in 2015–2016,[43] and supports the monarchy in its struggle against both internal and external threats – above all by praising its stability. Similarly, the European Union has its interest in a stable Hashemite monarchy, and that is the reason why it is engaged in supporting the royal vision of reform and cautioning against any moves that could hinder Jordan's security. As Julien Barnes-Dacey wrote, 'Jordan is a key strategic ally, and, at a moment of significant regional volatility, the preservation of a calm in the kingdom is clearly an important aim'.[44] Such a stance is being quite overtly confirmed by the EU bureaucrats working in Amman: 'Our [EU–Jordanian] relationship is based on democracy and human rights, but at the same time the overarching objective of the EU in Jordan is its stability. *Stability is number one*. As long as things remain quiet and stable, then one can say that the regime is doing exactly what has been needed and what has been asked for'.[45] As rightly affirmed by Roberto Aliboni and Laura Guazzone as well, such policies of the Western donors contribute more to 'promote the stability of the authoritarian regimes presently in power than to promote democracy.'[46]

One can also notice the influence of the Arab uprisings on the stability rhetoric. Initially seen as an impetus for constitutional reform in 2011, soon the regional struggle turned to be perceived as incongruent with the state's security. The direct risk of a conflict spill-over from Syria and Iraq, continuing massive influx of the refugees, destabilisation of the Sinai Peninsula and energy crisis in 2012, coup d'état in Egypt in 2013, intensifying external pressure from the Gulf

---

[41] Anne Mariel Peters and Pete W. Moore, 'Beyond Boom and Bust: External Rents, Durable Authoritarianism, and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, No. 44, 2009, pp. 256–285.

[42] Artur Malantowicz, 'Stosunki amerykańsko-jordańskie. Prawdziwy sojusz czy przejaw neokolonializmu?' [The Jordanian-American Relations. A True Alliance or Manifestation of Neocolonialism?], *Analiza Centrum Inicjatyw Międzynarodowych* [Centre for International Initiatives Analysis], No. 20, 2012.

[43] Sharp, *Jordan…*, p. 16–17.

[44] Julien Barnes-Dacey, 'Jordanian Tremors: Elusive Consensus, Deepening Discontent', *ECFR Policy Memo*, 2012.

[45] EU Diplomat in Jordan, author's interview, Amman, 2013. Emphasis added.

[46] Roberto Aliboni and Laura Guazzone, 'Democracy in the Arab countries and the West', *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2004, p. 91.

countries and international financial institutions, worsening economic situation, increasing social frustration and radicalisation – it all made the monarchy present the "Arab Spring" as a threat rather than an opportunity.[47] In other words, the post-2011 regime focused on preserving its stability and security, at the expense of political reform, at the same time skilfully adopting the rhetoric of democratisation. In employing such a top-down approach, the political parties or civil society actors would often be portrayed as unprepared or incompetent, by which 'the regime compels foreign allies and international organizations to fear potential instability in a country whose geopolitical importance need not be reiterated.'[48] Such rhetoric also had a moderating impact on the public opinion in Jordan, with many citizens willing to maintain the status quo in order to avoid violence in the streets. Not without importance was the financial support from the Gulf monarchies, which helped Jordan mitigate its economic burden. For them, Jordan's stability is at the centre of attention, as it serves as a convenient buffer zone between them and Israel–Palestine or Syria; likewise, they fear that any meaningful reform launched by the Hashemites could lead to a domino effect once the first of the monarchies in the region steps onto a democratic path.[49]

Why stability?

The Western powers, Israel, and the Gulf states all praise Jordanian stability at the expense of democracy because of their clear geopolitical interests. Similarly, state elites co-opted by the regime, certain parts of the bourgeoisie, and tribal elements all have tied its fortune with the stability of the authoritarian system. But why does society at large fall into the trap of the stability rhetoric? In short, it is a form of a self-fulfilling prophecy with the regime's slogans falling onto fertile soil, resulting in a stability mantra. One should remember that most of the Jordanians are supportive of the monarchy, while the royal family is commonly seen as a symbol of national unity and an element of national identity. With a general public distrust towards other public institutions (only 12% of the Jordanians have confidence in their prime minister, only 8% in the parliament, and 6% in political parties), it is precisely the monarchy and the army that are the most trusted by the citizens.[50] Even though for the first time in 2016 less than 50% of Jordanian citizens indicated they were satisfied with the direction their country was heading in, those who were satisfied indicated security and stability provided by the current regime (65%) and the Hashemite leadership (6%) as primary reasons behind their decision. Simultaneously, citizens who were dissatisfied with the developments in Jordan argued that it was mostly related to intensifying socio-economic concerns (e.g., weak economy, widespread corruption, poverty, unemployment, rising prices, etc.) rather than the lack of democratic reforms.[51] In fact, general disinterest in political

---

[47] Curtis R. Ryan, 'Jordanian Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring', *Middle East Policy*, Vol. XXI, No. 4, 2014, pp. 144–153; Artur Malantowicz, 'Wojna w Syrii a bezpieczeństwo Jordańskiego Królestwa Haszymidzkiego' [The War in Syria and Its Consequences to Security of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan], *Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe* [Cracovian International Studies], Vol. X. No. 3, 2013, pp. 111–127.

[48] José Ciro Martinez, 'Jordan's self-fulfilling prophecy: the production of feeble political parties and the perceived perils of democracy', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 2016, p .4.

[49] Hassan Barari, 'The Limits of Political Reform in Jordan. The Role of External Actors', *International Policy Analysis*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2013.

[50] The International Republican Institute, *Survey of Jordan Public Opinion. National poll #14. November 23–27, 2016,* http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/iri_national_poll_14_-_november_23-27_2016_.pdf (accessed 21 February 2017).

[51] Ibidem.

matters resulted in the unwillingness of the majority of Jordanian citizens to participate in anti-government demonstrations over the past few years, which only proves that the opposition could have never created enough of the critical mass necessary to implement bottom-up changes in Jordan. In 2012, the critical moment in the "Jordanian Spring," 70% of the Jordanians saw no reason for which they should take part in the protests, whereas only a small percentage had in fact participated or intended to participate in the manifestations in the future.[52]

To some extent, such inaction is related to the growth of the middle class in Jordan, particularly within the capital area of Amman. They are a group of educated and cosmopolitan citizens, who are exposed to the Western cultural trends, and who are "consumers of political information put forth on blogs, news and Internet sites, but are not otherwise politically engaged. Instead, they organize around certain places and times for consumption and around economic points for solidarity".[53] They are consciously following regional developments and see only "civil wars, death, chaos, poverty, refugees, extremism, and the collapse of governmental systems".[54] It is not a perspective favourable to revolutionary attitudes, hence the middle class, commonly seen as a key to successful democratic transition, jumps on the bandwagon with the elites and groups of interests closely linked to the regime, leaving aside any form of a genuine reform. It results in a widespread and multifaceted mantra of stability, which I have encountered throughout the course of my fieldwork in Jordan, examples including: "Generally, most Jordanians prefer *stability above everything else*. It is the way they are raised, the way the propaganda plays out, the way the state's message has been geared over years and decades, and generations".[55] "Of course, people want democracy, but they also want *security and stability for themselves and their children*. They want to have this security to be able to send their children to school. When they see what happened in other countries, [they think that] it is better even with this what they have already got".[56] "Yes, they [EU and U.S.] will talk a lot about reforms, they will make a lot statements. But if they have to choose between an alliance with Jordan as a moderate, *stable country in the region* and the fear that is being thrown if there is democracy, then there will be instability, they will choose the first".[57] "With the lapse of time, people realized that *first and foremost element we need is the stability*. The king, if he remains constitutional, is the symbol of stability. If the royalty is out, Jordan will be the victim of chaos".[58] "Because of the unstable area we live in, we are worried about the impact of our neighbours. Especially with the Syrian crisis, at least now, *it affects our stability, our security*. You know, in case of instability and threats to your security, you are supposed to take procedures that are sometimes not democratic".[59]

---

[52] The International Republican Institute, *National priorities, governance and political reform in Jordan. National public opinion poll #9. July 17–20, 2012*, http://www.iri.org/resource/iri-poll-jordanians-split-over-direction-country-economy-and-corruption-cited-top-concerns (accessed 21 February 2017).

[53] Sarah Tobin, 'Jordan's Arab Spring: The Middle Class and Anti-Revolution', *Middle East Policy*, Vol. XIX, No. 1, 2012, p. 100.

[54] Udi Dekel and Orit Perlov, 'The Elections in Jordan: People Want Evolution, Not Revolution', *INSS Insight*, No. 402, 2013, p. 2.

[55] Naseem Tarawneh, blogger, social activist, author's interview, Amman, 2013. Emphasis added.

[56] Musa Maaytah, former Minister of Political Development, senator, author's interview, Amman, 2013. Emphasis added.

[57] Daoud Kuttab, journalist, Director General at Community Media Network, author's interview, Amman, 2014. Emphasis added.

[58] High-level state bureaucrat, author's interview, Amman, 2014. Emphasis added.

[59] Ministry of Interior official, author's interview, Amman, 2013. Emphasis added.

Sadly, out of a few dozen interviewees, only two mentioned that democracy in Jordan does not necessarily oppose stability, which means that the regime has been relatively successful in convincing its people about the need of a secure status quo: "Jordan is among just a few Arab countries with a potential to make reforms and maintain stability. There is no need to put our people in front of this dilemma – whether they want to go for reform or for chaos. *We can go for reform and keep our stability*".[60] "You can only mobilize the people against the regime only if they understand that the *political reform does not undermine the stability*, but quite contrary, can bring some prosperity, prospect for development".[61]

Conclusions

Dessauer once wrote: 'Man in action is antinomian. He may worship the principle of progress as long as he thinks in terms of general ideas and makes speeches, but when faced with the responsibility of making specific decisions, he may rather seek security and stability'.[62] Remarkably, these words are very accurate in depicting the reality observed in Jordan in the past decades with the monarchy fully embracing democratisation rhetoric in order to please foreign donors though bereft of any meaningful reform while also praising stability and security. Notably, this is the view shared not only among the ruling elite, but also by a vast segment of the society and external actors, since the prevailing stability discourse largely reflects their overlapping interests. First, it benefits the autocratic rule of King Abdullah II, who retains power and broad prerogatives and provides patronage networks for the political elites. The Jordanian society, on the other hand, does not have to fear internal disorder and may run their ordinary lives without any disruption, even if at the expense of civil and political liberties. Finally, stability of the monarchy also works in favour of the international community, which values a long-standing and reliable partnership with Jordan.

In other words, the stability rhetoric pursued by the regime and transposed onto the society hinders further democratic development, and even though in the short-term – particularly when compared with the current havoc in the Middle East – it works in favour of the monarchy, the political elites, the society and the international community, in the long-run it solidifies the authoritarian system in Jordan. Nevertheless, stability rhetoric is yet only one of the tools at the regime's disposal to maintain its power and should not be seen as a threat to democracy per se.

---

[60] Oraib al-Rantawi, researcher at Al-Quds Center for Political Studies, author's interview, Amman, 2013. Emphasis added.

[61] Sami Hourani, social activist, author's interview, Amman, 2013. Emphasis added.

[62] Dessauer, *Stability…*, p. 57.

Agnieszka Pawnik[*]

The Roots of the Modern Japanese Educational System in the Meiji Period

Abstract

In the Meiji era (1868–1912) Japan changed its old feudal model by reforming the political, agricultural, social and economic structures after a period of isolation and stagnation. Those modifications could not be introduced without the establishment of the modern educational system shaped by the political elite called Meiji oligarchy. The education in the Edo period was a crucial fundament for the newly introduced reforms. This paper analyzes the first Education System Order Gakusei introduced in 1872. The characterization of its main guidelines will also follow. The author will focus on the most important figures that shaped Japanese educational system in the first decades of the Meiji period.

Introduction

During the Edo period (1600–1868) Japan limited its contacts with the Western world to the Dutch factory of Dejima, although the unofficial sources of information also existed.[1] After the reopening of the borders by the American commodore Matthew Perry in 1854, Japan was forced to end the period of isolation and undergo vast reforms to recreate its national structures into the new, modern model.[2] The country was facing social unrest that manifested through the concept of *sonnō jōi* ('Revere the king, expel the barbarians').[3] Even before the reopening of the borders Japan was gathering information on the topic of the opium wars in China, and more and more people realized that the modernization is desperately needed, not only to oppose the foreign forces, but also to be able to compete with them. *Jōi* group was gradually losing its influence.[4] The lords of the domains of Satsuma and Chōshū created an alliance and started a movement that resulted in the enthronement of the young emperor Mutsuhito (1852–1912), who took command over the allied forces and ultimately overthrew the Tokugawa shogunate in 1868.[5] From this moment forth, Japan reformed and modernized its political, social and economic structures while using foreign knowledge. The Meiji oligarchy prepared new general principles that were presented in the Charter Oath, the first national document of this era.[6] New slogans for the modernization of Japan were also established. One of them was the idea of the 'civilization and enlightenment' (*bunmei kaika* –

---

[*] Institute of the Middle and Far East, Jagiellonian University, e-mail: agnieszka.pawnik@wp.pl.

[1] Yayori Takano, 'Foreign Influence and the Transformation of Early Modern Japan', in *Emory Endeavours in History Volume III: Navigating the Great Divergence*, Brian Goodman (ed.), Atlanta: Emory University, 2010, p. 83–84.

[2] Jolanta Tubielewicz, *Historia Japonii* [History of Japan], Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich, 1984, p. 328. Ewa Pałasz-Rutkowska, *Cesarz Meiji (1852–1912). Wizerunek władcy w modernizowanej Japonii w setną rocznicę śmierci cesarza* [The Meiji Emperor (1852–1912). The image of the ruler in the modernized Japan in the centenary of the death of the emperor], Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2012, p.63; Olga Barbasiewicz, *Pomniki i miejsca pamięci w relacjach międzynarodowych. Wpływ pamięci na stosunki japońsko-amerykańskie z perspektywy Japonii*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Instytutu Kultur Śródziemnomorskich i Orientalnych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2016, p. 36, 39.

[3] Louis Frédéric, *Życie codzienne w Japonii u progu nowoczesności (1868–1912).* [Daily life in Japan on the brink of modernity (1868–1912], Warsaw: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1988, p. 10.

[4] Takano, 'Foreign Influence…', p. 92.

[5] Pałasz-Rutkowska, *Cesarz Meiji (1852–1912)…*, p.15, 95.

[6] Jansen, Marius B. (ed.) *The Cambridge history of Japan. Volume 5: The Nineteenth Century*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 359. Ewa Pałasz-Rutkowska, *Cesarz Meiji (1852–1912) …*, p.103–105.

文明開化).[7] In order to successfully carry out the ambitious plans, the country needed the modern educational system, not only to introduce its own specialist's staff, but to stabilize changes in the society. This led to establishment of the first Education System Order called *Gakusei*.

The role of education in the Meiji reforms was presented by many scholars such as Benjamin Duke,[8] Brian Platt[9] or Roland Anderson.[10] Many others briefly discussed this topic while doing their research for the wider thematic scope. The article consists of three main parts. In the first one, the role of the educational structures established in the Edo period (1600–1868) is presented. The author argues that the swift modernization of the educational system was possible because of the schools that were open to children of all social classes. This part ends with the analysis of the first units and offices that led to the establishing of the first Education System Order called *Gakusei* in 1872. Connections between those officials and politics, as well as the above discussed topics will be shown. The next part is focused on the *Gakusei* System itself. Its main guidelines and goals will be presented. In the last part, author discusses the successes and failures of the *Gakusei* System.

Sources that were used to research this topic are in English, Polish and Japanese. The author used previously mentioned works of the scholars interested in this field of study and also the books of the authors, that were not focusing only on this topic, such as Jolanta Tubielewicz,[11] Louis Frédéric,[12] Yayori Takano,[13] Ewa Pałasz-Rutkowska,[14] Olga Barbasiewicz.[15] The official information provided by the website of the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology was also useful in researching the Japanese official opinion on the analyzed issue.[16]

Educational structures established in the Edo period (1600–1868), the beginnings of the modern education system in Japan

During the Edo period Japan was experiencing the isolation which resulted in the political and military stagnation. It created an environment in which artist and scholars could work and be successful. Education of the samurai class, that favored the studies of the Confucian classic literature and Chinese history was a crucial base for the reforms and the transformations that Japan underwent in the Meiji era.[17] There were more than 300 schools for the warriors' class in the feudal

---

[7] Mikołaj Melanowicz, *W stronę Japonii – 150 lat Meiji (część 4)*, http://istotnie.pl/strone-japonii-150-meiji-czesc-4, (accessed 18 July 2017). Ewa Pałasz-Rutkowska, *Cesarz Meiji (1852–1912)…*, p.117.

[8] Benjamin Duke, *The history of the modern Japanese education: Constructing the national school system, 1872-1890*, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2009.

[9] Brian Platt, *Burning and Building: Schooling and State Formation in Japan, 1750–1890*, Cambridge (Massachusetts) – London: Harvard University Press, 2004.

[10] Roland Anderson, *Education in Japan – Century of modern development*, U.S. Department of health, education and welfare, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975.

[11] Tubielewicz, *Historia Japonii…*

[12] Frédéric, *Życie codzienne…*

[13] Takano, 'Foreign Influence…'.

[14] Pałasz-Rutkowska, *Cesarz Meiji (1852–1912)…*

[15] Barbasiewicz, *Pomniki i miejsca pamięci…*

[16] 学制百年史 [Japan's Modern Educational System. A history of the First Hundred Years], Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, March 1980, http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/hakusho/html/others /detail/1317552.htm, (accessed 18 July 2017).

[17] Adachi Kanako, Murata Yukuo, Umemiya Naoki, *The History of Japan's Educational Development*. Institute for International Cooperation (IFIC)/Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), 2004, p. 3.

domains that were funded by local clans.[18] Because of the Confucian idea that virtue can be learned, those schools were focused on the studies of literature that was to teach about loyalty, nobility, self-discipline and respect for the authorities. This practice was meant to create the devoted subjects. Lasting time of peace resulted in the enrichment of merchants. A samurai who could not fight and do the manual labor, started to learn, work in the offices and teach others.[19] This is one of the reasons why the samurai ethos still remains so strong.

Lower classes were studying in the so called 'temple schools' (*terakoya* – 寺子屋) and 'private schools' (*shijuku* – 私塾).[20] Those names were created during the Meiji period, while the government was trying to research the topic of education during the feudal era. Thanks to the statistics of the Ministry of Education from 1880, we know that during the Edo period there were 11 278 of such schools.[21] The official website of the Japanese Ministry of Education says that the *terakoya* 'numbered in the tens of thousands',[22] The main difference between the *terakoya* and the *juku* was accessibility. *Terakoya* were informal primary schools that were teaching the commoners of both sexes how to read and write. *Juku* were available for all of the social classes and were usually placed in the teacher's home.[23] The level of education, however, was inconsistent and differed depending on the school. In the late Edo period there were roughly 1 500 schools of this sort.[24] Both *juku* and *terakoya* were offering secular education, even though the latter ones were rooted in the Buddhist temples. The fact that Japanese Shinto and Buddhism did not have their own unique educational structures, was crucial for the standardization of the schools during the Meiji era.[25] The large number of *terakoya* made it possible to quickly open more schools throughout Japan after the System *Gakusei* was introduced.[26]

During the Edo period Japan limited its contacts with the West to the small artificial island Dejima, where the Dutch and Chinese were allowed to station. Another source of information about the outside world were the Ryūkyū islands. During that time the islands were dependent on the Satsuma domain that later was crucial for the Meiji restoration.[27] The Dutch's influence on Japan was meaningful and it involved both technological and ideological development. As Yayori Takano points out, it was connected with the fact that Japan was starting to realize the superiority of the western ideas over the Chinese ones.[28]

All western knowledge that came to Japan by the Dejima was called 'the Dutch studies' (*rangaku* – 蘭学). Those who studied it had the skills that enabled them to learn about many different fields. One of the first of such scholars was Aoki Konyō (青木昆陽) who was ordered to study Dutch by the shogun in 1744.[29] In 1808 the translation office of the shogunate included the studies on English and Russian. Access to information in those languages enabled Japan to update

---

[18] Duke, *The history of the modern…*, p. 13.
[19] Tubielewicz, *Historia Japonii…*, p. 291.
[20] Platt, *Burning and Building…*, p. 25.
[21] Ibidem.
[22] 学制百年史 [Japan's Modern Educational System. A history of the First Hundred Years]…
[23] Kanako, Yukuo, Naoki, *The History of…*, p. 3.
[24] Duke, *The history of the modern…*, p. 21.
[25] Kanako, Yukuo, Naoki, *The History of…*, p. 13.
[26] 学制百年史[Japan's Modern Educational System. A history of the First Hundred Years]…
[27] Tubielewicz, *Historia Japonii…*, p. 286.
[28] Takano, 'Foreign Influence…', p. 85.
[29] Frédéric, *Życie codzienne…*, p. 8.

their map of the world.[30] This proves that Japan had structures that later turned out to be useful during the modernization process.

After the enthronement of Mutsuhito, some of the schools were functional, but the political elite soon realized that old structures were not sufficient to reduce the level of illiteracy and to educate new specialists. In February of 1868, the Office of Education was established. As Benjamin Duke points out, during the initial 3 years of the Meiji era education was not for the masses but for the privileged social classes.[31] All 3 members of the Office were specialists in Japanese history and Shinto tradition, since they were all representatives of the *Kokugakusha* (国学者), the academic movement from the Edo period that was focusing on Japanese classics.[32] During the first 5 months the Office reformed and reopened two schools: medical faculty *Ikagujō* (医学所) renamed *Igakkō* (医学校)*,* that was focusing on the Western studies, and *Shohei Gakkō* (昌平学校), meant to educate new officers, was focusing on the Confucian and Shinto literature. The officials were trying to strengthen the indigenous Japanese identity while the country was facing the transformations. The third school that was opened in the 1868 was *Kaisei Gakkō* (開成学校), earlier referred to as *Kaiseijō* (開成所). This school was focused on studying foreign languages. In 1869 these three schools were merged into one – *Daigakkō* (大学校), coordinated by *Shohei Gakkō*.[33] In 1870 it was renamed Daigaku (大学) – the University.[34]

The Office of Education proposed many different reforms such as the *Regulations for the University and for Middle and Primary Schools* from the 1870. In this document the Office planned to open schools that were meant to be coordinated directly by Tokyo in every domain and prefecture.[35] It was not intended as a way of educating commoners, but only the elite of the country. Brian Platt argues that this proposition was rejected, because the government feared the domains would not carry it out.[36] The work of the Office of Education shows that during the first few years of Meiji Era Japan was trying to transform itself while using the indigenous traditions. After the establishment of the prefectures in 1871 Japan started the reform of modernizing and standardizing of the schools. In the same year the government authorized the Department of Education.[37]

The proclamation of the Education System Order

In 1871 the Ministry of Education (文部省) was established.[38] One year later it introduced Education System Order that was referred to as *Gakusei* (学制). Its primary goal was to provide an equal education for both sexes and all of the social classes.

---

[30] Ibidem.
[31] Duke, *The history of the modern…*, p. 48.
[32] Ibid.; Xavier Guillaume, *International Relations and Identity: A Dialogical Approach*, London: Routledge, 2010, p. 77.
[33] Ibid., p. 47–51.
[34] 学制百年史 [Japan's Modern Educational System. A history of the First Hundred Years]…
[35] Platt, *Burning and Building…*, p. 108.
[36] Ibid.
[37] 学制百年史[Japan's Modern Educational System. A history of the First Hundred Years]…
[38] Pałasz-Rutkowska, *Cesarz Meiji (1852–1912)…*, p. 111.

The bureau that was responsible for writing the initial draft was coordinated by Mitsukuri Rinshō (箕作麟祥, 1846-1897) who was a member of the learning mission in France before the overthrown of the Tokugawa shogunate. While working on the draft of the *Gakusei* he was inspired by the Napoleonic educational structures. Only two of his twelve co-workers were not specialists in foreign languages.[39]

One of the most notable figures that worked to create main principles of the System *Gakusei* was Fukuzawa Yukichi (福沢 諭吉, 1835-1901). Some consider him a pioneer of the Japanese modern education system.[40] During his youth he studied Dutch and English. In 1860 to 1867 he was travelling to many western countries.[41] He wrote many books on the topic of modernization foreign knowledge and popularized learning English.[42] He funded the Keiō University and was a noted member of the Meriokusha society (明六社) which was a platform to express the ideas of modernization.[43] He was not a member of the Meiji government and remained unaffiliated.[44]

Roland Anderson points out that the Education System Order was inspired by the American structures established before the civil war (1830–1860).[45] Benjamin Duke disagrees, since the U.S. never approved of the centrally controlled education system. In his opinion Japan was inspired by the French model, because during that time it was more advanced that the English or German.[46] Authors of the *Japan's Educational Experience* claim that the education system was inspired by many external sources; American model was used to established the three levels of education (primary schools, middle schools, university), whereas the French model provided the inspiration for the centralized system with the districts.[47]

The preamble of the Order was made public in 1872. The Order itself consisted of 109 chapters divided into 6 main parts. It referred to the three levels of districts, schools, the requirements for the teachers, educational expenditures and so on. In the following year some supplements and revisions were made, so in the end the chapters numbered in more than 200.[48] Japan was divided into 8 university districts. In each of them there were 32 middle schools and 210 primary schools.[49] The main goal of the Education System Order was to establish 8 universities, 256 middle schools and 53 760 primary schools. During that time it was a vast and ambitious plan that was meant to provide the equal education for both sexes and all of the social classes.[50]

The promulgation of the Order indicated that Japan was to turn away from the old feudal structures and embrace the Western ideas. As Benjamin Duke points out, the new system was focused on developing individuality of the students, so that they could advance in life (*risshin chisan* – 立身治産).[51] Parents, however, were the ones responsible for their children's education.[52]

---

[39] Duke, *The history of the modern…*, p. 65–67.
[40] Anderson, *Education in Japan…*, p. 35.
[41] *The Cambridge history of Japan. Volume 5…*, p. 458.
[42] Tubielewicz, *Historia Japonii…*, p. 366.
[43] Frédéric, *Życie codzienne..*, p. 54.
[44] Duke, *The history of the modern…*, p. 65.
[45] Anderson, *Education in Japan…*, p. 35.
[46] Duke, *The history of the modern…*, p. 70.
[47] Kanako, Yukuo, Naoki, *The History of…*, p. 15.
[48] Duke, *The history of the modern…*, p. 75.
[49] Ibidem.
[50] Frédéric, *Życie codzienne..*, p. 153; Kanako, Yukuo, Naoki, *The History of…*, p. 15; Duke, *The history of the modern…*, p. 75.
[51] Duke, *The history of the modern…*, p. 73.

The schools were only meant to provide the practical knowledge, reduce the illiteracy rate and develop natural skills. Education was considered to be a mean to climb a social ladder, which was an obvious turn from the feudal system of the classes.[53]

The main requirement for the teachers in primary schools was the age (at least 20 years old) or a certificate that proved the graduation from the middle school. If one wanted to become a teacher in the middle school, the academic degree was compulsory.[54] Since the local community was a beneficiary in this procedure, it was required to pay the fees for the establishing new schools. The significant rise of the communal expenditures connected with building and equipping new schools resulted in objections and protests. Studying required tuition fees. Students were paying 50 sen, which was equal to the 5 weight units of rice.[55] The following table shows the layout of costs related to education in years 1873–1888:

	The Beneficiaries	The Founders	The State	Others	Total
1873	6,3	81,1	12,6		100
1874	6,9	73,8	6,2	13,1	100
1875	5,2	64,5	8,4	21,9	100
1876	5,7	71,5	9,7	13,1	100
1877	5,9	70,8	8,2	15,1	100
1878	4,9	69,2	8,2	17,7	100
1880	4,3	71,5	5,4	18,8	100
1882	4,2	83,7		12,1	100
1884	4,5	88,5		7,0	100
1886	7,1	84,4		8,5	100
1888	20,9	69,4		9,7	100

Table 1. Educational Expenditures Liability of the Beneficiaries, the Founders, and the State (%).[56]

As we can see, the most important group responsible for financing the education were the funders. The role of the state was gradually losing its importance. Even though building new schools was part of the internal politics, the villages and cities were responsible for the funding. Education soon became one of the biggest local expenditures.[57] Establishing the primary schools faced many problems, such as the need for new, modern buildings. In the beginning, the old feudal schools were used, as well as the Buddhist temples and the common village cottages. Many local communities worked together to ensure the success of building a new school.[58] As the time went

---

[52] The word 'obligatory' was not used until the 1886. Duke, *The history of the modern…*, p. 337.
[53] 学制百年史 [Japan's Modern Educational System. A history of the First Hundred Years]…
[54] Duke, *The history of the modern…*, p. 75.
[55] Frédéric, *Życie codzienne…*, p. 153.
[56] Claude Diebolt, 'Accounting expenditures on education: Japan from the Meiji Restoration to the Second World War', *Historical Social Research*, 28, 2003, p. 299.
[57] Ibidem.
[58] Platt, *Burning and Building…*, p. 207.

by, primary schools became a symbol of the western culture; they were equipped with foreign furniture and painted blue like the central faculties. In 1875 there were more than 34 000 primary schools. 1/3 of them were placed in the private houses, 40% in the Buddhist temples and 18% in the new buildings.[59] In 1890, special units that were preparing students for the middle schools were built next to the primary schools.[60]

The criticism of the Education System Order and the beginnings of the 'reverse course'

Brian Platt points out that in the first decades of the Meiji era Japan was establishing the education system that was meant to enlighten the individual and help the advancement of people, but in the 1880's, the government turned back to the bureaucratized Confucian procedures that stressed out the importance of loyalty and obedience. The alternatives were belittled.[61] The questions connected with the Japanese identity (*nihonjinron* – 日本人論), as well as the culture and its characteristics (*nihon bunkaron* –日本文化論) were raised. It was connected with the growing discontent with the fact, that Japan was taking too much from the foreign countries while neglecting its own values.[62]

The conservative intellectuals started to criticize the *Gakusei*. Schools were fighting with the old customs and traditions, and this contributed to the disintegration of the traditional Confucian family values. It was caused by the fact that teachers often travelled far to teach in the rural areas and were ignorant of the local customs.[63] At the same time, an oppositional group was founded, described by Andrew Gordon as 'the movement for freedom and people's rights' (*Jiyū Minken Undō* –自由民権運動).[64] Main part of this group was formed by the samurai who were left out when the new political elite was created, the commoners protesting the taxes and intellectuals enchanted with the foreign ideas of revolution. Some of the teachers were also participating in the meetings of this movement. Tanaka Fujimaro, who at that time was a Minister of Education, favored the American ideas and considered this movement the proof that the *Gakusei* Order needed to be revised, but in general the Meiji Oligarchy recognized it as dangerous and subversive.[65]

The Gakusei Education System Order did not fulfill its promises. Only one university of the planned 8 was established (in Tokyo in 1877).[66] The official page of the Ministry of Education explains that the enforcement of this System was pricy and difficult.[67] Roland Anderson confronts the monthly tuition fee that could cost up to 50 sen (1/4 yen) with the annual income of a commoner family, that was then 30 yen.[68] Satoshi Yamamura presents the statistics

---

[59] Anderson, *Education in Japan…*, p. 37; Frédéric, *Życie codzienne...*, p. 153–154;
[60] Ibid.
[61] Platt, *Burning and Building…*, p. 10.
[62] Pałasz-Rutkowska, *Cesarz Meiji (1852–1912)…*, p. 191.
[63] Frédéric, *Życie codzienne...*, p. 115.
[64] Gordon, *A modern history…*, p. 80.
[65] Benjamin Duke, *The history of the modern…*, p. 245–247.
[66] Saito Yasuo, *Education In Japan: Past and Present.* National Institute for Educational Policy Research, p. 3.
[67] 学制百年史 [Japan's Modern Educational System. A history of the First Hundred Years]…
[68] Anderson, *Education in Japan…*, p. 40–41.

of the attendance made by the Ministry of Education from 1875 to 1878: the annual rate of daily attendance of the children aged from 6 to 13 changed from 73,21% to 70,36%.[69]

One of the most important figures that were recommending to turn back to the indigenous values in education, was a Confucian scholar Motoda Nagazane (Eifu), a teacher and an advisor of the emperor Mutsuhito for 20 years. He used his influence to convince the ruler that bringing back the traditional values could be a remedy for the problems of the modern Japan.[70] Even before the proclamation of the Education System Order he gave a series of lectures for the emperor, in which the meaning of the Confucianism for the education was highlighted. He was worried, that because of the modernization and transformation Japan was becoming 'an imitator of Europe and America'.[71] In 1872 he voiced his criticism for replacing the classical Confucian texts by French and American books about ethic. He also wrote a publication after the emperor Mutsuhito's travels in the Tōhoku region. Those essays were then distributed to schools.[72]

In the document *Kyōgaku Seishi* (教学聖旨– *Sacred Words on Education*) from 1879 Motoda described himself as a narrator that was meant to pass on the emperor's words, but his own ideas and impact on the Japanese system of education were crucial and reached to the next several decades.[73] The Ministry of Education published new, standardized publications inspired by Motoda's essays. Confucian scholars were gradually returning to working as teachers. To separate the students from the anti-government groups, teachers were banned from all political meetings in 1885.[74]

The next influential figure connected with the revisions of the Japanese education system was Mori Arinori of the Satsuma domain, who was a Minister of Education from 1885 to 1889. Motoda did not approve of him. During his administration he ordered a stricter control of the textbooks and was most known by his reforms of the teachers' education. He divided the schools into 4 categories (universities, primary schools, middle schools, and normal schools, that were meant to prepare the teachers for their work). He focused more on the reason of state than the personal advancement of the students. He implemented loyalty for the emperor, the concept of usefulness and discipline.[75] He was working with German advisors that recommended the ideas of loyalty and hierarchy.[76] This resulted in more German faculties in law and literature, causing decline in English studies. From 1881 the Tokyo University drastically limited the number of the American medical faculties, as we can see on the table below:

---

[69] Satoshi Yamamura, 'National Education Policy and the Masses in Modern Japan: The Origins of a State-Oriented Mentality and the Long Detour to a New Form of Citizenship Education', *International Education Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 5, 2002, p. 10.

[70] Pałasz-Rutkowska, *Cesarz Meiji (1852-1912)*…, p. 192–193.

[71] Duke, *The history of the modern..*, p. 264.

[72] *The Cambridge history of Japan. Volume 5...*, p. 682. Anderson, *Education in Japan...*, p. 41; Duke, *The history of the modern...*, p. 267. To confirm his fears Motoda Eifu described an incident that happened in one of the primary schools visited by the emperor. The group of students was presenting their English skills, but later on they could not do the same in Japanese. Moreover, they could not answer the question what Japan could gain from the foreign knowledge and technologies. Perhaps students were too stressed to comment on that, but this fact was omitted by Motoda. Benjamin Duke says that emperor's approval for the Confucian scholar proves that Mutsuhito was not content with the politics carried out by the government in his name. Duke, *The history of the modern...*, p. 261–262, 268.

[73] Ibid., p. 270–271.

[74] Anderson, *Education in Japan...*, p. 42.

[75] Gordon, *A modern history...*, p. 105.

[76] Ibid.

Tokyo University Foreign Faculty: 1881–1885			
	British	**American**	**German**
1881	5	10	12 (10 medical)
1882	3	5	12 (6)
1883	3	2	10 (4)
1884	3	1	11 (3)
1885	1	1	10 (3)

Table 2. Tokyo University Foreign Faculty: 1881–1885.[77]

The units that were to qualify the teachers for their work caused controversy. They were being established in all prefectures until 1886. In the same year their goal was made public: 'to prepare future teachers with the qualities of *junryō* (obedience – 順良), *shinrai* (trust – 信頼) and *ichō* (dignity – 威重).'[78] The program consisted of the training course inspired by the military drill. A participation in physical activity was also required. This reform established a higher school in Tokyo that was meant to school the employees of those training units for the teachers. It was run by the general Yamagawa Hiroshi (山川浩). After his administration was confronted with protests and criticism, Mori published a book *Proposals Concerning Military Physical Eduaction* that was inspired by Herbert Spencer's thoughts.[79] Mori considered physical activity to be belittled during the first decades of the Meiji era.[80] Confucian scholars started to demand the 'sacred rescript' that would introduce new rules for education, but Mori Arinori and other members of the Meiji oligarchy opposed this idea. They did not want to create rigid and inflexible rules and were in favor of the secular values.[81] In 1889 Mori was murdered, and that sped up the procedures leading to the promulgation of the *Imperial Rescript of Education*.[82] From this moment forth, the initial part of the establishment of the Japanese modern education system ends.

Conclusion

After the overthrow of the shogunate, Japan tried to transform itself using foreign knowledge and ideas. The modernization of the political, economic and social structures proved to be successful and at the end of Meiji era, Japan was the first Asian country that reduced its illiteracy rate almost completely by using a modern education system. The changes could be introduced in such a quick time, because this country had a relatively large number of schools.[83] The most popular types of schools, which were *terakoya* and *juku,* offered a secular education that further quickened the unification and standardization of the education system.[84]

---

[77] Duke, *The history of the modern…*, p. 308.

[78] Ibid., p. 328.

[79] Mori and Spencer knew each other and considered themselves to be friends.

[80] Duke, *The history of the modern…*, p. 328–330.

[81] *Cambridge history of Japan. Volume 5…*, p. 683.

[82] In the same day that the Constitution was promulgated.

[83] Mikołaj Melanowicz, *W stronę Japonii – 150 lat Meiji* (part 4), http://istotnie.pl/strone-japonii-150-meiji-czesc-4, (accessed 20 July 2017).

[84] *The Cambridge history of Japan. Volume 5…*, p. 443.

The establishment of the Office of Education in 1868 proves that during the initial part of the Meiji era, the oligarchy tried to use the indigenous sources for the education such as Shintō.[85] The officials soon turned to the American ideas and continued to use them until 1890.

In 1872 the Education System Order was proclaimed. It was inspired by American and French models, and was an ambitious plan for providing the equal education for the children regardless of their social status or sex.[86] It wasn't successful, as it required the commoners to fund the newly established faculties and caused a great increase in the local expenditures. There were more and more critics who claimed that Japanese education needs to be in sync with traditional Confucian values, especially with the virtues of obedience, loyalty and respect for the authorities.[87] Soon the Department of Education realized that *Gakusei* could not be enforced upon the entire nation without encountering problems connected with the ethic or finances. Feudal Edo period, which after the restoration was considered foul, started to be viewed as a romantic past.[88] At the same time the movement for people's rights was popularized. The government made a decision to reform the education system, so that the foreign models and knowledge would be complemented by the Confucian values. The turning point was the promulgation of the *Imperial Rescript on Education* in 1890, that crystallized 'the imperial system of education' (*tennōsei kyōiku*) connected with the cult of the emperor.[89] Thus the beginning of the Meiji era's education system ended when the sentiment of the 'civilization and enlightenment' was replaced by the Confucian rules.

One of the most important figures that shaped the Meiji education system was Fukuzawa Yukichi, who was working on the first draft of the *Gakusei*. He was demanding the equal education for everyone, reduction of the illiteracy rate and political freedoms.[90] He also voiced his opinions connected with the direction of the foreign policy during the Meiji period, favoring the Americans over Chinese, so that Japan should eventually be able to compete with the Western countries.[91] Another noted figure was Motoda Eifu, Confucian advisor and teacher of the emperor Mutsuhito. He was criticizing the replacement of the Japanese indigenous sources with the Western ideas.[92] Ultimately he shaped the *Imperial Rescript on Education* and influenced the following historical periods.[93] Those two prominent figures can be the seen as the example of how many contradictory ideas were being voiced, enforced and confronted with each other, eventually creating the modern Japan.

During the first initial years of the Meiji era Japan went through the changes that can be described as the 'revolution'. Children of all social classes, sexes and places could start their education. Many new and often controversial ideas were voiced. Some of the old customs were left aside and Japan could start recreating itself anew. During those first decades of the Meiji era a lot of meaningful questions were raised. The System *Gakusei* caused a dispute: how can the education system be used in the modern time? During those decisive first years Japan was to face not only

---

[85] Duke, *The history of the modern…*, p. 48–51.
[86] Anderson, *Education in Japan…*, p. 36.
[87] Ibid., p. 40–41.
[88] 学制百年史 [Japan's Modern Educational System. A history of the First Hundred Years]…
[89] Platt, *Burning and Building…*, p. 10.
[90] Anderson, *Education in Japan…*, p. 35.
[91] Barbasiewicz, *Pomniki i miejsca pamięci…*, p. 39.
[92] Ibid., p. 42.
[93] Gordon, *A modern history…*, p. 105.

the internal problems connected with the act of the enforcement of the new educational structures, but also the questions of its identity and roots. Ultimately Japan entered the 20th century with the education system that was a unique connection of the western inspired structures and Confucian values. This proved to be a lasting fundament of the Japanese identity until 1945.

Magdalena Pinker[*]

Supernatural Motifs in Chronicled Descriptions of the Foundation of Early Arabic-Islamic Towns

Abstract

The foundation of earliest Arabic-Islamic towns is known almost exclusively through chronicles written in the 3rd century of the Hijri calendar / 9th century CE. These accounts were, therefore, written nearly two centuries after the events they describe. The aim of this article is to study the extent to which supernatural motifs were present in literary narratives of the foundation of early Arab-Muslim towns – Basra, Kufa, Fustat and Kairouan. The scarcity of mythical elements might suggest the mandatory comparison of those texts to their European counterparts – in which supernatural motifs play a part in almost every foundation myth – this article argues that this is approach is unnecessary. The analysis of the descriptions conveying the foundation of early Arabic-Islamic towns leads on to conclusions regarding the role of the chronicles in the creation of the earliest history of Islamic statehood.

Introduction

The creation of a town is often connected with various kinds of supernatural events. The foundation of Rome brings to mind the story of the two brothers – Romulus and Remus, who survived thanks to the help of a she-wolf.[1] One of Warsaw's origin myths connects the foundation of the city with a lord who paid a visit to a pair of humble fishermen, Wars and Sawa.[2] Non-European cities also have numerous legends alluding to their creation; Cuzco in Peru was founded by the winged brothers Ayar[3], and Varanasi in India – by the god Shiva.[4] Therefore it is worth investigating the extent to which supernatural motifs were a part of the legends describing the foundation of the earliest Arabic-Islamic towns.

The foundation of a town can be analysed on two levels – material and symbolic. The first is connected with the physical creation of a settlement: finding a place for a future town, setting out the network of streets, and finally building houses and other elements of infrastructure. All these acts can be examined by studying written and archaeological sources. Unfortunately, the latter might not be sufficient for creating a coherent vision of the beginnings of a given town. Cities usually expand, and their appearance changes rapidly, so archaeological findings only show some phases of their development, but rarely illustrate the initial stages of their formation. Therefore, the only possible way to analyse the foundation of a town is by studying the written sources.

On a symbolic level – greater than the physical establishment of streets and houses – the creation of a town required transferring the descriptions and histories of the town to the sphere of myth, by linking them with some supernatural, miraculous elements or phenomena. Bogusław Żyłko, semiotician and historian of ideas, wrote that, when founding a town, "the choice of a place

---

[*] Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies, University of Warsaw, e-mail: m.pinker@uw.edu.pl.

[1] Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Roman Antiquities*, (trans. E. Cary), Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937, Vol. 1, pp. 263–273.

[2] Marta Dobrowolska-Kierył, *Legendy warszawskie* [Warsaw Legends], Warszawa: Wydawnictwo RM, 2016, p. 28.

[3] Rodolfo Cerrón-Palomino, 'Cuzco: La piedra donde se posó la lechuza. Historia de un nombre' [Cuzco: the Stone Where the Owl Perched. The History of a Name], *Revista Andina*, No. 44, 2007, pp. 155–156, 173–174.

[4] John G. Melton, *The Encyclopedia of Religious Phenomena*, Visible Ink Press, 2007, p. 29.

was often not decided upon practical issues (e.g. convenient location), but symbolic ones".[5] Foundation myths of towns – full of extraordinary, supernatural elements and phenomena – made the meaning of a settlement go beyond the rational and practical discourse and enter the mythical sphere.

Sources

The foundation of the earliest Arab-Muslim towns can, predominantly, only be studied through written sources. The origins of the Islamic religion, and Muslim culture and society emerging from it, date back to the seventh century CE (i.e. first century of the Hijri calendar). According to the widely accepted version of the beginnings of Islamic history, one of the earliest surviving written sources connected with this religion is the Qur'an, considered by its followers to be a holy book sent to the prophet Muḥammad by God. Islamic tradition claims that it was first written down during the reign of the third caliph 'Uṯmān Ibn 'Affān (35–47 AH/644–656 AD). Religious importance makes academic analysis of this script extremely difficult, because, as the Qur'an is considered to be the revelation from the omniscient God, the limited human mind cannot grasp its full meaning. Moreover, the Quranic text is often incoherent and ambiguous, which makes drawing consistent conclusion from its examination very arduous.

The earliest known type of Arab-Muslim historiographical writing is a biography of the prophet Muḥammad, including the most famous one – *Sīrat rasūl Allāh*[6] [Life of the Messenger of God] by Muḥammad Ibn Isḥāq.[7] Other popular literary genres were genealogies and biographical dictionaries e.g. *Kitāb at-tabaqāt al-kubrā* [Book of the Major Classes] by Ibn Sa'd[8], and *maġāzī*, the accounts of the campaigns and conquests, by Mūsā Ibn 'Uqba[9] (*Kitāb al-maġāzī* [Book of the Campaigns] – which has not survived) and by Al-Wāqidī[10] (*Kitāb at-tārīḫ wa-al-maġāzī* [Book of History and Campaigns]). Most of the earliest works have disappeared, and we know them only from references in later works.

Due to the scarcity of other sources, our knowledge about the earliest history of Islamic civilization is based almost entirely on chronicles written in the 3rd c. of the Hijri era/10th c. CE, so almost two hundred years after the events they describe. Present analysis of the descriptions of the earliest Arab-Muslim towns is based on four major chronicles: *Ta'rīḫ ar-rusul wa-al-mulūk* [History of the Prophets and Kings] by Abū Ǧa'far Muḥammad Ibn Ǧarīr aṭ-Ṭabarī[11], *Kitāb futūḥ*

---

[5] Bogusław Żyłko, 'Wstęp tłumacza. Miasto jako przedmiot badań semiotyki kultury' [Translator's Foreword. Town as an Object of the Cultural Semiotics Study], in *Miasto i mit* [Town and Myth], Władimir Toporow, Gdańsk: Słowo/obraz terytoria, 2000, p. 5.

[6] Ibn Isḥāq, *As-sīra an-nabawiyya* [Biography of the Prophet], Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-'ilmiyya, 2004.

[7] Muḥammad Ibn Yasār Ibn Ḫiyār Ibn Isḥāq (d. 150 AH/761 AD) – Medinian historian and biographer.

[8] Ibn Sa'd Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad Ibn Sa'd Ibn Mani' al-Baṣrī al-Hāšimī (d. 230 AH/845 AD) – hadith scholar and historian; scribe of Al-Wāqidī.

[9] Mūsā Ibn 'Uqba al-Asadī (d. 675 AH/758 AD) – Medinian scholar and historian. His works have not survived to this day.

[10] Muḥammad Ibn 'Umar Ibn Wāqid, known as Al-Wāqidī (d. 207 AH/822 AD) – Medinian historian and scholar of a Islamic jurisprudence *fiqh*. One of the greatest authorities in the matter of earliest Arab-Muslim history.

[11] Abū Ǧa'far Muḥammad Ibn Ǧarīr aṭ-Ṭabarī (d. 310 AH/923 AD) – probably the most famous early Arab-Muslim historian; author of the commentary of the Qur'an and the history of the world from its creation to the year 302/915.

al-buldān [Book of the Conquests of the Lands] by Aḥmad Ibn Yaḥyā al-Balāḏurī[12] and *Kitāb futūḥ Miṣr wa-al-Maġrib* [Book of the Conquest of Egypt and Maghreb] by Abū al-Qāsim ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān Ibn ‘Abd al-Ḥakam.[13] A later piece of work from the 8th c. of Hijri era / 14th c. CE entitled *Al-Bayān al-muġrib fī aḫbār al-Maġrib* [Book of the Amazing Story of the History of Maghreb] by Ibn ‘Iḏārī[14], will also be used.

Early Arabic-Islamic Town

The subject of Arabic-Islamic towns has always been an important issue for academic research. Various arabists, archaeologists and historians have tried to define its specificity and describe its form.[15] The two major types of Islamic towns are those founded by the Arabs and those taken over by them during the conquests. These "inherited cities", as they are called by Hugh Kennedy[16], were ancient cities located mostly in Aš-Šām (Syro-Palestine) e.g. Damascus, Aleppo, Jerusalem, but also in Egypt with cities like Alexandria, and other parts of territories conquered by the Arabs. Their beginnings are thus not connected with Arab-Muslim culture, so this research focusses on the first type of town, namely, those founded by Arabs who had recently converted to Islam. At the beginning these towns were military camps, in which an army was stationed to defend the newly conquered lands and prepare for their next advancement. In the Arabic sources garrison towns are designated with the term *miṣr* (pl. *amṣār*), although it is worth mentioning that this word has many other meanings.[17]

---

[12] Abū Ǧa‘far Aḥmad Ibn Yaḥyā Ibn Ǧābir al-Balāḏurī (d. ca 278–279 AH/892 AD) – historian, probably born in Baghdad, author of the biographical work *Ansāb al-ašrāf* [Genealogies of the Nobles] and the famous history of Islamic conquests (*Futūḥ al-buldān*).

[13] Abū al-Qāsim ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān Ibn ‘Abd Allāh Ibn ‘Abd al-Ḥakam (d. 257 AH/871 AD) – Egyptian historian born into a family of prominent jurists and hadith scholars; author of the history of Egypt (*Kitāb futūḥ Miṣr wa-al-Maġrib*, also known under different titles).

[14] Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad Ibn Muḥammad Ibn ‘Iḏārī al-Marrākušī (d. 1st half of 8th of Hijri era/14th c. CE) – Maghrebian historian; his only surviving work is, *Al-Bayān al-muġrib fī aḫbār mulūk al-Andalus wa-al-Maġrib* (the title varies depending on the edition).

[15] The beginnings of the work on the Arabic-Islamic towns are connected with the brothers William and Georges Marçais (e.g. Georges Marçais, ‘La Conception des villes dans l’Islam’ [The Concept of a Town in Islam], *La Revue d'Alger*, Vol. 2, 1945, pp. 517–533; William Marçais, ‘L’islamisme et la vie urbaine’ [Islamism and the Urban Life], *Comptes Rendus de L'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, Vol. 72, No. 1, 1928, pp. 86–100), who at the beginning of the 20th century tried to define the quintessence and essential elements of the town. Roger LeTourneau (*Fes avant le protectorat; etude economique et sociale d'une ville de l'occident musulman* [Fez before the Protectorate: Economic and Social Study of a Western-Muslim Town], Société marocaine de librairie et D'édition, 1949), Robert Brunschvig (‘Urbanism medievale et droit musulmane’ [Medieval Urbanism and Islamic Law], *Revue des Etudes Islamiques*, Vol. 15, 1947, pp. 127–155) and Jean Sauvaget (*Alep: Essai sur le developpement d'une grande ville syrienne des origines au milieu du XIXe siècle* [Aleppo: an Essay on the Development of a Large Syrian Town from its Origins to the Early 19th century], Bibliotheque archeologique et historique, Vol. 36, Paris, 1941) were other early scholars Describing various cities of the Islamic world, their organization and the ideas behind them. The "second wave" of Muslim urbanism studies started in 1967 with Ira M. Lapidus’ book *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge–Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967). Worth mentioning is Islamic city theorist, Janet Abu Lughod (‘The City in the Islamic World – Historic Myth, Islamic Essence, and Contemporary Relevance’, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 19, No. 2, 1987, pp. 155–176), and also the two-volume publication, *The City in the Islamic World*, edited by Salma K. Jayyusi and published by Brill in 2008, which presents a summary of the studies into this topic to date.

[16] Hugh Kennedy, ‘Inherited cities’, in *The City in the Islamic World*, Salma K. Jayyusi, (ed.), Vol. 1, Leiden–Boston: Brill, pp. 98–99.

[17] One of the greatest Arabic lexicographers Ibn Manẓūr (d. 711 AH/1311 AD) presents various meanings connected to the root ر ص م (m ṣ r), among others are: a boundary between two things; a famous town; one of the *amṣār*; or to milk a camel with the tips of the fingers (Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-‘Arab* [The Tongue of Arabs], Cairo

Basra

Basra (ar. Al-Baṣra), located in the south of Iraq near the river Shatt al-Arab, which connects the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers, is considered to be the first *miṣr*.[18] The foundation of this earliest Arabic-Islamic garrison town is connected with ʿUmar Ibn al-Ḫaṭṭāb – the second caliph (reign 13–23 AH/634–644 AD). According to Aṭ-Ṭabarī, the ruler sent his troops to Iraq, to the frontier between lands conquered by the attacking Arabs and those occupied by the defending Persians. The Muslim army was commanded by one of the prophet Mohammed's famous companions (ar. *ṣaḥāba*) – ʿUtba Ibn Ġazwān (d. 17 AH/638 AD). The caliph is believed to have said: "Set off with your companions and when you are in the farthest part of the Arab land and the closest part of the Persian territory, then halt". When they reached Al-Mirbad[19], they found soft stones (ar. *al-baṣra*)."What are these soft stones?" They went on until they reached a small bridge. The land was covered with grasses and reeds. "We were commanded to stop here".[20]

Thus, the chroniclers present ʿUmar, the caliph who had, in fact, stayed in Medina, as the person responsible for choosing the location of the new camp for his army in Iraq. Aṭ-Ṭabarī explains the etymology of the name of the future town – the word *baṣra* in Arabic means soft gypsum stones. Al-Balāḏurī also emphasizes the role of the caliph when describing the place the garrison town was created: "When ʿUtba Ibn Ġazwān set up camp in Al-Ḫurayba[21], he wrote to ʿUmar Ibn al-Ḫaṭṭāb informing him of his whereabouts and the fact that they needed a place to spend the winter and to come back to from their raids (ar**.** *ġazw*). [ʿUmar] answered: "Gather your companions in one place, which should be close to water and pasture. Send me its description". [ʿUtba] wrote to him: "I found a land full of reeds, on the edge between a desert and fertile soil. Beyond it, there are swamps full of reeds". When [ʿUmar] read the letter, he said; "This land is green and located near a watering place, pasture and firewood". He wrote to [ʿUtba] telling him to settle the people there, and so he did. They built houses of reeds and ʿUtba erected a reed mosque. It was in the year 14".[22]

(Bulaq): Al-Maṭbaʿa al-Mīriyya, 1301 AH/1883–1884 AD, Vol. 7, p. 23). Al-Murtaḍā az-Zabīdī (d. 1205 AH/1790 AD), author of *Tāǧ al-ʿarūs min ǧawāhir al-qāmūs* [The Crown of the Bride made from the Gems of the Ocean/Dictionary] mentions the usage of the word *miṣr* in the Qu'ran, where it is translated mostly as Egypt (Al-Zabīdī, *Tāǧ al-ʿarūs min ǧawāhir al-qāmūs*, Kuwait: Maṭbaʿat Ḥukūmat al-Kuwayt, 1974, p. 127). British orientalist Edward William Lane presents in his *opus magnum – Arabic-English Lexicon,* another definition of the word *miṣr*, taken from *Kitāb at-taʿrīfāt* [Book of Definitions] by Al-Ǧurǧānī (d. 816 AH/1413 AD): "town whereof the greatest of its mosques will not hold, or contain, its inhabitants" (Edward W. Lane, *An Arabic-English Lexicon*, Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1968, Vol. 1, p. 2719).

[18] Chroniclers give different years for the foundation of Basra. Al-Yaʿqūbī, Islamic historian and geographer (d. ca 284 AH/897 AD), says that Basra was founded in the year 17 AH/638 AD, during ʿUmar Ibn al-Ḫaṭṭāb's reign (Al-Yaʿqūbī, *Kitāb al-buldān* [Book of Lands], Theodoor W. Juynboll (ed.), Leiden: Brill, 1860, p. 109). According to Al-Balāḏurī, it happened in the year 14 AH/635–636 AD (Aḥmad Ibn Yaḥyā Al-Balāḏurī, *Kitāb futūḥ al-buldān* [Book of the Conquests of the Lands], M.J. de Goeje (ed.), Leiden: Brill, 1866, p. 346). Aṭ-Ṭabarī wrote that, according to Al-Madāʾinī, scholar and historian d. 225 AH/752 AD, it was in 14 AH/635–636 AD, but Sayf Ibn ʿUmar, a well-known early Islamic historian from Kufa, claimed that Basra was founded in the spring of 16 AH/637–638 AD (Abū Ǧaʿfar Muḥammad Ibn Ǧarir Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīḫ ar-rusul wa-al-mulūk (Annales)* [History of the Prophets and Kings], M.J. de Goeje (ed.), Leiden: Brill, 1893, Vol. 5, p. 2377).

[19] Al-Mirbad – a town close to Basra. According to some of the sources, it was once a part of Basra.

[20] Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīḫ*, 1893, Vol. 5, p. 2379.

[21] Al-Ḫurayba – literally: small ruin; early chroniclers called it the settlement where Basra was later founded, although their the specific meaning of this name is unclear.

[22] Al-Balāḏurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 346.

The relation of the foundation of Basra, probably the first Arabic-Islamic town, focuses on prosaic reasons for the creation of the new settlement. The Muslim army needed shelter and a base from which to attack the new territory, and to defend those already conquered. The troops were very far from the capital city Medina, and therefore they could not come back after every raid. The campaign was not yet over, and so the creation of a garrison town in the conquered territory was a fundamental and logical necessity.

Kufa

Kufa is considered to be the second *miṣr*, although the date of its creation is not certain. According to Aṭ-Ṭabarī – quoting earlier scholars – Kufa was founded in 15 AH/636–637 AD,[23] but Al-Balāḏurī claims that it happened two years later, in 17 AH/638–639 AD.[24] The foundation of Kufa is connected with Sa'd Ibn Abī Waqqāṣ – the famous commander of Muslim troops at the battle of Al-Qādisiyya. After this great Arab victory, the Muslim troops conquered the Persian capital city – Al-Madā'in (the towns). According to the chroniclers' reports, the soldiers did not feel well in the city: they complained to the caliph 'Umar about their health issues, which were the result of the unfavourable habitat. Their complexion was beginning to look unhealthy and they were gaining weight[25]. When Sa'd informed the caliph that his troops suffered terribly from mosquito attacks, Ibn al-Ḫaṭṭāb told them to search for a new place, saying: "Arabs are like camels. The only things good for them are those good for the camels. Find a suitable place and may there not be water [lit. 'sea'] between me and you".[26]

Two scouts were sent in search of the best place to settle a new town. They travelled along the two banks of the Euphrates until they reached a spot named Kufa – called so after the name of the Arabic word for gravel mixed with red sand (ar. *kūfa*). As reported by Al-Balāḏurī, the area was pointed out by the legendary 'Abd al-Masīḥ Ibn Buqayla[27], who said to Sa'd: "I will point out a site, which is beyond the dry desert, but over the place where mosquitos are born".[28]

'Umar let Sa'd and his men build a town and the chroniclers described the process of planning and distribution of the first settlers. The accounts relating the foundation of Kufa are more detailed than those concerning the first *miṣr* – Basra. According to these, 'Umar insisted on the temporary character of the new town: he prohibited its citizens from building their houses out of durable materials – so they could only erect reed huts. He eventually changed his mind after a fire burnt down eighty homesteads in the town.[29]

When it comes to the descriptions of the first two *miṣrs* (ar. *miṣrān*), the authors of the chronicles focused only on the physical aspects of the creation of both towns. Kufa, as well as Basra, was a garrison for Arab troops during the conquest of Persian territories. The description of its foundation is relatively commonplace. Chroniclers concentrated on the prosaic reasons behind

---

[23] Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīḫ*, 1893, Vol. 5, p. 2389.
[24] Al-Balāḏurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 275.
[25] Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīḫ*, 1893, Vol. 5, p. 2483.
[26] Al-Balāḏurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 276.
[27] 'Abd al-Masīḥ Ibn Buqayla – most likely a mythical person (he was said to have lived for 350 years); according to one of the traditions, he was connected the siege of Hira by Ḫālid Ibn al-Walīd (Charles Pellat, 'Ibn Buqayla' *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Leiden–London: E.J. Brill–Luzac&Co, 1986, Vol. 3, p. 739).
[28] Al-Balāḏurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 276.
[29] Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīḫ*, 1893, Vol. 5, p. 2487.

the foundation of Kufa (namely a plague of mosquitos infesting Al-Madā'in) and the planning of the town and distribution of its inhabitants (there was even a man responsible for this task – Abū al-Hayyāğ Ibn Mālik[30]).

Kufa played a significant role in the earliest history of Arabic-Islamic statehood. For a short time – under the reign of the fourth caliph 'Alī Ibn Abī Ṭālib's – it even became its capital city. It might explain why descriptions of the foundation of Kufa and its earliest functions are more specific than in the case of Basra. Although it is possible to say that Kufa was more important than Basra in the first centuries of Islamic civilisation, from the 4th of the Hijri era/10th century CE onwards it slowly lost its significance and nowadays only forms a part of the Iraqi city of Najaf. Basra, on the other hand, is now the second biggest city in Iraq.

Fustat

The story of the foundation of Fustat, today a part of Greater Cairo, differs slightly from those concerning Basra and Kufa. First of all, there are more written sources describing the early history of this town. One of the most important chronicles is *Kitāb futūḥ Miṣr* (also known under different titles) by Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam. Al-Balāḏurī and Aṭ-Ṭabarī mentioned the creation of a new *miṣr* in Egypt, but the amount of attention they pay to Fustat is considerably smaller than to the Iraqi towns – Basra and Kufa. It might be understandable because both authors lived in Iraq, therefore local history may have been more important for them than the history of Egypt. The Coptic sources, like the chronicle of John of Nikiu[31] or *Tārīḫ al-baṭārika* [History of Patriarchs] by Sāwīrus[32], shed new light on the Arab conquest of Egypt, but unfortunately Christian chroniclers remain mute about the establishment of a new town – Fustat.

Aṭ-Ṭabarī summarized the description of the foundation of Fustat in one short sentence – *fa-maṣṣara 'Amr Al-Fusṭāṭ*[33], what can be translated as: *and 'Amr founded Fustat as a garrison town* (ar. *miṣr*)". The chronicler focused on the most important person connected with the conquest of Egypt – 'Amr Ibn al-'Āṣ[34], the famous commander of the Arab army and companion of the prophet Muḥammad. Al-Balāḏurī, on the other hand, identifies Fustat with the "fortress of Babylon": "['Amr] advanced to Fustat and set up camp there in a myrtle garden, because the citizens of Fustat had dug trenches. The city was named Aylūna [from Bāb al-Yūn], but it was known as Fustat, because they said that this place was 'fusṭāṭ al-qawm' – a place where people gathered. People also say that 'Amr set his tent [ar. fusṭāṭ] there, and hence the name".[35]

---

[30] Ibid., p. 2488.
[31] In his chronicle John, Bishop of Nikiu described the history of the world from its beginnings up to the time of the Arab-Muslim conquest. The original text in Coptic has not survived and the only known version of the chronicle is its translation to Ge'ez from 1602. Sadly this text is missing the account of the events that took place in the years 611–639. The text was translated to English by Robert H. Charles (John, bishop of Nikiou, *Chronicle of John, bishop of Nikiou*, Oxford: Williams and Norgate, 1916).
[32] Sāwīrūs Ibn al-Muqaffa', *Tārīḫ al-baṭārika li-al-anbā Sāwīrūs Ibn al-Muqaffa' usquf Al-Ašmūnayn* [History of the Patriarchs by father Sāwīrūs Ibn al-Muqaffa' Bishop of Al-Ašmūnayn], Vol. I. S.l.: An-Na'ām li-aṭ-Ṭibā'a wa-at-Tawrīdāt, 1999.
[33] Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīḫ*, 1890, Vol. 4, p. 2589.
[34] 'Amr Ibn al-'Āṣ (d. ca 42 AH/663 AD) – a companion of the prophet Muḥammad, one of the greatest commanders of Arab troops in the early history of Islam. Most famous for his conquest of Egypt.
[35] Al-Balāḏurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 213.

The chronicler gives an interesting account of the events that took place during the conquest of Egypt. Whilst marching, and after taking over the towns along the Sinai Peninsula and Eastern Desert lands, the Arabs besieged the fortress of Babylon, which in Arabic sources is called "Bāb al-Yūn" or "Bābilyūn". There, the 'Amr's troops were reinforced by another ten to twelve thousand soldiers, led by Az-Zubayr Ibn al-'Awwām[36]. The course of the battle for the Egyptian fortress is unknown, but Al-Balāḏurī mentions some fabled episodes of the struggle. He tells the story of Az-Zubayr, who took a ladder and climbed it, shouting *Allāhu akbar*! ('God is the greatest'). He managed to enter the Byzantine stronghold with the first wave of Arabs, leading the rest of his troops. Babylon then fell into Arab hands and the ladder was kept in Egypt until the days of Al-Balāḏurī[37].

Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam narrates the story explaining the name given to this new town in the following words: "The town was named Fustat, because when 'Amr Ibn al-'Āṣ wanted to march on Alexandria to fight against the Byzantines, he ordered that his tent be taken down, but there was a wild dove hatching eggs. 'Amr Ibn al-'Āṣ said:

"This placed is blessed and we cannot move it"[38] and he had his people leave it as it was. (…)
When the Muslims came back from Alexandria, they said: "Where should we set our camp?".
They answered: "In Fustat, because the 'Amr's tent (ar. fusṭāṭ) was left there in a place called
Dār al-Ḥaṣā (lit. 'the House of Gravel'), next to the present-day little house of 'Amr".[39]

It is worth underlining that this story was passed on by an Egyptian author. When describing the history of his home country, Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam does not avoid lyrical and legendary elements, such as the story of the ladder or the dove. In his eyes they likely added splendour to the story of his homeland and made him proud of his heritage. All the chroniclers studied here write about the process of organizing the town by laying out quarters and settling people according to the tribes they belong to.[40] The authors also mention the mosque built by 'Amr in the newly created town. The mosque of 'Amr Ibn al-'Āṣ still stands to this day, in the exact place Fustat was founded. Unfortunately, its present form is the result of various modifications, and has very little in common with the original structure built by 'Amr.[41]

Similarly to the previous towns mentioned, the exact date of foundation of Fustat is not certain. Aṭ-Ṭabarī presents different dates, starting from the year 16 AH/637 AD (which is very unlikely), up to 25 AH/646 AD.[42] According to Al-Balāḏurī, the 'Amr's expedition to Egypt started

---

[36] Az-Zubayr Ibn al-'Awwām (d. 36 AH/656 AD) – one of the most famous companions of the prophet Muḥammad. According to tradition, he was one of the Muslims to whom the prophet guaranteed Paradise while they were still alive. He died in the Battle of the Camel.

[37] Al-Balāḏurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 213. The ladder is also mentioned by Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam (Abū al-Qāsim 'Abd ar-Raḥmān Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam, *Futūḥ Miṣr wa-al-Maġrib* [The Conquest of Egypt and Mghreb], Cairo: Laǧnat al-bayān al-'arabī , n.d., p. 94).

[38] This is a loose translation from the Arabic original which might refer to the story of the prophet Muḥammad, who was hiding in a cave in the Ḥirā' mountain. According to the legend described in hadiths, the entrance to the cave was miraculously hidden and closed by a spider's web and there were two doves hatching eggs. People searching for the prophet thought that these very skittish birds could not nest in a place next to any human. Therefore the spider and the doves saved the prophet from being caught by his enemies.

[39] Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam, *Futūḥ Miṣr*, p. 133.

[40] Al-Balāḏurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 134; Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam, *Futūḥ* Miṣr, p. 134.

[41] Doris Behrens-Abouseif, *Islamic Architecture in Cairo. An Introduction*, Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2005, p. 47; Bernard O'Kane, *The Mosques of Egypt*, Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press. 2017, pp. 2–3.

[42] Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rīḫ*, 1890, Vol. 4, p. 2580.

_____

in the year 19 AH/640 AD.[43] One of those involved in the conquest of Egypt and the creation of the first Arabic-Islamic town there was – as in previous cases – the caliph 'Umar Ibn al-Ḫaṭṭāb. He did not allow the Arab soldiers in Alexandria to occupy the empty quarters and buildings, which had been left by their previous Byzantine occupants. The caliph also did not want to be separated from his troops by any water[44] – which brings to mind similar objections he presented when choosing the location for Kufa. Władysław Kubiak suggests that the caliph's "fear of water" could have been the result of the traumatic, and still fresh in the memory, "Battle of the Bridge", in 16 AH/634 AD – in which a flooding river halted the Arab army's retreat, leading to a crushing defeat by the Persians.[45]

The description of the foundation of Fustat does not include any story about Arabs searching for an appropriate location – contrary to the stories of the two previous *miṣrs* (ar. *miṣrān*), Basra and Kufa. The authors focus mainly on the fight between the Muslims and the Byzantines, who ruled Egypt at that time. Some supernatural motifs are visible in the stories about the two famous Arab warriors – 'Amr Ibn al-'Āṣ and Az-Zubayr Ibn al-'Awwām. Their connection with the foundation of the first Egyptian *miṣr* can add importance to the town itself and its inhabitants (including Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam – the future narrator of those stories).

Kairouan

The description of the foundation of Kairouan, a town in Ifriqiyya (present day Tunisia and its surroundings), is, in many aspects, different form the narrations of Basra, Kufa and Fustat. First of all, the North African town was created later than the first *miṣrs* (ar. *amṣār*) – probably around the year 50 AH/670 AD. The Islamic Empire was ruled at that time by a new dynasty, the Ummayads, from their capital city of Damascus. 'Umar Ibn al-Ḫaṭṭāb, who had been one of the decision makers when founding the earlier towns, was long dead when Kairouan was created. The main protagonist of the history of the foundation of the town was 'Uqba Ibn Nāfi' – the celebrated conqueror of North Africa, a nephew of 'Amr Ibn al-'Āṣ and a companion of the prophet (although this statement seems to be grossly exaggerated: 'Uqba was just one year old when Muḥammad died).[46]

Contrary to the situation in Iraq and Egypt, where – generally speaking – Muslim Arabs arrived and then stayed, the conquest of Ifriqiya had several stages. The first commander to march towards the west was 'Amr Ibn al-'Āṣ himself. One of the participants of his quest was the young 'Uqba Ibn Nāfi'. The expedition ended in what is now Libya; the caliph, 'Umar Ibn al-Ḫaṭṭāb had not given his permission to advance upon Ifriqiya, because, as he said: "Ifriqiya is treacherous and deceptive".[47] Subsequent conquests of North Africa did not lead to the permanent settlement of Arabs in these territories, but they would often return in order to plunder the riches that could be found there. After the campaigns of 'Abd Allāh Ibn Sa'd Ibn Abī Sarḥ, 'Amr's replacement, and

_____

[43] Al-Balāḏurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 212.
[44] Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam, *Futūḥ Miṣr*, pp. 132–133.
[45] Wladyslaw B. Kubiak, *Al-Fustat. Its Foundation and Early Urban Development*, Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1987, p. 144.
[46] Vassilios Christides, ''Uḳba b. Nāfi'', *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2000, Vol. 10, pp. 789–790.
[47] Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam, *Futūḥ Miṣr*, p. 232.

Mu'āwiyya Ibn Ḥudayǧ, who according to Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam visited Ifriqiya three times[48], finally in 46 AH/666 AD 'Uqba Ibn Nāfi''s expedition began[49]. The same chronicler describes various towns captured by the Muslims (e.g. Zuwayla or Zawīla[50] and Ġadāmis[51]). And, while doing so, he occasionally mentions some legendary stories:

'''Uqba came to the place called Mā' Faras ('water of the mare'), where there was no water. Therefore, they suffered from a great thirst and 'Uqba and his companions wanted to save themselves from death. Thus 'Uqba began to pray and ask for God's help. His mare started to paw in the soil with her hoof, until she came across a rock and the water spouted from underneath, which the mare began to drink. When 'Uqba saw that, he called his men and told them to dig. They dug out seventy holes, drank and thanked God and, because of that, the place was named Mā' Faras".[52]

'Uqba, who had visited North Africa before, knew that the previous tactics of attacking the Berber-Byzantine territories of Ifriqiya, looting them and coming back home was insufficient and ineffective. He decided then to set up a permanent residence for his Arab troops. Ibn Nāfi' chose the place of Kairouan, which was approximately 50 km from the Mediterranean coast. He might have thought that being away from the coast was safer, since at the time Muslims could never have stood up to the Byzantine fleet.[53] All the chronicles described the wildlife of the place where this future town of Kairouan was to be created.

Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam says: "[This place] was a valley full of fruits and trees, where the wild animals [lit. beasts], lions[54] and insects were hiding".[55] Al-Balāḏurī adds that there were also tamarisk shrubs, "snakes and deadly scorpions".[56] When 'Uqba saw all that, he is said to have shouted: "Oh you inhabitants of the valley! Go away and may God have mercy on you, and we will settle here".[57] Al-Balāḏurī describes the miraculous effect of these words: "'Uqba was a righteous man, whose prayers were answered. He prayed to his Lord and He made everything [i.e. dangerous animals] go away. Even the lions carried their cubs whilst running away".[58]

Aṭ-Ṭabarī also mentions the description of lions carrying their young. It is worth mentioning that it seems to be common among Arab-Muslim historians and chroniclers that the later they wrote, the more detailed their accounts of past events are. And so Ibn 'Iḏārī, an author living three centuries after Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam, Al-Balāḏurī and Aṭ-Ṭabarī, in the 7th–8th c. of the Hijri era/13th–14th c. CE, offers the most extensive description of the supernatural events connected with the foundation of Kairouan:

"People saw something extraordinary – lions came out from the bottom of the valley carrying their cubs, wolves with their pups and snakes their young. 'Uqba called to his men "leave them be, whilst they go away from us". When all the wild animals and insects were leaving,

[48] 'Abdulwāḥid Dhanūn Ṭāha, *The Muslim Conquest and Settlement of North Africa and Spain*, London and New York: Routledge, 1989, p. 59.

[49] Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam, *Futūḥ Miṣr*, p. 262.

[50] Zuwayla/ Zawīla – a town in Fazzan in the west of Libya.

[51] Ġadāmis – a town-oasis in the west of Libya, next to the Algerian and Tunisian borders.

[52] Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam, *Futūḥ Miṣr*, p. 264.

[53] Mohamed Talbi, 'Al-Ḳayrawān', *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 1997, Vol. 4, pp. 825.

[54] The Arabic word *sibā'* can describe a wide range of predators and dangerous animals, not necessarily lions.

[55] Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam, *Futūḥ Miṣr*, pp. 264–265.

[56] Al-Balāḏurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 228.

[57] Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam, *Futūḥ Miṣr*, pp. 265.

[58] Al-Balāḏurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 228.

[people] watched them. 'Uqba settled in the valley and ordered to cut down trees. Then the period of forty years came, when not a single scorpion or lion was seen there".[59]

Similarly to the other garrison-towns, the first place created in the new *miṣr* was a mosque. Then the quarters for the Arab tribes, who formed part of the Muslim army, were erected. One of the most astonishing stories given by the Arabic-Islamic chroniclers tells the planning of the area for the mosque. Al-Balāḏurī writes that 'Uqba saw the spot for the future Muslim place of worship in his dream[60]. Ibn 'Iḏārī's description is, as usual, more comprehensive than those of the older authors:

"People differed [in opinions] about the direction of qibla (direction of Mecca). They said, that people in the west will set qibla according to the qibla of this mosque [in Kairouan] therefore ['Uqba] had to try hard. They observed sunrises and sunsets and stars, both in winter and in summer. But people disagreed about their calculations even more. ['Uqba] was upset and he prayed to God Almighty to show him [the solution? (part of the original text missing here)]. Someone came to him in a dream and told him: "Take the banner and put it next to your neck [so your hands are free to pray]. You will hear 'Allāhu akbar!', which will not be heard by any other Muslims except yourself. Search for the place where 'Allāhu akbar!' comes from (lit. where 'Allāhu akbar!' will end) and this will be your qibla and your mihrab[61] and God will be glad with your commanding of the army, this town and mosque. The religion of the Lord will be preached with their help and the unfaithful will be gone". ['Uqba] woke up and he panicked. He performed the ritual ablution and began to pray. Some of the most noble inhabitants [of the town] were with him. When the dawn began to break and he had done two rak'as (movements in Muslim prayer), he heard 'Allāhu akbar!' before him and asked if anyone else could hear it. They said 'No'. Thus he knew it was a sign from God. He took a banner, put it on his neck and went in the direction from which the voice came. He found the place of mihrab, which is in the big mosque, and the call stopped. He put down the banner and said: 'This is your mihrab'".[62]

The miraculous circumstances surrounding the creation of the Kairouan mosque of 'Uqba Ibn Nāfi' began a long history of this building. Today it is one of the most important examples of early Arabic-Islamic architecture, although its present form dates back only to the 3rd c. of the Hijri era/9th century CE, when it was rebuilt under the Aghlabid dynasty.[63]

Conclusion

The description of the foundation of Kairouan – the final Arabic-Islamic *miṣr* analysed in this paper, differs from the previous ones, when it comes to the supernatural motifs included in the narrative. The text is abundant in legendary elements and motifs, such as the animals carrying

---

[59] Abū al-'Abbās Aḥmad Ibn Muḥammad Ibn 'Iḏārī al-Marrākušī, *Al-Bayān al-muġrib fī aḥbār al-Maġrib* [Book of the Amazing Story of the History of Maghreb], R. Dozy (ed.), Leiden: Brill, 1848, p. 13.

[60] Al-Balāḏurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 229.

[61] Mihrab – a niche in the wall of a mosque indicating the qibla (direction of Al-Ka'ba in Mecca, towards which every Muslim should pray).

[62] Ibn 'Iḏārī, *Al-Bayān al-muġrib*, pp. 13–14.

[63] Oleg Grabar, Richard Ettinghausen, Marilyn Jenkins-Medina, *Islamic Art and Architecture 650–1250*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001, p. 33.

out their young or the mysterious voice pointing 'Uqba in the direction of Mecca. The question arises – why is the case of Kairouan so different from the previous towns?

In attempting a response, we must try to answer the question of supernatural motifs by examining how the chronicles generally articulate the founding of the earliest Arabic-Islamic towns. The analysis of the description of the first two *miṣrs* (ar. *miṣrān*), Basra and Kufa, shows that there were no mythical elements in those stories – chroniclers focused on the standard and quite prosaic reasons for the foundation of these towns. Similar motifs are noticeable: searching for a suitable place and a decisive role played by the caliph 'Umar Ibn al-Ḥaṭṭāb.

The accounts of the foundation of Fustat are again slightly different from the narrations concerning the two towns founded before it – the description centers mostly on the fight with the Byzantines, with the creation of the town seemingly of secondary importance. Yet again, caliph 'Umar in Medina has the last word, even though 'Amr Ibn al-'Āṣ seems to be the main character in the story. Some legendary elements of the narrative (i.e. a dove building a nest atop Amr's tent) appear, although they are presented mainly in the writings of a very "pro-Egyptian" chronicler, Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam – who was creating, knowingly or not, the founding myth of his homeland.

Finally, descriptions of the foundation of Kairouan, the town located farthest from the capital cities of the Islamic Caliphate (Medina, Damascus and Baghdad) of any of the towns discussed above, are completely different from those relating to the establishment of Basra, Kufa and Fustat. Since this *miṣr* was created later than the others, 'Umar Ibn al-Ḥaṭṭāb was no longer a caliph, and the state was already ruled by the Umayyads. The famous commander 'Uqba Ibn Nāfi' was the hero in all of the accounts concerning the early history of Kairouan. The narrative is full of supernatural events, which are all associated with 'Uqba. He can be compared to Christian saints or other extraordinary characters, often connected with the foundation of a given town. To create a foundation myth, authors needed to link its creation to some exceptional individual or individuals. Considering the question from this perspective can make us realise that there were also 'saints' in the stories of the creation of the previous towns. Prophet companions, 'Umar (who up till this day is considered a great ruler, famous for his piety) and various commanders (who were, and still are, heroes of Islam), can be viewed as 'substitutes' for saints in analogous Western stories.

In descriptions of the foundation of later Arab-Muslim cities, e.g. Baghdad and Samarra, there are many supernatural motifs, in comparison to the general scarcity of these elements in accounts reporting early *miṣrs* (ar. *amṣār*). This might indicate that the reasons for the foundation of these later towns were different – they were imperial cities, capitals of the Islamic state. The stories of their origin are then a reflection of the glory of the Caliphate they represented. In the case of earliest Arab-Muslim garrison towns, such efforts were not necessary.

When, in the 3rd c. of the Hijri era/9th century CE, Arab-Muslim chroniclers did start to write the story of the beginnings of Islam, they in fact created the first 'foundation narratives' explaining the origins of Islamic religion, society and state. These authors described what had happened almost three centuries earlier and, due to a deficiency of possible reference materials, almost all we know about the beginnings of Arabic-Islamic towns is based on their annalist texts. Also, due to the above mentioned lack of other materials improving the credibility of these texts, we must question their reliability. The narrative that emerges from these accounts focuses on exploits of courageous and pious warriors and their commanders, who fought for their new, true religion and built the foundations of the Caliphate – where the chroniclers who described it were living. Maybe the

"orientalist" (used in the negative sense, as coined by Edward W. Said[64]) approach forcing us to compare the towns' origin stories with their Western equivalents, in which some legendary motifs are almost obligatory, is unjustified. Maybe the accounts of the foundation of the earliest Arabic-Islamic towns are "mythical", but not because of supernatural or miraculous events, but because of the way the authors of the chronicles described them, and at the same time created the earliest history of the Islamic state. In other words, the descriptions are mythical, even without miracles and other supernatural motifs, because their subjects relate to the vague origins of the Islamic religion and state. With almost no other sources describing that period of history, the chroniclers' narrative from the 3rd c. of the Hijri era/9th century CE formed the foundations for the development of Islam and the entire Muslim caliphate, with all of its settlements, lands and towns.

---

[64] Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1978.

Martyna Rusiniak-Karwat[*]

The Road to Freedom. Jewish Socialists in Shanghai

Abstract

This article aims to show the way to freedom of Bund organizations members, who escaped from the occupied Poland after the outbreak of the war, in the fall of 1939, and through Lithuania and the USSR arrived in Japan and later in Shanghai, then occupied by Japan, where they were to stay even until 1949. I want to show here what a great influence the decisions of the Soviet authorities had on the fate and survival of individual Jews – including active members of the Bund. The last part speaks about the Jewish socialists staying in Shanghai – a place that was culturally, linguistically and climatically different for the Eastern European Jews, comparing to their place of birth and past life, and it presents their political and social activities in the Shanghai ghetto.

The beginning of the war. Escapes to Lithuania

The outbreak of World War II, including the German and then the Soviet invasion of Poland, has led many people to decide to leave their places of residence. Numerous documents and memoirs describe whole groups migrating towards the eastern border of the Second Polish Republic. Jews constituted a large part amidst the refugees from the Western and Central Poland. Among them there were also those related to the milieu of the Jewish socialists – members of the Bund, the Tsukunft and other organizations related to the Bund.

The seemingly neutral Lithuania became a place of refugee for many leading activists from the ranks of the Bund Central Committee and the Tsukunft Central Committee, fleeing from the German invaders, who – after entering a number of cities – looked for Bundists. Besides, many of the Jewish socialists remembered the period of World War I, during which many party members found themselves in German prisons because of their political activities.

By Lithuania we mean the land which – prior to September 1939 – belonged to the Second Polish Republic, namely Vilnius and its surroundings. It was there that in 1897 not only Zionism but also the Bund were born. In Vilnius, the majority of the Bundists had either their relatives or party comrades whom they knew well from conferences, camps and mutual visits. Some of them had actually lived for a certain period of time in Vilnius and actively participated there in the life of the party.

Due to the large number of refugees, the so-called the *pabėgėliai*,[1] the larger cities of the Vilnius Region became soon overpopulated, which resulted in lack of lodgings and jobs, causing an increase in crime rates. After June 15, 1940, when the Red Army entered Vilnius, political repressions began – there was a wave of arrests of political organizations members, including Bundists, who were put on trials and often deported into the USSR.

---

[1] The term *Pabėgėliai* (Lithuanian) or *Bieżeniec* (Russian) – for a refugee – used to describe people who did not have Lithuanian or Soviet citizenship before 1939; here, refugees from Central and Western Poland.

Sugihara visas

Caught in a "dead-end" situation, many of the Jewish refugees decided to escape from the neutral Lithuania, both from the further consequences of the occupation as well as from the Soviet repressions. People realized that the Soviets had a huge influence on what was happening in Lithuania, even before June 21, 1940 (official incorporation of Lithuania was proclaimed as "joining" the Soviet Union).

Those, who decided to leave, attempted to obtain visas in different consulates but to no avail. Eventually, the Japanese consulate gave them a positive answer and hope to escape from the occupied Europe. The decision to embark on such a long journey to the unknown was motivated by the need to protect themselves and their loved ones – at any price – from the further consequences of the ongoing war. Moreover, the Lithuanian state was seeking to reduce the number of refugees since the outbreak of war in September 1939, trying to send them to other countries, including the UK, Spain, Palestine, and the Scandinavian countries.[2]

Chiune Sugihara – the then Japanese vice-consul in Kaunas, began issuing transit visas on July 9, 1940. It is worth mentioning that the visas were issued by the Japanese diplomat at a time when Japan was an ally of the Third Reich. The German state led an anti-Jewish policy, encouraging Japan to adopt it as well, which the latter refused to do. In consequence, by 1939 the Japanese government issued a permission for Jews to settle in Japan and Shanghai, remaining under its occupation.[3]

Parallelly to Sugihara's work, the Dutch honorary consul in Kaunas, Jan Zwartendijk, started issuing destination visas to the Dutch colony of Curacao. Visas issued by the two consuls solved to some extent the problem of the overcrowding of Lithuania, above all the Vilnius area. This was done with the quiet consent of both the Lithuanian and the Soviet side. The departures brought relief to the overcrowded cities, including Vilnius, and the authorities probably also hoped to get rid of the criminals. In this case, the Lithuanian Government was following the USSR directives.

For many people a refugee visa was the same as a ticket to freedom. In many testimonies of the time there are mentions of memories of long queues outside the consulate in Kaunas at the door of the Japanese vice-consul's, Chiune Sugihara's[4] office, as well as the honorary consul's of the Netherlands Jan Zwartendijk's, issuing visas to the Dutch colony of Curacao. Both diplomats were aware that such a large number of visas issued in short time could get them into trouble. By issuing visas, Sugihara risked not only compromising his career but also the fate of his own children as it proceeded without the consent of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

---

[2] Gintautas Surgailis, *Uchodźcy wojenni i polscy żołnierze internowani na Litwie w czasie II wojny światowej* [War refugees and Polish soldiers interned in Lithuania during WWII], Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy Erica and Wydawnictwo Tetragon, 2013, pp. 56–91.

[3] Olga Barbasiewicz, 'Konsul Sugihara Chiune a polscy Żydzi w Kownie w okresie 1939–1940' [Consul Sugihara Chiune and Polish Jews in Kaunas in the period 1939–1940], *Sprawy Narodowościowe. Seria Nowa*, No. 36, 2010, pp. 168–169; Joanna M. Guzik, *Stosunek Japonii do kwestii żydowskiej w latach 1932–1945* [Japan's attitude towards the Jewish question in the period 1932–1945], Cracow: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2013, passim.

[4] For more information on Sugihara's activities and his cooperation with Polish intelligence, see: Barbasiewicz, 'Konsul Sugihara Chiune…', pp. 173–175; Ewa Pałasz-Rutkowska and Andrzej T. Romer, 'Współpraca polsko-japońska w czasie II wojny światowej (Kowno, Sztokholm, Królewiec i Berlin 1939–1944)' [Polish-Japanese cooperation during World War II (Kaunas, Stockholm, Konigsberg and Berlin 1939–1944)], *Zeszyty Historyczne*, No. 110, 1994, pp. 4–23; Pałasz-Rutkowska and Romer, *Historia stosunków polsko-japońskich 1904–1945* [The history of Polish-Japanese relations 1904–1945], Warsaw: Wydawnictwo TRIO, 2009, pp. 251–264.

Both diplomats were also aware that the visas granted the right to travel to but did not guarantee the right to stay at the destination. It is estimated that between July 9 and August 31, 1940, Sugihara issued visas (according to the list prepared by him) to 2,139 names. It should be noted that one name could stand for a whole family. There were also cases, where visas were never used, e.g. because the holder got arrested by the NKVD, as in the case of Leo Oller, who at the time of the arrest had visas for the whole family.[5] According to the estimates made by Hillel Levin, Sugihara saved the lives of about 10,000 people.[6] According to Sugihara's wife – Yukiko Sugihara – these numbers ranged from 5,000 to 6,000 people. Around 95–97% of the refugees, who have benefited from the visas, were people of Jewish origin. When estimating the number of visas, Sugihara or his relatives could not include visas issued after his departure.[7]

Obtaining a visa was just the beginning. Next, one had to obtain a transit visa trough the Soviet Union, without which it was impossible to get to the port of Vladivostok. A visit at the local NKVD office aroused fear in many people but was also accompanied by many difficulties. Sometimes one had to wait a few days, before getting the answer. As Perla Frankel-Shalev wrote: "The hardest part of our preparations for the trip was to obtain visas from the Russians, who reluctantly agreed to let people go to other countries. Nina was responsible for the department of the NKVD, the Russian intelligence. Most people were afraid to enter the building, not only because of the fear of not being able to ever come out but also the fear of the terrible Nina".[8]

For many of the refugees, including the Bundists, leaving the "underground" and submitting an application for a transit visa through the Soviet Union was a kind of self-denunciation, which could result in arrest. Claiming visas was possible after coming out of the hiding. Writing a personal record, even one containing false information, for many members of the Bund, e.g. for Leon Oller, Joszke Lifszyc (Yoshke Lipshitz), was tantamount to the loss of freedom, for others, even a record of a real party activist did not constitute an obstacle to leaving.

Many of the petitioners were returned with a negative decision, some just for a moment before being arrested a few minutes or days later. Others, despite harassment and intimidation, received visas and embarked on a long journey. In many cases, people succeeded to obtain a visa through the falsification of their biographies, e.g. a longtime member of the Bund, who worked in the *Folks-Tseitung* newspaper, Josl Hammer, wrote that he was working as a fabrics producer.[9] For Zelda Bernstein, one of the members of the Warsaw Bund, wife of Matwiej (Mordechai Wolf) Bernstein, Bundist arrested in August 1940, a visa was a chance for a better life, with the financial help from her family from Chicago, where she ultimately wanted to go (she had an American visa). As she wrote in her personal record, she was raising her underage daughter, Masha, alone, after

---

[5] Lithuanian Special Archives (Lietuvos Ypatyngasis Archyvas), hereinafter referred to as LYA, ref. K.1–58.P–12996 SB.

[6] Hillel Levine, *Kim pan jest panie Sugihara* [Who are you Mr. Sugihara], Warsaw: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 2000, p. 9.

[7] Pałasz-Rutkowska and Romer, 'Współpraca polsko-japońska…', pp. 13–15; Guzik, *Stosunek* Japonii…, pp. 102–103. Sugihara did not stop issuing visas to Jews, even after moving to Berlin where he held the office of the Japanese consul from September 13, 1940 to February 28, 1941. He issued 69 visas in this period. See: *Flight and Rescue*, Washington: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Press, 2001, pp. 55–72.

[8] Perla Frankel-Shalev, 'Z Poznania do Kobe' [From Poznań to Kobe], *Miasteczko Poznań. Pismo społeczno-kulturalne*, No. 1–2, 2015, http://www.miasteczkopoznan.pl/node/428 (accessed 8 January 2016).

[9] *Flight and Rescue…*, p. 79.

having moved away from her much older husband, whom she could not stand because the marriage was arranged by their parents.[10]

It is difficult to determine why the Russians arrested some but softened their attitude towards the others (including party members), letting them go. There were instances in which the refugees encountered difficulties from the Soviets during further travel.[11] In many cases, the economy possibly won with the politics – as for example, the Soviet authorities charged Jews a double charge for Trans-Siberian Railway.[12]

Journey to the unknown? Race against time

Travel on the Trans-Siberian Railway to Vladivostok (sometimes with a change and a stay in Moscow) could also pose a threat and entail the possibility of denunciation. For many it was "to be or not to be", as well as an escape from imprisonment – as in the case of Shloyme-Fajvish Gilinski, sought after by the Vilnius NKVD.[13] Gilinsky, Abraham Brumberg, Majus Nowogrodzki,[14] and many other Bundists could afford the travel thanks to the Jewish Labour Committee cooperating with the Bund in New York, which also provided them with destination visas to the United States.[15]

Even with the right documents, the travelers could not be sure whether the Soviets would allow them to leave the USSR, or e.g. stop them in Vladivostok. A major obstacle was the lack of visas to the countries of destination. Ultimately, most of the Jews wanted to go to North America and Palestine. Many of the travelers did not have the money required the by the Japanese government to enter Japan. Besides, in Vladivostok they had to get an entry visa to Japan, which was issued at the Consulate of Japan in Moscow, and that process also took time.[16]

Going back in time to 1940, when no one knew what was going to happened next, we could ask "why leave"? What could a journey to "the unknown" bring? Choosing to escape from the occupiers, even through the "lion's mouth" (the whole USSR), the Bundist refugees were driven by the wish to begin another chapter in their lives. Those who managed to leave with Sugihara visas escaped death from the hands of both, the Soviets and then the Germans. We could even say that they won the ultimate prize – their lives. Most of the *Sugiharowcy*, as they called themselves years later, left the USSR when the Third Reich attacked the Soviet Union, and the German Einzatsgruppen marched into Lithuania and started murdering Jews, which was followed by the creation of ghettos. The survivors once again started to build their lives from scratch in a distant and exotic Asian country with foreign culture which they hoped to leave one day and reconnect

---

[10] The Lithuanian Central State Archives (Lietuvos Centrinis Valstybės Archyvas), hereinafter referred to as LCVA, ref. F.757, ap. 1/541.

[11] Pałasz-Rutkowska and Romer, *Historia stosunków polsko-japońskich…*, pp. 266–267 (Romer's encrypted telegram from February 2, 1941).

[12] Barbasiewicz, 'Konsul Sugihara Chiune…', p. 177.

[13] He was one of the founders and long-time directors of the Włodzimierz Medem's Sanatorium in Miedzeszyn near Warsaw for children suffering from tuberculosis. It took the Gilinskis about a year and half to get from Vilnius to New York.

[14] A recorded interview with Mayus [Marek] Nowogrodzki, given to Martyna Rusiniak-Karwat in August 2014, New York, owned by the author. M-s [Mayus Nowogrodzki], 'Sugihara – a kapitl fun di milkhome-yorn' [Sugihara – the period of the war], *Unzer Tsait*, No. 9, 1995, pp. 24–26.

[15] A recorded interview with Victor Gilinski – the son of Shloyme-Fajvish, given to Rusiniak-Karwat on July 28, 2014, in Los Angeles, owned by the author.

[16] More on the travels and all formalities related thereto, see: Guzik, *Stosunek* Japonii…, pp. 104–105.

with their loved ones. They were not only members of biological families but of a great Bund family, which after the Holocaust became even more important than before 1939.

Thanks to the list held by the members of the Bund family, we know that at least 140 Bund families fled from Europe with the visas issued by Sugihara. We do not know whether everyone on the list had original visas issued by the Japanese vice-consul, or counterfeit ones (because counterfeiting also took place).[17]

Japan – Shanghai. "Resting place"

After the arrival from Vladivostok to Tsuruga, the next step in the journey was the Japanese Kobe. For example, Roman (Abraham) Blit's journey from Vilnius to Kobe lasted from February 6 to 21, 1941.[18] The refugees were placed in rented homes in Kobe, Yokohama and Tokyo, for the time necessary to complete all the formalities before further journey. Sugihara visas were only valid for 10 days but thanks to the efforts of the Ambassador of the Polish Republic in Japan – Tadeusz Romer, the refugees were able to stay in Japan for three weeks, and sometimes, if necessary, for a longer period of time.[19] Shloyme Gilinski (with his wife Liuba and their son Victor), Mayus Nowogrodzki, Emanuel Pat all left from Kobe directly to the United States. Matwiej Bernstein's wife, Zelda, with their daughter, Masha, took a ship to Canada.[20]

It should be added that many of those people would not have succeeded, if not the another person who constituted a link in this "chain of help" for refugees – the then Polish ambassador in Tokyo Tadeusz Romer.[21] Thanks to his courage and perseverance, he managed to get the Polish refugees asylum visas to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Burma, and entry the certificates to Palestine. For those who stayed, he organized financial aid, establishing (with his wife) a Polish Support Committee for War Victims, and managed to get the permission for the refugees to stay in Shanghai,[22] where they were transferred (the ones that failed to go elsewhere) following the liquidation of the Polish Embassy in Tokyo.[23] Some of the Bund members were transferred from Kobe to Shanghai (occupied by Japan). Some of them even stayed there until 1949.[24]

According to Romer's report, we know that between autumn 1940 and summer 1941 about 2,300 Polish refugees arrived in Japan through Vladivostok. The outbreak of the Pacific War

---

[17] Guzik, *Stosunek Japonii*…, pp. 132–133.

[18] YIVO Archives (Institute for Jewish Research, New York), RG 1476, folder 21 – Roman Blit's Diary.

[19] Pałasz-Rutkowska and Romer, *Historia stosunków polsko-japońskich*…, pp. 268–269.

[20] A recorded interview with Masha Leon (née Bernstein) given to Rusiniak-Karwat on August 20, 2014, New York, owned by the author.

[21] Pałasz-Rutkowska and Romer, 'Współpraca polsko-japońska…', pp. 3–22; Guzik, *Stosunek Japonii*…, pp. 109–110.

[22] Barbasiewicz, 'Konsul Sugihara Chiune…', p. 182; Pałasz-Rutkowska and Romer, *Historia stosunków polsko-japońskich*…, pp. 231–232.

[23] Pałasz-Rutkowska and Romer, 'Współpraca polsko-japońska…', pp. 18–19; Pałasz-Rutkowska and Romer, *Historia stosunków polsko-japońskich*…, p. 215.

[24] On the subject of the creation of the Shanghai ghetto and its activity, see: Barbasiewicz, 'Migracje żydowskich uchodźców z Europy do Azji w czasie II wojny światowej. Getto w Szanghaju' [Migration of Jewish refugees from Europe to Asia during the WWII. Shanghai ghetto], in *Wokół problematyki migracyjnej. Kultura przyjęcia* [Around migration issues. Reception culture], Janusz Balicki and Mariusz Chamarczuk (eds), Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie, 2013, pp. 362–373.

_____

on December 7/8, 1941 stopped 972 refugees in Shanghai, where waiting for further emigration and a change in the situation, they began a new life.[25]

Bundists in Shanghai

The Jewish Quarter in Shanghai was established before 1939. Initially it was inhabited by Jews from Western Europe, mainly from Germany, who fled to Asia from the consequences of the Nazi politics. It was there that *Sugiharowcy*[26] ended up, among them there were about 70 Bundists.[27] However, the conditions have much deteriorated after February 18, 1943, when an area for Jews was separated in the Hongkew district. They were supposed to move there by May 18, 1943. Similarly to the ghettos in the German-occupied Europe, the inhabitants were prohibited from going outside, so shortly after that this area started to be called the "Shanghai ghetto". Same as in Vilnius from which they fled, they had to cope with overpopulation and severe housing conditions.[28] At the time, they started receiving pieces of information about the extermination of Jews in Europe. Despite all these constraints, they were trying to function normally.[29]

Among those 1,000 people from Poland who found themselves in Shanghai, Jewish organizations, including the Bund, soon began to rebirth and continue political, cultural and social activity.[30] A substitute of Polish *shtetl* was created, including the whole political division, associations of writers, actors, journalists, and religious organizations, even universities – yeshivas.[31] In the "Shanghai Jewish street", Bund constituted a numerically small group among other Zionist organizations. One of the main reasons for its existence and activity was to integrate the milieu of Jewish socialists, which was a reflection of the past times, family and the duration of the Jewish Diaspora coming from Poland.

During the war, there was hardly any continuity in the implementation of the political program of the Bund, including slogans against the creation of a Jewish state (Zionism).[32] The main goals set by the members of the Shanghai Committee were mutual assistance in surviving in the new conditions, the search for work and integration of the environment. In addition, the Bundists had their representatives in the Council of Refugees from Poland. Bundists received money not only from the Shanghai branch of the Joint[33] – a Jewish charity, but since August 1944, also from the Bund organizations operating in Switzerland and the United States. As the Bundists always fought for the rights of the weaker and poorer, in the "ghetto" they founded a Party's kitchen, which was not only a place to eat, but above all, a kind of home – "a club kitchen", in which the Bundists spent their entire days. Apart from that, they tried to keep in touch with other Bund centers,

_____

[25] Figures based on Romer's reports: Pałasz-Rutkowska and Romer, *Historia stosunków polsko-japońskich…*, p. 272.

[26] Barbasiewicz, 'Migracje żydowskich uchodźców z Europy do Azji…', pp. 371–372.

[27] Data based on: Shaul Gros, 'Bundistn in Shankhay' [Bundists in Shanghai], *Unzer Tsait*, No. 11/12, 1957, p. 91.

[28] Barbasiewicz, 'Migracje żydowskich uchodźców z Europy do Azji…, p. 366.

[29] Barbasiewicz, 'Konsul Sugihara Chiune…'; Guzik, *Stosunek* Japonii…, pp. 117–123 (on the financial support and the functioning of charities, see: pp. 139–152).

[30] At the same time it should be added that numerously similar organizations also appeared in other centers abroad, e.g. in Johannesburg or in Santa Rosa.

[31] A religious secondary school for Jewish boys.

[32] The ideology of the Bund is based on three pillars: *doykayt* (Yiddish – here-ness); *mishpokhedikayt* (Yiddish – family-ness); *Yiddishkayt* (Yiddish – Jewishness, what is related to the Yiddish culture and language).

[33] Full name: Joint Distribution Committee.

including the Bund Polish National Team in America, the Jewish Labour Committee, in the ranks of which there were also Polish Bundists.[34] This connection gave them hope for survival. Thanks to it, they obtained information about the situation on the war fronts, including the fate of Jews in Europe. As Shaul Gros wrote: "In the most difficult conditions, with closed doors and darkened windows, we used to hold group meetings. The aim was not to forget, despite the difficult conditions, who we are, to maintain a human face. Although numerically small, our group was growing in great integrity. There was not one action, in which we would not participate".[35]

It is difficult for us to reconstruct the structure of the Bund Committee in Shanghai. Probably, similarly to the ghettos of the occupied Europe, it was minimized. We do not have information on whether there was a party Presidium. One of the leading figures among the Bund was probably the pre-war member of the Bund in Warsaw – Berl Ambaras.[36] Others included: Anka and Hershel Bachrach, Engelsberg, Janek Gross (actually Saul Grosfater), Josl Mlotek, A. Hammer, Dina Lejbczkes and Blatt.[37]

The end of the war did not bring the end of the Jewish settlement in Shanghai, nor of the Bund's activities. After the war and the opening of the "ghetto", in March 1945, the first open meeting of the Bund in Shanghai was held – in commemoration of Henryk Erlich and Victor Alter who had been murdered in Soviet prisons. A library named after Alter and Erlich was opened. Berl Ambaras gave a speech during the ceremony.[38] In 1946, they celebrated the third anniversary of the outbreak of the Warsaw ghetto uprising, led by Hershel Bachrach together with Y. Pajn and Mlotek.[39] Other Jewish refugees from Poland also took part in the ceremony and the commemorations organized by the Bund.

With such a limited number of members of the Bund in Shanghai, one of the forms of their post-war activities was keeping up "diplomatic" correspondence with other Bund centers scattered around the world. So apart from the courtesies and greetings sent on the occasion of anniversaries of the party's existence, as in the case of Poland, the members looked for information about their loved ones who for various reasons decided to remain in the occupied Europe.[40] Moreover, thanks to the financial assistance and visas they received, party activists in Shanghai could find a new place of residence, where they also joined the ranks of the Bund. Some even waited until 1949 to leave. The destination depended on the destination visa. Most of them settled permanently in Australia, others in Canada and America,[41] only a few went to Israel.[42]

---

[34] 'A briv fun Shankhay' [A letter from Shanghai], *Unzer Tsait*, No. 9, 1941, pp. 42–43.

[35] Quoted from: Gros, 'Bundistn in...', p. 93.

[36] Berl Ambaras (born on January 1, 1923 in Warsaw), in 1936 he graduated from CISzO (Central Jewish School Organization) in Warsaw. He stayed in Shanghai until 1948, then he moved to New York, USA, where he worked in the Jewish Labour Committee. In Shanghai he kept up correspondence on behalf of the Bund with other Bundist organizations scattered around the world and the Jewish Labour Committee. Information: YIVO, Ref. RG 1400 ME 17, File 33a.

[37] YIVO, ref. RG 1458, file 23, Files 23–27.

[38] 'A bibliotek oyfn nomen fun H. Erlich un V. Alter in Shankhay' [Library of the name of H. Erlich and V. Alter in Shanghai], *Unzer Tsait*, No. 7, 1946, p. 41.

[39] 'Ondenk-fayerung in Shankhay tsum 3-tn yortog fun oyfshtand in varshever geto' [Commemoration of the third anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in Shanghai], *Unzer Tsait*, No. 7, 1946, p. 44.

[40] Archiwum Akt Nowych, *Ogólnożydowski Związek Robotniczy "Bund" w Polsce 1900–1948* [General Jewish Labour Bund in Poland 1900–1948], ref. 30 / IV-3, vol. 8, k. 1 (letter from A. Mlotek to Abram Stolar from November 19, 1946).

[41] Gros, 'Bundistn in...', pp. 91–93.

[42] YIVO, Mkm 15.145–25.

Conclusions

The fate of one man is sometimes the result of actions and intentions of others, sometimes of the politics of great powers. In this case, we can even say that thanks to the "mercy" of the NKVD, many Jews, including Bundists, escaped extermination from the hands of the German invader and could then continue their political work. Shanghai, then under the occupation of Japan – an ally of the Third Reich, became a refuge for many European Jews. The activities of Bund in Shanghai are an example that in extreme conditions, in isolation from the roots one can still be true to one's ideals and create a semblance of normality, for instance, by further continuing to work for a political organization.

Agnieszka Syliwoniuk-Wapowska[*]

Identity and Inventions of the Past in the City Space: the Case of Dubai

Abstract

The paper focuses on the process of inventing and interpreting history in order to create national identity in the United Arab Emirates. The analysis is illustrated with the case of Dubai. The manifestations of the policy of nation-building are present in the city space and the main goal of the article is to show how space is used in this kind of creations. The paper is mostly based on qualitative research – direct observations and free-form interviews – that was conducted in Dubai in February 2015.

Introduction

The concept of cultural identity is multi-layered and multi-faceted. Many Emiratis feel a strong bond with their emirate of origin, the Emirati nation and the United Arab Emirates as a state, the Gulf as a part of the Arab world and with the Arab world as a whole. There are also two more aspects of the cultural identity of the Emiratis – tribalism and religion – which are of significant importance. The paper, however, focuses on the process of inventing and interpreting history in order to create national identity in the United Arab Emirates. The analysis will be illustrated with the case of Dubai. The manifestations of the policy of nation-building are present in the city space and the main goal of the article is to show how space is used in this kind of creations. Nevertheless, the Emirati national identity cannot be considered separately from selected components of identity which relate to a certain emirate and the Gulf. These elements will be also included in the analysis. The paper is based on qualitative research – mostly direct observations and free-form interviews – that was conducted in Dubai in February 2015.[1]

The past and space in the United Arab Emirates

The first assumption to be made is that there is a link between the past, space and identity. Perhaps the words of Nadia Rahman illustrate the core of the issue more precisely: "[p]lace is both the locus of events and a trigger for memory. That is what people hold on to so that they do not forget their roots".[2] Space can therefore be perceived as means of conveying the notions of the past.

Michael Gilsenan arguments that:

---

[*] Arabist and political scientist, doctor of social science in political science; Pope John Paul II State School of Higher Education in Biała Podlaska, Faculty of Economics and Technical Sciences, Chair of Economics and Management, Department of National Security.

[1] The descriptions of all the places indicated in the paper are made on the basis of direct observations and free-form interviews conducted in Dubai in February 2015. Although English is not an official language of the United Arab Emirates, it is widely used by the foreigners as well as the Emiratis themselves. As – even in the formal context – the names of the people, districts of Dubai, museums, heritage sites and even metro stations are frequently written in English (or transcribed from Arabic into English), in the article I use these versions instead of the Arabic ones.

[2] Nadia Rahman, 'Place and Space in the Memory of the United Arab Emirates Elders', in *Popular Culture and Political Identity in the Arab Gulf States*, Alanoud Alsharekh and Robert Springborg (eds), London: SAQI in association with London Middle East Institute at SOAS, 2008, p. 37.

"[s]pace is not a kind of pure, given form but is a set of structures and relations that have to be learned, absorbed into what is taken for granted, and constantly acquired in everyday life. [...] Space is crucial in thinking about culture and ideology because it is where ideology and culture take on physical existence and representations. These material forms embody, reinforce, and order universes of power and belief. People learn them, absorb them as part of the «as it is», everyday nature of things. Definitions of those universes may also be imposed and maintained by certain groups over others, and those groups will therefore have quite different experiences and apprehensions of space".[3]

Hastings Donnan and Thomas M. Wilson seem to support this view as they indicate that space may be perceived as a kind of conceptual map, something that organizes the social life. It is an idea which concerns physical and cultural relations of things.[4] Space can therefore be interpreted as an important factor that shapes the human mind. It makes people learn certain regularities of social life, ways of thinking and seeing the reality that surrounds them. Space can be used in order to convey messages and this feature is of crucial meaning in terms of politics – including the politics of identity and nation-building.

Interpretations of the past – historical or mythic – are essential components of national narrations. According to Eric Hobsbawm, nations tend to appear much older than they really are. In order to justify their claims, nations show that they are deeply rooted in the past and that their history dates back to the ancient times. They support their point of view by making references to 'invented traditions'.[5] As the author explains: "«Invented tradition» is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past".[6]

The policy of nation-building and constructing national identity in the United Arab Emirates can be seen as a good example of the above-mentioned regularity. The marriage of history – both contemporary and remote – and city space plays a leading role in this process. In Dubai one can observe many manifestations and interpretations of the past. In some parts of the city the visitor may have the impression that space reminds him of the old days of the emirate. On more than one occasion it is more an illusion than the reality as many places are new but their aim is to present certain inventions of the past.

It has to be stressed that the Arab monarchies of the Gulf are sometimes stereotyped as 'countries without history'.[7] Such a concept may indicate that only the modern times are perceived as important and, therefore, worth mentioning. The international image of the Gulf monarchies as wealthy and rapidly developing countries tends to confirm this view. From the standpoint of national identity, however, what really counts is not the 'real past' which is 'based on facts', but the 'invented past' which results from various interpretations and inventions of the

---

[3] Michael Gilsenan, *Recognizing Islam. Religion and Society in the Modern Middle East*, London–New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000, p. 187.

[4] Hastings Donnan and Thomas M. Wilson, *Granice tożsamości, narodu, państwa* [Borders. Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State], Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2007, p. 25.

[5] Eric Hobsbawm, 'Introduction: Inventing Traditions', in *The Invention of Tradition*, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp 11–14.

[6] Ibid., p. 1.

[7] See: Ahmed Kanna, 'Dubai in a Jagged World', *Middle East Report*, No. 243, Summer 2007, p. 23.

historical events. The past can therefore be seen as some kind of creation which manifests itself in various fields. And the space of the city is one of these areas.

The history of the emirates as independent monarchies is not a short one, however, the history of the Emirati statehood it is not very long. The union between six emirates was formed in 1971 and the seventh emirate – Ras al-Khaimah – decided to join it in 1972. The state was already established yet there was an essential question to be raised: the creation of the Emirati nation which would make the state stronger. The subjects of the seven monarchs had to be integrated into one nation. In order to achieve this goal a new social and cultural identity had to be created. The reason behind this logic is that social identity – defined as a vision of an individual as a member of a group – results in responsibility and stronger motivation to support common issues. It also involves people in the matters of their group.[8]

Being a federal state composed of seven emirates – Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah and Umm al-Qaiwain – the United Arab Emirates boasts an original political system which underscores both the unity of the state and the independence of each emirate. This duality is also reflected in the Emirati policy of identity.

Following this line of thought, one can conclude that the policy of constructing national identity in the United Arab Emirates can be analysed with reference to two dimensions: unity–diversity and past–modernity. The first one of them relates to a key principle which can be noticed in the Emirati politics: unity and cooperation of all the monarchies in order to achieve common goals on the one hand and respect for autonomous politics of each and every emirate on the other hand. As for the second dimension, it is based on the inclusion of both historical and modern elements in the process of creating the Emirati national identity. Among the former one can enumerate: tribalism, the heritage of Bedouins, falconry, pearl diving and trade while the latter would be: prosperity and rapid economic and technologic development. The borderline between 'what is old' and 'what is new' is the moment of the discovery of oil.

Oil revenues contributed significantly to deep changes not only in the Emirati economy but also in the social structure and culture of the state. Lubna Ahmed al-Kazi points out that the nationals of all the Gulf monarchies feel the significance of the economic changes and are aware of their social consequences. Furthermore, they perceive the possible loss of their distinctive identity as one of potential repercussions of this state of affairs.[9] Possible loss of identity is a serious problem as it may turn into a form of annihilation of a community.

Going further, Fred H. Lawson and Hasan M. al-Naboodah indicate that cultural pluralism was a feature of the Emirati society since the rise of the state. The authors claim that the inflow of petrodollars contributed to the diminishment of indigenous popular culture. One of the reasons of this situation was that those of the Emiratis who – quite suddenly – became rich abandoned their old, traditional lifestyle and adopted a new, modern one. The other phenomenon that had a negative impact on the local culture was the inflow of expatriate labourers who brought their symbols,

---

[8] Piotr Oleś, 'Tożsamość osobista i społeczna – płynna czy określona?' [Individual and social identity – fluent or definite?], in *Tożsamość. Trudne pytanie kim jestem* [Identity. A difficult question 'who am I'], Wiesław Łukaszewski, Dariusz Doliński, Aleksandra Fila-Jankowska, Tomasz Maruszewski, Agnieszka Niedźwieńska, Piotr Oleś, Tomasz Szkudlarek, Sopot: Smak Słowa, 2012, pp. 118–119.

[9] Lubna Ahmed al-Kazi, 'Gulf Societies: Coexistence of Tradition and Modernity', in *Popular Culture and Political Identity in the Arab Gulf States…*, p. 178.

practices and idioms of their countries of origin with them.[10] In the effect, by the early 1990s popular culture in the United Arab Emirates was composed mostly of foreign elements. In search for a solution of this problem, the elites of the monarchies took measures aimed at making the Emiratis more aware of their history and popular culture. A network of institutions was created in order to encourage greater appreciation for national heritage. These bodies promote local culture, conduct scientific research, organize educative activities and cultural events. Archeological excavations and restoration works which are to preserve the national heritage are also within the scope of such policy.[11] It has to be stressed, however, that actions of this kind are not distinctive of the United Arab Emirates but rather reflect a broader tendency which is present also in the other Gulf monarchies.[12]

Dubai and its inhabitants

The history of Dubai dates back to the third decade of the 19th century when members of the Banu Yas tribe settled in these lands. The leaders of the tribe belonged to the Al Maktoum family which today rules the emirate of Dubai. The settlers earned their living mainly as pearl divers and traders. As the years passed, the city expanded and experienced fast growth which was due mostly to two factors – modern trade[13] and oil production.[14]

It is worth mentioning that Alexander Melamid names five groups of people whose presence had the most significant impact on the city and its development. The first of them is the ruling dynasty which has relatively high level of openness to Western influences. The second group is composed of the Arabs who are indigenous people of these lands and are characterized by close attachment to religion, tradition and tribalism. They are claimed to expect preferential treatment by the monarch. The third community is formed by merchants[15] who need adequate and efficient trade policy as well as proper infrastructure. In the fourth group there are all those who work for oil and

---

[10] Jerzy Zdanowski claims that in the era of globalization cities turned into places where the local cultures clash with the global culture. In order to justify his view, the author uses the example of Dubai. Many immigrant communities continue to follow their own cultural practices, have their own institutions, religions and culinary taste. The expatriates maintain close contact with those members of their families who stayed in their countries of origin. Various communities which make up the social structure of Dubai meet each other mostly in the sphere of consumption. The main feature of such encounters is confrontation between diverse components of communal identities. Jerzy Zdanowski, *Historia społeczeństw Bliskiego Wschodu w XX wieku* [History of societies of the Middle East in XX century], Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Askon, 2013, p. 246. In Dubai cultural differences are often followed by economic ones as the Emiratis are generally better off than great majority of the expatriates. In my opinion a place where cultural and economic divergences are clearly visible is a shopping centre. Most of the shop assistants, waiters and other personnel of a mall are of foreign origin whereas the Emiratis can rather be found among rich customers. On the basis of direct observations, Dubai, February 2015.

[11] Fred H. Lawson and Hasan M. al-Naboodah, 'Heritage and Cultural Nationalism in the United Arab Emirates', in *Popular Culture and Political Identity in the Arab Gulf States*…, pp. 15–22, 26–28.

[12] For instance, similar steps are undertaken in Bahrain. See: Mohammed A. Alkhozai, 'An Aspect of Cultural Development in Bahrain: Archeology and the Restoration of Historical Sites', in *Popular Culture and Political Identity in the Arab Gulf States*…, p. 71–84.

[13] It is worth mentioning that since 1960s Dubai remains one of the most important gold markets in the world. See: Alexander Melamid, 'Dubai City', *Geographical Review*, Vol. 79, No 3, July 1989, p. 346.

[14] In 1958 crude oil was discovered in Abu Dhabi and in 1969 – in Dubai. See: Kanna, 'Dubai in a Jagged...', p. 23.

[15] It has to be said that in terms of origin the merchants did not form a homogenous group. Among them there were the Arabs who were sometimes perceived as some kind of bourgeoisie, the British subjects from India and Persians. See: Fatma Al-Sayegh, 'Merchant's Role in a Changing Society: The Case of Dubai, 1900-90', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 1, January 1998, p. 88.

gas industry and in the fifth one – expatriate labourers, mainly of Asiatic origin, who form the major part of the workforce.[16]

The inflow of foreign workforce has a strong impact on the social life in the United Arab Emirates, especially in Dubai which is perceived as particularly attractive place to work in. Yasser Elsheshtawy points out that Dubai's social structure is characterized by a serious demographic imbalance between the Emirati nationals and foreign-born inhabitants of the city. According to some estimates quoted by the author, local population forms around 10% of the whole and, furthermore, some sources suggest that the percentage is actually much lower (4–5%). There is also a large disproportion between the male/female ratio. Women form only around ¼ of the whole society.[17] Dubai is widely known for its cosmopolitanism and the key feature of its inhabitants is diversity which has to be understood in terms of national or ethnic origin, social status and wealth. In such circumstances social inequalities seem to be particularly visible. Nevertheless, the scale of these differences is so large that it poses a threat to national identity of the Emiratis.

Living the heritage

In Dubai one can find two kinds of places created in order to 'remind' the Emiratis of their history and bear testimony to rapid social and economic changes and their influence on the daily life of the inhabitants of the city. The first type of such institutions are museums which exhibit everyday objects, tools and various items used by, for instance, craftsmen whereas the institutions of the second sort are heritage places which focus on certain aspects of human life.

Many museums and heritage sites of Dubai are situated near Dubai Creek, in such quarters as Shindagha, Deira and Bur Dubai. Located in the old districts of the city, these places became an inherent part of its landscape. Although some of the buildings that house institutions of this kind were restored and the other ones were constructed not many years ago, they fit the neighbourhood quite well and the visitor may have an illusive feeling that they are indeed very old. In this manner reconstructed past enters the everyday life of the city and its inhabitants.

The authorities of Dubai spare no efforts in preserving local history and culture and the effects of their actions are clearly visible. In the city one can find many examples of sites which allude to the old times. As this paper tackles the relation between identity, space and interpretations of the past, it does not seem to be out of place to present shortly a few institutions of this kind.

The Heritage Village and the Diving Village can be listed among the most vivid examples of Dubai's places of interest. Both the sites are located in Shindagha historical neigbourhood and were opened in 1997. The former houses exhibitions which depict various aspects of everyday life of the inhabitants of the Gulf in the old days, whereas the latter presents the maritime heritage of the emirate, especially pearl diving. The exhibitions in the two sites consist mainly of reconstructions which show, for instance, the work of craftsmen, pearl divers, falconers or traders. It is, therefore, a ready-made – and, one must add, somehow superficial – vision of the past which is conveyed to the visitor. In the Heritage Village there is also an entertainment area where one can enjoy performances of folklore singing or dancing, witness how various professions are practiced and try typical dishes of the Emirati cuisine. In such a way a person who visits

---

[16] Melamid, 'Dubai City...', p. 345.

[17] Yasser Elsheshtawy, 'Transitory Sites: Mapping Dubai's 'Forgotten' Urban Spaces', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research,* Vol. 32, Issue 4, December 2008, pp. 970–972.

the place gets an opportunity not only to 'see' the heritage but to 'live it', with all the senses involved. There is also a touch of consumption in the village as the traditional products and souvenirs are sold there.

In the immediate vicinity of the two villages there is Sheikh Saeed Al Maktoum House which was built in 1896 as a residence of the Al Maktoum family. Currently the building houses a museum which documents the history of Dubai and its ruling dynasty. One can see there a collection of coins, post stamps, documents and old photographs of the city, however, the most interesting is probably the house itself. Simple yet original architectural solutions which can be found in the interiors of the residence give an idea of life of the people in the pre-industrial era. It has to be stressed that many of these solutions are typical for the Gulf and were applied also in the other old houses of the region.[18] Near the house there are three more museums to be mentioned, nevertheless, perhaps there is no need to describe them in detail. These are: Traditional Architecture Museum, Camel Museum and Horse Museum.

The neighbourhood of the aforementioned heritage sites is full of restaurants, which serve typical Arabic – but not necessarily Emirati – dishes. The pleasant atmosphere of the area induces the visitors to enjoy their time. Furthermore, the place is organized in a manner which creates a feeling that the past is within easy reach.

Having a walk in the old part of Dubai one will notice that quite the same concept as the one of Sheikh Saeed Al Maktoum House can be found in the Al Ahmadiyya School. Since 1994, the museum brings closer the history of education in Dubai.

The Al Fahidi Historical Neighbourhood is another luminous example of a place which combines (invented) past and present. It is a complex of old-styled buildings constructed by the use of old techniques and traditional materials. The buildings are used for various purposes, some of them house restaurants or cafes while inside the others one can find shops or ateliers of different kind. The Al Fahidi Historical Neighbourhood also hosts a number of cultural events. Nearby, there is another site which is worth seeing – the Dubai Museum 'Al Fahidi Fort' which was opened in 1971. As the name says, the museum is situated within the walls of an old fortress which dates back to 18th century, however, in 1995 a new, underground part was added to the old one. Apart from the fort itself, a visitor has an opportunity to see a wide range of everyday objects used in the pre-oil era (including collections of traditional weapons and musical instruments), reconstructions (amongst them the one of an interior of a typical house in the Gulf and another one of desert), and exhibitions depicturing the old days of Dubai.

The aim of both museums and heritage places is to encourage the public to explore the past. Nevertheless, there is a slight yet meaningful difference in the way these institutions carry out their mission. Exhibits in the museums are presented statically and accompanied by more or less detailed descriptions and, therefore, a visitor is looking at these objects from the distance which is marked by the perspective of not only time but also space. The heritage sites show the past differently. The exhibitions take on the form of more extended scenes which present typical images of daily life

---

[18] Perhaps one of the most ingenious solutions that can be found in Dubai – and in the Persian Gulf – is the *badgir* (the windcatcher). It is a traditional mechanism of Persian origin which serves for ventilation. It consists of a tower with the summit open (most frequently on four sides) which has an internal vertical partition. As it is a system that uses wind for cooling purposes, it is sometimes called 'a wind tower'. See: D. Tanzj, C. Clemente, F. Cumo, G. Piras, 'Sustainable solutions for spa design, Dubai, United Arab Emirates: building envelope optimization and impact energy evaluation' in *Eco-Architecture III: Harmonisation Between Architecture and Nature*, Santiago Hernández, Carlos A. Brebbia, Willy P. De Wilde (eds), WIT Press, 2010, pp. 283–284.

in Dubai in the pre-oil era. Thanks to the real size of figures and objects which form part of the scenes and – in many cases – the use of multimedia, the visitor has a feeling as if he participated in the presented activities himself. The illusion of reality is intensified by the play of sounds and lights. In the heritage sites the exhibitions are accompanied by areas in which one can eat traditional Emirati dishes, see craftsmen in their work and buy handmade products. The way in which history is presented enables the visitor not only to 'see the past' but to 'experience the past'. The heritage sites are places where education, entertainment and consumption meet. It has to be stressed, however, that although the exhibitions in the heritage sites present the elements of daily life in an attractive manner which is easy to understand and to remember, they do not encourage to a deep intellectual reflection over the old days.

Furthermore, places of this kind play an important role in the process of creating collective memory which is one of the elements of the content of cultural identity. It is done by several means, of which one seems to be particularly interesting: commemorating the past by events. Andrzej Szpociński explains that an event can be understood as any visual (and aural) sensation in which a consumer seeks pleasure, visual information or meaning – that is: a spectacle, show, happening, performance or reconstruction. These forms of visual expression may include – or not – new visual technologies and tools. Such means of making reference to the past are growing in popularity nowadays. When the past is commemorated by events the consciousness of history is complemented by a set of behaviours that take place in certain time and space – that is in such circumstances that are reconstructed especially for that particular purpose.[19] Following this line of thought, it is important to notice that reconstructions of historical events require extensive knowledge of not only historical facts but also details of circumstances (time, place) in which certain events took place, the atmosphere of those times. Shows or scenes that one may see in the heritage sites of Dubai do not necessarily meet these criteria, however, they do have an educative value. By showing fragments of erstwhile reality such presentations may encourage the visitor to deepen his knowledge on history and traditions of the Emiratis.

On the basis of the above argument one may reach a conclusion that the common feature of all the institutions mentioned in the paper is that they tell the story of Dubai and the Gulf region in a smooth and attractive way which enables a visitor to assimilate it with ease. A heritage site or a museum can therefore be a useful and, at the same time, effective tool to convey an official interpretation of historical events.

Outside museums: history in the daily life

Walking around Dubai one can find many references to the history of the city and its inhabitants. Public space gives us a plenty of examples of such representations and, what is important, these are not only the old style buildings. Architecture of Dubai abounds in interpretations of traditional patterns and solutions. The past is invented and enters the modernity.

In traditional culture of the Arab people the *suq* (the market) plays an important role. It is not only the place of exchange – of goods, services or information – but also a space which has crucial meaning for social relations. It is a place where people build their relations with the others

---

[19] Andrzej Szpociński, 'Widowiska przeszłości. Pamięć jako wydarzenie' [Spectacles of the past. Memory as event], in *Kultura jako pamięć. Posttradycyjne znaczenie przeszłości* [Culture as memory. Posttraditional meaning of the past], Elżbieta Hałas (ed), Kraków: Nomos, 2012, pp. 64–65.

and negotiate their social status.[20] The market is has its own rules of behaviour which form some kind of social convention.[21] As Michael Gilsenan puts it, '[t]he suq is intensely personal and social'.[22]

Thanks to the fact that the *suq* is associated with traditional lifestyle it is also used in the process of interpreting the history. As in every big city of the Middle East, in Dubai there are many old markets[23] visited by the local people as well as by tourists. However, in the consequence of rapid development of the city and rising level of wealth of its inhabitants, the patterns of consumption changed. This, in turn, demanded changes in the city landscape. What can be seen in Dubai is a growing number of shopping centres which offer wide range of shops and services for various groups of consumers. Dubai is perceived as a perfect place for shopping and its shopping centres are perhaps among most frequently visited ones in the world. Furthermore, architectural references to the Arab traditions can be seen in the interiors of some of them. These two facts are of particular importance in terms of use of imagined traditions in the process of creating the Emirati national identity.

The Dubai Mall ranks among the most recognized shopping centres not only in the city but also in the United Arab Emirates. It is also a place which gives a sense of how tradition can be interpreted in terms of consumption. Walking around the Dubai Mall a visitor – a consumer – can easily notice that one of the sections is designed as a *suq*. It is, however, not a reconstruction of a traditional market but rather a modern variation of this theme. In fact the interior design of this section has more to do with an image of a *suq* that can be found in stories or tales than with a real market visited daily by the inhabitants of Dubai or any other city of the Gulf. In the shops located in this part of the shopping centre one can buy arts and crafts, gold jewellery or oriental carpets but – unlike in traditional *suq* – the items are sold at a fixed price. Furthermore, the *suq* in the Dubai Mall does not reflect probably the most important and characteristic feature of the place – the unique atmosphere of the Arab market. The new *suq* is not a place where people meet, talk and exchange information but a place where they sell, buy and demonstrate the affluence they have reached.[24] It is an illusion of traditional market and its nature is purely consumerist. This should not surprise anyone as the shopping centres are deeply rooted in the lifestyle which is an outcome of globalization.[25] It has to be stressed, though, that the transposition of the concept of *suq*

---

[20] In his analysis of the *suq* in Moroccan town of Sefrou, Clifford Geertz shows its role as a place where people – in the course of daily interactions – negotiate their own social status. The author shows how the notion of *nisba* (a kind of adjective that relates to a noun) is used in setting one's place in the structure of these interactions. Clifford Geertz, 'Suq: the bazaar economy in Sefrou', in *Meaning and order in Moroccan society. Three essays in cultural analysis*, Clifford Geertz, Hildred Geertz and Lawrence Rosen, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 142–150.

[21] Anthropologically, the market may sometimes be perceived as a kind of space which has (almost) sacred meaning. According to Michael Gilsenan, there is an interplay between the *suq* and the mosque and sometimes, in terms of social meaning, the former may be seen as an extension of the latter. Gilsenan, *Recognizing Islam....*, pp. 173–180.

[22] Ibid., p. 177.

[23] For instance: the Old Souk of Deira, the Spice Souk, the Gold Souk and Naif Souk.

[24] The shopping centres are 'the new town square, where Emiratis can see and be seen by their fellow citizens engaged in the widespread pastime of shopping'. Nada Mourtada-Sabbah, Mohammed al-Mutawa, John W. Fox, Tim Walters, 'Media as Social Matrix in the United Arab Emirates' in *Popular Culture and Political Identity in the Arab Gulf States…*, p. 134.

[25] Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska indicates that shopping centres are the most recognizable elements of the culture of consumption and are always identified with the West. Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska, *Muzułmańska kultura konsumpcyjna* [Muslim consumerist culture], Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademickie Dialog, 2011, p. 188–191. The

to a shopping centre illustrates a tendency to highlight the elements of local culture. I dare to say that the fact that such places – the *suq*-like parts in shopping centres – are created and enjoy considerable popularity reflects some kind of yearning for 'the old good times' and traditional lifestyle. This nice memory is nowadays invented and presented to the public in a more up-to-date form. The Dubai Mall is certainly not the only place where one can observe this trend.[26]

The past can be also presented in the form of a combination of historical facts and fairy tales – Ibn Battuta Mall is a case in point. Born in Tangiers in 14th century, Ibn Battuta is perhaps most well-know of the Arabic travellers of all time. He is widely recognized not only in the Arab world but also in other parts of the globe. During his journeys Ibn Battuta visited both Muslim and non-Islamic lands – to show the variety of the destinations he saw, it is enough to list the Middle East, North and East Africa, India or China. Being a sophisticated traveller, Ibn Battuta had also an impressive predisposition to observe social relations and cultural phenomena that were present in the countries he visited.[27] The shopping centre refers to the figure of the outstanding adventurer and his life by its interior design. It is divided into six sections – Andalusia Court, China Court, Egypt Court, India Court, Persia Court and Tunisia Court – which represent six countries visited by Ibn Battuta. Each of the courts is designed in way which reflects most recognizable features of architecture of the countries in question in the old days. At the same time each and every part of the shopping centre gives the visitor the impression of being a part of not only a magical world of consumption but also of a tale, a story about distant places. Nevertheless, an interesting feature of the Ibn Battuta Mall is that it has, apart from its consumerist character, some kind of educational value. Walking about the shopping centre a consumer can see exhibits – for instance everyday objects or tools – that allow him to learn some details about Ibn Battuta, his times and the history of the Arab world. It should be stressed that the exhibits and their descriptions do not turn the shopping centre into a museum of any sort but they do, however, influence the curiosity of some people who see them. Furthermore, from my point of view such reference to the famous Arabic traveller – even if purely consumerist – shows that the United Arab Emirates share the heritage and history of the Arab world as a whole. After all, Ibn Battuta is an icon of the Arab culture.

New interpretations of traditional concepts can be seen also in the Dubai metro. The Al Ghubaiba metro station is an example which illustrates the phenomenon. As the station is close to the places of interest in Shindagha, its architectural design relates directly to the old style of the district. One can easily notice the lifts that provide access to the metro station resemble the wind towers. In this manner a symbol of modernity became an inherent part of the ancient part of the city.

Another metro station which is worth mentioning in the context of historical policy is Khalid Bin Al Waleed. The interior of the station combines avant-garde design with memoirs of the past. In the inner part of the building the futuristic fixtures go along with old photographs that depicture daily life in the old times. It is my conviction that the station renders the atmosphere of Dubai –

---

global/local duality in terms of space is also noticed by Yasser Elsheshtawy. Elsheshtawy, 'Transitory Sites...', p. 969–970.

[26] Another example of such place is Souk Madinat Jumeirah in Dubai. The abovementioned trend can be also observed in the other parts of the Arab world. For instance, in Casablanca there is a shopping centre – the Morocco Mall – which also has the *suq* section. The concept is quite the same as in the case of the Dubai Mall.

[27] The descriptions of Ibn Battuta's observations can be found in his book *A gift to Those Who Contemplate the Wonders of Cities and Marvels of Traveling*. The book is commonly known as *The Travels of Ibn Battuta*.

a city which is both ultramodern and traditional. There is one more aspect to be noticed: being a transfer station, Khalid Bin Al Waleed is visited by hundreds of people each day.

The examples of shopping centres and the metro stations support the argument that architectural references to the past are sometimes made in a less obvious way. The key feature of such places can be described as an interplay of the past, present and future that can be felt easily.

Modern Dubai: the past as the point of reference for the future

In the last few decades Dubai experienced a plenty of rapid changes. The city expanded both in terms of geography and demography[28], becoming an icon of modernity and cosmopolitanism. Having a glance at the buildings which are most commonly associated with the city one may find that most of them are either supermodern skyscrapers or constructions which – in one way or another – go beyond the canons of contemporary architecture.[29] It is enough to mention such buildings as: the skyscrapers Burj Khalifa (the tallest building in the world, with over 160 stories), Cayan Tower (the tower with a twist of 90 degrees) and Emirates Towers, the hotels Burj al Arab (the building in a shape of the sail of a ship, which stands on artificial island), Jumeira Beach Hotel or the artificial archipelago Palm Jumeira.

The aforementioned constructions boast a plenty of original and bold architectural solutions as well as unique design. They symbolize not only the modernity but also some values which are important for the Emirati society such as development and prosperity. These qualities are also vital from the point of view of national identity and the process of its creation. According to the United Arab Emirates Vision 2021[30], the Emirati nation is ambitious and confident, knowledgeable and innovative. It should be stressed that these features – which are undoubtedly highly desirable for a nation – are connected to the present and to the future. It is, however, essential to notice that their assessment is only possible in relation to the past. They become visible when the present (and the anticipated future) is compared to the past. In terms of space the iconic Burj Khalifa seems to be a good example to illustrate this regularity. The tallest and one of the most innovative skyscrapers of the globe offers its visitors a possibility of having an impressive 360-degree view of Dubai from one of its highest decks. At the same level it also hosts an exhibition which is made of a set of photographs that depict Dubai in the old days. The exhibition is arranged in such a way which enables the visitor to make comparisons between the present reality seen from the window or terrace (modern city full of movement, wide arteries, a large number of skyscrapers, gardens, pools and fountains) and the reality of the past times (desert with poor flora, few human settlements). One has to admit the view of today's Dubai is stunning but by comparison with the

---

[28] According to the data presented by Dubai Statistics Center in 1988 the population of the Emirate of Dubai was 59 000. As a result of constant demographic growth, in 2000 this number reached 862 387 and in 2015 – 2446675. *Population by Sex – Emirate of Dubai,* Dubai Statistics Center, https://www.dsc.gov.ae/ Report/DSC_SYB_2015_01%20_%2001.pdf (accessed 21 March 2017). Being the largest city of the emirate, Dubai inscribes itself within this tendency.

[29] On the basis of free-form interviews and direct observations, Dubai, February 2015.

[30] United Arab Emirates Vision 2021 is a national agenda launched in 2010 by Vice-President and Prime Minister of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed Ibn Rashid Al Maktoum. The document contains six national priorities which should be fulfilled in order to achieve the goal – that is to make the UAE one of the best countries of the world by the Golden Jubilee of the Union. The national priorities refer to: national identity, judiciary, economy, environment and infrastructure, education and health care. The government of the UAE should focus its actions on these sectors as they are of key importance for the state and nation. *Ru'yat al-Imārāt 2021*, https://www.vision2021.ae/sites/default/files/uae_vision-arabic.pdf (accessed 23 March 2017).

space which is shown at the picture it seems to be even more imposing. In this manner the past serves as the reference point for the present and future.

Conclusions

The space of Dubai abounds in emanations of the past. Interestingly, references to the history of the emirate are sometimes presented in a rather unexpected manner – it is enough to mention the examples of the metro stations. These are the places where modernity and tradition meet quite unexpectedly. Heritage sites and museums play a more conventional role in the policy of creating the Emirati national identity and revitalizing the local culture as they show the life of the inhabitants of the emirate in the old days. It must be stressed, though, that the way these institutions fulfill their mission is efficient. Both heritage sites and museums present official narrations and interpretations of the past which is important not only when it comes to nation-building process but also in terms of creating a bond between nation and state. The history of the Emirati people is presented as inextricably intertwined with the history of the state and also, in broader sense, the land. The space is used to remind the people of their ancestral past and heritage. They are to be proud that they are Emirati – and also the inhabitants of Dubai.

Another point to be made is that these actions are directed not only toward the Emirati nationals or the inhabitants of Dubai but also toward the visitors of the city. The picture of Dubai and its people reflected in the city space is assimilated by tourists and foreigners and it affects their manner of thinking and perception of the United Arab Emirates. A positive image of the state and the city may bear fruit in the future.

Dubai is presented as a city of modernity and prosperity. These qualities are depicted in the manner of thinking of the Emirati nation and its identity. However, it is essential to notice that it is also the place where the present and future meet the past. In the city space national heritage and history coexist with the symbols of development. All these values – the ones that relate to the past and the ones that are connected to the present or the anticipated future – are of equal importance from the perspective of the national identity of the Emiratis. And all these features find their reflections in the space of Dubai. In this manner the city space reminds its inhabitants and visitors of not only the past of Dubai but also of some vital values that are present in the content of the Emirati national identity.

Olga Barbasiewicz[*]
Robert Zając[**]

Book review

Peacebuilding and Security Sector Governance, Yuji Uesugi (ed.), Münster:
Lit Verlag, 2014, 200 pp.

This book was published in 2014 as a part of the research conducted within the Hiroshima University Partnership Project for Peace Building and Capacity Development (HiPeC). General structure of the book consists of series of articles creating two sets of three chapters each. First group, consisting of Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand, depicts how states behave during the process of political transition and democratization. The second one is devoted to the problem of building a functioning and independent nation after the conflict ends. It presents the cases of Nepal, Sri Lanka and Timor-Leste.

By building such a wide array of intriguing case studies, the compilation manages to illustrate processes described in the introduction. Each article focuses on an issue that closely relates to the chosen region and supplements the general theory.

The process of peacebuilding is in this publication defined as "the human endeavor to prevent the recurrence of the conflict"[1] as well as "the art of creating trust and building confidence".[2] The hypothesis provided by Osamu Yoshida says that almost all conflicts originate from the local level, therefore all the projects that aim at solving such clashes should be shared among the wider public. For sure this book provides us with cases worth analyzing and statements helping readers to gain knowledge on the reasons and potential solutions for such conflicts and peacebuilding.

The editor of the book, Yuji Uesugi, specifies the aim of the publication as facilitation of a critical dialogue.[3] He specifically targets two distinct sets of issues. First, he focuses on the dialogue revolving about nexus between the security sector governance and peacebuilding. Secondly, he targets the gap between the practice and research in peacebuilding processes and how to overcome it.

The very first chapter by Samsu Rizal Panggabean is devoted to Indonesia and the difficulties it faces with the governance of Aceh region. *Democratization, Peace Processes and Security Sector Governance in Indonesia: The Case of Aceh* highlights the core aspect of democracy – elections and its importance in keeping a relatively stable situation in any region. It also tackles the issue of police rebranding, or at the very least an attempt to change the negative

* Assistant professor at the Institute of the Middle and Far East, Jagiellonian University, e-mail: olga.barbasiewicz@uj.edu.pl.
** Student at the Institute of the Middle and Far East, Jagiellonian University, e-mail: robert.marcin.zajac@gmail.com.
[1] Osamu Yoshida, 'Foreword', in *Peacebuilding and Security Sector Governance*, Yuji Uesugi (ed.), Münster: Lit Verlag, 2014, p. VII.
[2] Ibidem.
[3] Uesugi, 'Introduction', in *Peacebuilding...*, p. 1.

connotation it once had. The author also asks two questions closely related to the security sector reform (SSR), namely: "to what extent did democratization in post-Suharto Indonesia contribute to the peace process in Aceh" and "to what extent did the peace process in the Aceh transform security sector governance in the province"? The author carefully lays out notable moment of history and the brink of *dwifungsi* (also known as dual function doctrine of armed forces) and explains how the *reformasi* movement shaped the security sector. Only then he moves towards the particular region of his interest to give a brief summary of the negotiations between government and insurgency movement. He explains why previous arrangements have failed and the reason that Memorandum of understanding have been upheld. The chapter ends with a presentation of relevant security sector actors in Aceh and provides readers with an agreeable answer to the core questions.

Next chapter, written by Carolina G. Hernandez, provides a valuable perspective on the transformation of an authoritarian regime towards a democratic one during the third wave of democratization. By looking at the case of Philippines, with the region of Mindanao emphasized, the author provides few variants of a carefully written definitions describing what security sector is. For the sake of her study, she favors the moderate approach. By following this train of thoughts, she defines what security itself is and how it connects with the human security issue. *Peacebuilding and Security Sector Governance in the Philippines* makes a bold statement, yet a clarified one, that good security sector governance requires a functioning democracy. It then gives a clear distinction between statutory and non-statutory security actors. Then the article gives a strong case for the importance of civilian oversight institutions and presents a wide array of such organs. While the article provides few challenges that Philippines will most likely face in the future, it simply could not take into account the election of Rodrigo Duterte and how would it change the political landscape.

The third chapter entitled *Crossing the Threshold: Thailand's Path to Rethinking Security Sector Governance* investigates the April-May 2010 crisis and the questions that it gave birth to. Keokam Kraisoraphong suggests that the violent crisis in Southern Thailand was not an ungrounded case but a simple reflection of certain issues with the security sector. She paints the historical landscape that lead to current predicaments by dividing the years 1932–2007 in five distinct periods. The author gives a detailed explanation of how the military accumulated such an enormous power and how the country's development was deeply intertwined with the army. After giving an account of the aforementioned cases and Thailand's attempts at peacebuilding, Kraisoraphong explains the inefficiency of such actions with a transparent model of an aristocracy-king-monarchy triangle of influence. In the end she proves that reforming the Thai security sector must not me be based in on the external forces but should rather originate from the endogenous political movements.

Next chapter is the first from the second group concerning the post-conflict state-building. *Understanding the Security Sector of Nepal: Challenges and Prospects for Reform* by Shiva Hari Dahal gives an overview of the ongoing discourse on security while explaining the challenges and prescribing possible strategies for a reasonable security governance. The author tackles the issue of confronting the peacetime system with the remnants of the wartime one and points towards a well-written constitution as one of the solutions. He explains all the difficulties and reasons for which the process of its creation is being prolonged. The article also depicts the deep influence of India over both the Nepalese society and its army. It moves toward painting the relations between the security and the development of a country by showing the scale of budget's expenditure

on military issues. Furthermore, the author convincingly proves that the current legal framework for the oversight on army is obsolete and points towards the creation of a properly functioning justice system that through enacting a proper judgment would restore some of the government's legitimacy.

Fifth chapter written by S.I. Keethaponcalan revolves around the security sector's governance in Sri Lanka. The author creates a novel analytical framework that examines the pressure on the state emanating from 'secondary' security actors. The article lays a clear division between both – the core institutions and the aforementioned one. It also claims that despite taking care of root cause of the problem, the situation is still far from stable. The presented thesis is supplemented by a distinction between positive and negative way of governing of the security sector. The article concludes with simple yet seemingly efficient and logical recommendations for transitioning from the latter towards the former. *Trajectories of Security Sector Governance in Sri Lanka* is an intriguing addition to the book and might create a whole new tool to the arsenal of future researchers.

Peacebuilding and Security Sector Governance in Timor-Leste by Nelson Belo is the final chapter of this compilation. It presents a difficult approach as to how a society changes after 24 years of a permanent and overtly violent struggle. The author then moves towards the vast challenges that such a young country will have to face. He builds a case towards the existence of a strong justice system being one of the core elements keeping society away from dependence upon traditional methods of executing justice. Furthermore, he presents the reasons for which the police forces are viewed as unprofessional. The article accounts much of that towards the issue of the officers' loyalty who are much closer to their local communities rather than serving the society as a whole. The research also presents different duties that the police takes in order to rebuild the trust in state's authorities. These actions mostly contribute towards building a more positive image of the armed forces as a reliable source of security. Furthermore, the author creates a detailed description of all contributors to the sector. He then lists many challenges that Timor-Leste will face in this department, starting with the great influence of strong leaders and the necessity of reintegrating former soldiers back into the society. He ends with a statement that the manner of treatment of non-state actors is as important as a proper management of the state ones.

Yuji Uesugi takes each study into an account and creates a concrete summary of key concepts in this anthology. He crafts a conclusion and answers the two questions that a reader might pose after reading each article. He completes the book by giving some strong remarks about DDR process as well as how to approach the problematic aspects of the security system reform.

Editorial Principles

Hemispheres. Studies on Cultures and Societies is a quarterly journal published online. Articles from current and recent issues are available at: **hemispheres.iksiopan.pl**

Articles submitted to the journal should not be submitted elsewhere. Authors are responsible for obtaining permission to publish any material under copyright (see the 'Ghostwriting' and 'Statement for authors' files on www.iksio.pan.pl/hemispheres).

Articles must be in English or French. The article should begin with an abstract of up to 100 words, followed by five keywords which should describe the article's main arguments and conclusions. Manuscript length should be between 30,000 and 40,000 characters (including the main text, footnotes, and spaces), and should be typed on A4 paper, in 12-point Times New Roman font, with ample margins on all sides.

The entire manuscript must be 1½-spaced and numbered consecutively. The title, the author's name and her/his institutional affiliation should be at the top of the first page (do not use headnotes). All titles in non-Roman alphabets must be transliterated. An English translation of other language titles should be provided in square brackets after the title.

Footnotes at the bottom of the text page are obligatory, and they should be typed in 10-point Times New Roman font and single spaced. Quotations must be numbered consecutively throughout the text and the style of note citation should conform with the following examples.

1. Ivor Wilks, *Wa and Wala. Islam and Polity in North-Western Ghana*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 70.
2. John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, *Islam and Democracy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 23.
3. Raymond Hinnebusch, 'Syria under Bashar: Between Economic Reform and Nationalist Realpolitik', in *Syrian Foreign Policy and the United States: from Bush to Obama*, Raymond Hinnebusch, Marwan J. Kabalan, Bassma Kodmani and David Lesch (eds), St. Andrews: University of St. Andrews Centre for Syrian Studies, 2010, p. 20.
4. Zygmunt Komorowski, *Kultury Afryki Czarnej* [Cultures of Black Africa], Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1994, pp. 89–90.
5. Larry J. Dimond, 'Rethinking of Civil Society', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 5, No. 3, July 1994, p. 4.
6. 'Tunisia's al-Nahda to Form Party', *Aljazeera*, 1 March 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com /news/%20middleeast/2011/03/201131132812266381.html (accessed 10 November 2011).
7. *Sudan Peace Act Report: 21 April 2003*, Washington DC: Department of State, 2003, www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rpt/2003/19790.htm (accessed 23 August 2013).

When notes to the same work follow after interruption, use the author's last name and a shortened title of the book or article. **Do not use op.cit.**

8. Hinnebusch, 'Syria under Bashar…', pp. 20, 22.
9. Ibid., p. 186.
10. Ibidem.

A bibliography should be included at the end of the paper. It should list, alphabetically by author's last name, all the books and articles cited in footnotes.

More substantial editing will be returned to the author for approval before publication. No rewriting will be allowed at the proof stage. Authors will be asked to return the material to the editorial office within 4 days of receipt, or approval will be assumed.

Articles are qualified on the basis of a double-blind review process by external referees (see the 'Peer Review Process' file at www.iksiopan.pl/hemispheres).

Manuscripts and all editorial correspondence should be addressed to **hemispheres@iksio.pan.pl.**